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iii Summary 
Palliative care is unusual as a specialty within health care in that it has 
its own philosophy, which is summarised in the WHO definition of palliative 
care. This philosophy has influenced clinical practice so that specialist palliative 
care differs significantly from other aspects of health care. The thesis is a 
critique of that philosophy. It examines the moral problems inherent in 
implementing the philosophy in clinical practice. It concludes with suggestions 
for improvements which could be made to the philosophy statement so as to 
influence clinical care for the better. 
The World Health Organisation definition of palliative care states that: 
'Palliative care is the active total care of patients whose disease is not 
responsive to curative treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms, and of 
psychological, social and spiritual problems is paramount. The goal of palliative 
care is achievement of the best possible quality of life for patients and their 
families.' 
Five separate theses are discussed in chapters 1 to 5.  Each is related to 
an aspect of the philosophy statement. 
Thesis 1 is that decisions regarding the use of treatment to control 
symptoms or prolong life do not need to depend on complex doctrines such as 
double effect, but instead ought to be based on weighing up the benefits, harms 
and risks of treatment. The distinctions between killing and letting die, and 
between intending and foreseeing an adverse effect of treatment are 
discussed. It is suggested that the methods of casuistry are helpful in both 
education and clinical practice for resolving the moral problems arising in 
iv treatment decisions. Further discussion of casuistry and its similarity to 
methods of decision making in health care is contained in the Appendix. 
Thesis 2 is that the relatives should not be an equal part of the remit of 
care. It is argued that whilst there is a special relationship, founded on an 
implicit promise and associated with specific obligations, between patients and 
health care professionals, this special relationship should not be extended to 
relatives of the patient. The interests of relatives should not be pursued at the 
expense of the patient's health interests, and improving the quality of life of 
relatives should not be regarded as an intrinsic aim of palliative care. 
Thesis 3 is that quality of life as a global concept should not be used. 
Since quality of life depends on  many incommensurable factors, and it is not 
possible to construct a coherent account of quality of life from our everyday 
notions of what it means, it is not possible to construct a quality of life scale. 
Quantitative assessment of global quality of life should be abandoned, and 
instead qualitative studies on the impact of specialist palliative care on the 
various domains of quality of life should be undertaken. 
Thesis 4 is that there are constraints of expertise and propriety on 
attempts to influence the patient's psychological, social and spiritual well-being. 
It is argued that neither a close personal relationship, nor the counsellor/client 
relationship, should serve as a model for the professional/patient relationship. 
Instead of seeking to control the patient's psycho-social and spiritual state, 
professionals should offer explanations and advice in a sensitive and friendly 
manner. 
Thesis 5 is that within health care there ought to be a just distribution of 
resources to specialist palliative care, and then among terminally ill patients 
regardless of their illness. Professionals should see themselves as trustees of 
resources, with responsibility to ration scarce specialist palliative care 
v resources so that a decent minimum of care is available to all. The use of the 
health-economics concept of the Quality Adjusted Life Year to allocate 
resources to specialist palliative care is not morally justifiable. It is argued that 
patients' ability to benefit from specialist care is the criterion which ought to be 
used when allocating that care between individual patients. 
Chapter 6 includes a discussion on the desirability of a philosophy 
statement for palliative care. It also introduces a suggestion for a new 
philosophy statement which might bring about improvements in patient care by 
using concepts which are well understood, and by stating clearly the role of 
health care professionals in relation to patients and their families. 
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xi Introduction:  The  Aim  and  the  Objectives 
0.1  The  Aim 
There are two concepts involved in the title of my thesis: the idea that 
there is a philosophy of palliative care and then a critique of the same. The 
main aim of this thesis then is to offer a critique of the philosophy of palliative 
care. 
Palliative care is unusual in that it has an explicit philosophy. This is 
summarised in the following World Health Organisation definition: 
'Palliative care is the active total care of patients whose disease is not 
responsive to curative treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms, and of 
psychological, social and spiritual problems is paramount. The goal of palliative 
care is the achievement of the best possible quality of life for patients and their 
families.'1 
This philosophy is expressed in practice, especially as staff often work in 
specialist units (sometimes called hospices) set apart from the main stream of 
health care. My questioning of this philosophy has arisen directly out of clinical 
experience, both in such a specialist unit and also in a general hospital and 
primary care settings. In addition to this practical experience participation in a 
general professional ethics committee and in the teaching of health care 
professionals has encouraged me to examine specialist palliative care from 
other perspectives. This thesis is the outcome of my attempt to examine the 
relationship of specialist palliative care to health care more generally. 
I am using the term 'critique' in Kant's sense when he speaks, for 
example, of a 'critique of pure reason'. His critique of pure reason consists in 
his attempt to establish the limits of pure reason. He is obviously not dismissing 
the whole concept but is investigating it with the aim of discovering what can 
and cannot be established by pure reason. In a similar way I am not rejecting 
the whole idea of a philosophy of palliative care but attempting to establish its 
1 strong and weak points. This is particularly important in view of the facts earlier 
mentioned: that those working in palliative care characteristically see 
themselves as different from other health care practitioners, and that they often 
work in locations which are physically separate from both primary and 
secondary health care. Before proceeding to detailed discussion of my critique 
some general points will be made regarding the 'philosophy' of palliative care, 
its impact on clinical practice, and possible links to major philosophical issues. 
Firstly, it is important to ask whether the WHO is really expressing a 
'philosophy' at all  (0.2), and secondly, what it is that this statement is striving to 
achieve (0.3). 
0.2  A  'philosophy'  of  palliative  care. 
It might be objected that the WHO is not offering a 'philosophy' of 
palliative care at all but simply a definition. But what kind of definition is it? It  is 
certainly much more than a dictionary definition. The Oxford English Dictionary 
reports that (from 1588) the verb 'to palliate' means 'to alleviate the symptoms 
of a disease, to mitigate the sufferings of, to ease'. It would follow that palliative 
care is simply the branch of health care concerned with that activity, just as 
orthopaedics is the branch concerned with correcting injuries and deformities of 
bones. The O.E.D. is simply reporting how the words 'palliative' or 'to palliate' 
are used in ordinary speech. The WHO is clearly going well beyond this. 
Nearer the mark is the 'definition' of 'health' offered by the WHO in  1946: 
'Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.' 
This definition has several characteristics. Firstly, it is not reporting how 
the word 'health' is used; rather it is attempting to say something about the 
thing itself - health. Secondly, it is attempting to persuade us to see health in a 
much wider way than at that period had been common (i.e .. involving the social 
and psychological). Thirdly, it was intended to influence health care practice, or, 
2 in other words, it had a normative function. To say all this, however, is 
tantamount to saying that the WHO definition of health was introducing, via a 
persuasive definition of health, a philosophy of health promotion. 
All the above characteristics hold of the WHO 'definition' of palliative 
care: it is not reporting word usage; it is saying something about the activity of 
palliative care; and it is intended to influence practice. In short, the WHO 
definition is really the condensation of a 'philosophy'. But what sense of 
'philosophy' is involved? Let us look at typical descriptions of 'philosophy'. 
David Raphael acknowledges that philosophy itself cannot be easily or 
simply defined, but notes that its main purpose 'is the critical examination of 
assumptions and arguments.'2 He states that the critical evaluation 
characteristic of philosophy begins as a critique of assumptions but then goes 
on to a critique of argument. It is in this sense of philosophy that I shall offer a 
critique of palliative care. On the other hand, the WHO statement of the 
philosophy of palliative care is certainly not a critical evaluation of assumptions, 
but instead is more like a list of assumptions. Nothing in the statement 
encourages questioning of those assumptions. It seems that the statement is 
not really 'philosophical' in  Raphael's sense at all, although perhaps it is related 
to philosophy in the sense that it is at least a list of assumptions. 
Carl Elliott, a doctor and a philosopher now working as a bioethicist, in 
describing what he calls the 'traditional conception' of philosophy, provides us 
with a second account of philosophy. He notes that 'the aim of philosophy is to 
provide us with general explanations of the way things are, and ultimate 
justifications for our ethical and epistemological practices.'3 But the WHO 
statement does not explain the way things are in relation to palliative care, 
although it might perhaps be making a statement about the way it thinks things 
ought to be. Furthermore, it certainly does not provide us with any justification, 
ultimate or otherwise, for those assumptions. So it is not a philosophy 
statement in Elliott's sense either. 
3 There is a third, a non-professional, sense of 'philosophy'. This is found 
in claims such as 'My philosophy, or my philosophy of life, is .... ' followed by a 
list of beliefs about what I ought to do, attitudes to others etc. This sense of 
'philosophy' is close to the idea of an ideology, since it is a statement of 
assumptions, beliefs or values held by a group of people, in this case by the 
WHO representing health care professionals who specialise in palliative care. 
This sense of 'philosophy' resembles a statement of a religious faith. 
Firstly, it is similar to a list of articles of a faith in that no grounds for the 
assertions it makes are given, and indeed it may not be possible to prove the 
assertions in the way that statements of fact can be proved. Secondly, it 
resembles a faith in that the assertions are thought to express truths which are 
self-evident to professionals working in the field. Thirdly, like a faith, those 
truths are not self-evident to all people, for it is clear that many professionals 
working outside the context of specialist palliative care might not accept or 
follow the normative content of the statement. For example, they would not 
consider that the relatives should form part of the remit of care. Fourthly, it 
resembles a faith in that critics may be viewed as a threat, or perhaps are to be 
pitied, since they are unable to accept the truths self-evident to others. Lastly, it 
resembles a faith in that its articles declare not just what one ought to believe 
but how one ought to live. 
Supporters of the WHO statement might object that this interpretation is 
unfair. They might claim that it is not strictly a statement of faith but rather that it 
presents a reasoned point of view, and that in  being a reasoned point of view it 
is more like a philosophy according to Raphael, Elliott and many others. They 
might argue that there is evidence from clinical practice to support the ideology 
it describes. They might further state that commitment to this ideology follows 
from general beliefs in the importance of close relationships and of 
psychological as well as physical well-being. But if it is indeed a reasoned point 
of view then it should be open to a critique. Such a critique would examine its 
4 assumptions and any arguments supporting them. Palliative care does not have 
such a critique, but I aim to offer one in this thesis. 
0.3  The  normative  function  of  a  philosophy  of  palliative  care. 
If we assume for the moment that the 'philosophy' of palliative care is in 
fact a description of an ideology (which mayor may not be well-founded on 
reason and evidence) then it is possible to address the second question, 
namely what is the explicit statement of the ideology aiming to achieve. It 
seems that its function is not simply to state what palliative care is about, by 
way of a description of the way things are, but rather to fulfil a normative 
function in stating the way that things ought to be.  It is a statement about how 
health care professionals ought to care for people whose illness is incurable 
and progressive to the pOint of death. Now a statement about how health care 
professionals ought to care for people as they approach death can take us 
along two different paths, which I shall call the 'theoretical' and the 'practical'. 
These terms must not be taken to be  mutually exclusive for, as we shall see, 
the theoretical can have practical implications, and the practical makes 
theoretical assumptions. The paths can overlap. 
0.3.i  Theoretical  questions 
Since the ideology proposed relates to care at the end of life and implies 
acceptance of our mortality, then any discussion about palliative care occurs 
against the background of those major questions which relate to the meaning of 
life and death, or what constitutes a good life (and perhaps death) for man. The 
answers to such questions are what Carl Elliott calls 'ultimate justifications' for 
our actions, or ultimate explanations of what we think is right. The ideology of 
palliative care does not contain explicit statements about the meaning of life or 
what constitutes a good life for man. Yet it is intended to influence, and does 
influence, the way professionals care for patients at the end of life. In so doing it 
5 implies that there is a 'right way of living and dying' for both patients and 
professionals. But the 'right way of living and dying' must depend on answers to 
the ultimate questions about what makes life worthwhile and about the meaning 
of life. It is perhaps strange that the ideology describes the right way of living 
and dying in the context of palliative care without even alluding to those 
ultimate questions or providing any answers to them. The explanation may be 
that the origins of palliative philosophy are religious but the practitioners wish 
their special type of care to be widely available so they do not make explicit the 
metaphysical beliefs on which the philosophy is based. 
It is not just in the sphere of palliative care that the ultimate questions are 
not acknowledged or addressed. Carl Elliott comments that 'Bioethics assumes 
it is about conduct and character, or,  more narrowly, human obligations to each 
other', but that it does not ask or answer the ultimate questions about the 
meaning of life.4Instead, it asks only indirectly and unsatisfactorily (via the 
'quality of life' concept), what makes life worth living. He goes on to ask 'Is it 
possible to think philosophically about the sense of life, and how it is situated in 
relation to other lives and to the institutions of medicine, once we have given up 
on ultimate explanations?'5 This is an important question, for the ideologies of 
palliative care and of bioethics are each attempting to influence people into the 
'right way of living and dying' without producing the answers and explanations 
which must act as reasons why one life or death should be better than any 
other life or death. Is it reasonable for the ideology of palliative care, and for 
bioethics in general, to try to influence people into living life in a particular way 
without basing the values and assumptions put forward on answers to the 
ultimate questions? 
If one postulates that in order to provide a basis for trying to influence the 
way of living of others one must put forward some answers to the ultimate 
questions, then those answers must be framed in some way and used to justify 
principles or rules which govern behaviour. Such a framework of answers (and 
6 perhaps explanations) has been called an 'ethical theory', from which are 
derived principles and rules to govern individual actions. 
Childress and Beauchamp in their influential work 'Principles of 
Bioethics' proposed four principles which, even though not fully grounded in a 
comprehensive theory, were said to be sufficient as a framework for describing 
ethical problems and reaching solutions.6 They discussed at some length the 
characteristics of an ideal ethical theory, but noted that to date no single theory 
had satisfied them all. 
Daniel Callahan, in describing the impact of ethical theory in the 
development of bioethics, states that 'Good ethical theory, it was believed, 
should be objective, rational, internally coherent and consistent, universally 
applicable, detached from individual self-interest, and impersonal in its capacity 
to transcend the particularities of time and culture.'? He suggests that one might 
be able to frame a logically consistent moral theory, but he notes that 'the hard 
part is to devise a theory that can readily join universality and the moral 
complexity of everyday life. A flavor of cruel fanaticism seems often to go with 
single-minded, unnuanced applications of, say, utilitarian or deontological 
theory, running roughshod over that complexity and usually devoid of moral 
imagination and sensitivity.' 
Even if it were possible to produce an ethical theory satisfying the criteria 
suggested by Callahan and discussed by Childress and Beauchamp, how 
successful would its application be in practice? Carl Elliott asserts that if the 
task/aim of applied ethics is to apply normative moral theories to ethical 
problems, then it does not work. He notes that 'the practical difficulty with 
applying ethical theories is that ordinary people pay little attention to theories 
when they make their moral decisions. Moral decisions are, of course, 
influenced often by theories of one sort or another, but this influence is usually 
indirect rather than explicit.'8 My own experience teaching medical ethics to 
doctors and nurses is that whilst one may present them with the four principles 
7 as an ethical framework, and even if one links the principles with the rules of 
established professional codes, health care professionals do not seem to 'use' 
the principles in the resolution of cases discussed immediately afterwards. 
Moreover, if one analyses a case simply in terms of principles one is likely to 
overlook many details which are morally relevant. Simplifying a case so that it 
appears as a conflict between, for example, the principles of respect for 
autonomy and beneficence, may make it appear easier to resolve, but that 
appearance may be misleading and may hide morally important features of the 
case. 
So given the difficulties of coming up with a satisfactory ethical theory, 
and having discovered that health care professionals are unlikely to use such a 
theory when resolving the moral problems of particular cases, and that there 
are disadvantages and difficulties inherent in the application of theory to 
individual cases, then perhaps it is acceptable to discuss the ethical problems 
of health care and palliative care without appeal to ultimate answers about the 
meaning of life and the good life for man. However intellectually attractive the 
construction of a universal ethical theory may seem, it is impractical in health 
care and palliative care, and should be left to pure moral philosophy. I shall now 
turn to the practical interpretation of the philosophy of palliative care. 
O.3.ii  Practical  questions 
The 'philosophy' of palliative care influences clinical practice - that is to 
say, it influences the decisions people actually make. If those decisions are 
made, as Elliott suggests, without explicit reference to ethical theory, then how 
are they made, and how does the expressed ideology of palliative care 
influence practice? 
Whenever clinicians recognise a moral problem in a particular case, they 
describe the case to themselves and hopefully to the rest of the team. This 
description is drawn against the background of the ideology of palliative care 
8 which forms part of their cultural background and values. What part does the 
description of the case play in the resolution of the problem, and what part does 
the ideology of palliative care play? 
When faced with the task of sorting out what is wrong, and what is to be 
done, health care practitioners first listen to the patient's story. The importance 
of listening to the patient's account has been much stressed recently in articles 
on 'narrative based medicine'. This idea is not new, for the importance of 
'taking a good history', which simply means listening carefully to the patient's 
own account, has been stressed in medical education for many years. 
Proponents of narrative based medicine suggest that having listened attentively 
to that story, a professional interpretation of it is constructed and recorded.9 
The way that the story is described, interpreted and recorded is part of the 
analysis of any moral problems inherent in the case. 
Carl Elliott notes that 'the real work of bioethics, more often than not, is 
in listening, reading, and watching carefully in order to judge what is important 
and what is not.'10 He goes on to stress that the way in which we recount the 
story of the case plays naturally into a certain way of thinking about it. He 
concludes that 'When we use language, we are not just representing the world; 
we are interpreting it, and in some ways, creating it .... the manner in which a 
bioethicist writes the case narrative - the setting, the narrator's voice, the use of 
irony and so on - will reflect his or her own philosophical arguments.'11 
A purely objective presentation of a case is not possible, for such a 
presentation always entails inclusion of factors considered relevant and 
exclusion of others, plus some interpretation of the scenario presented. The 
language chosen greatly influences the way actions are interpreted. For 
example, in the context of palliative care removal of a life-prolonging treatment 
may variously be described as an act which allows the patient to die or an act 
which brings about the patient's death. The words used clearly indicate the 
author's own perspective. Elliott notes that what is problematic is not that 
9 narrative style communicates a personal moral vision, for this is obvious, but 
rather that the case presentation 'packages a personal moral vision in the 
surface wrapping of objectivity.'12 
The way that a case is described causes it to fall into a certain class of 
similar cases. This resembles the process of diagnosis itself; doctors make 
diagnoses by comparing the package of symptoms and signs with those typical 
of certain diseases, and deciding which disease the presenting package most 
resembles. They then conclude that the presenting illness is most likely to be a 
case of that disease, and treat it accordingly. When confronted with a moral 
problem in a case they will tend to react in the same way; they will gather 
together the features of the case they consider relevant, and then they will try to 
classify the case by deciding what general type of case it most resembles. How 
they classify the case will much depend on the words used in the description. 
For example, it may be seen as a case of either killing or letting die, or of a 
patient refusing a life-prolonging treatment or of a patient committing suicide. 
For each class of cases there will be a paradigm case, one in which there is 
general agreement about the right course of action, rather in the same way as 
there is general agreement about the best treatment for a certain disease. 
When the problem case has been identified as similar in important ways to the 
paradigm case, doctors will tend to conclude that they should act in the way 
accepted as right for the paradigm case, unless of course there are certain 
features of the problem case which suggest otherwise. 
This approach to moral problems has a long history. It developed in the 
early modern period and acquired the name of 'casuistry', a name which refers 
to the central role of paradigm cases in  moral reasoning. It acquired a bad 
reputation, was heavily criticised and abandoned as a model of moral 
reasoning until recently. I shall discuss the method in detail in the appendix but 
note here simply that it appeals to doctors as a method of moral reasoning 
because of its similarity to the process of diagnosis. This similarity was pointed 
10 out by Albert Jansen and Stephen Toulmin in their book 'The Abuse of 
Casuistry'.13 
It is certainly true that doctors and nurses working in palliative care tend 
to identify a particular case with a paradigm case. For example, they might see 
the question of whether or not artificial rehydration should be given to a dying 
patient as resembling a paradigm case of providing a treatment which will 
simply prolong dying. In contrast their colleagues outside palliative care would 
be more likely to consider the case as resembling a paradigm where adequate 
hydration is considered essential to prolong or sustain life, as in acute care. So 
the way that doctors and nurses describe a particular case determines how 
they think it should be managed, for they tend to decide how to manage 
individual cases by considering how a similar but paradigm case would be 
managed. The ideology of palliative care influences how professionals describe 
the ethical problems they recognise in individual cases. 
This is an important point because it means that the moral reasoning of 
casuistry is not a value-neutral process. For example, when professionals 
outside palliative care describe cases they tend to present the 'facts' of the 
case but may omit details relating to the emotional impact of the situation on 
the patient, family and professionals. This omission occurs because such 
emotional issues are considered either as irrelevant, or even dangerous 
because they may cloud judgement. In contrast, professionals working in 
palliative care are charged with maximising the patient's and family's 
psychological, spiritual and social well-being, and so they tend to include in 
their package of relevant features the emotional impact of the situation on all 
concerned. In this way the philosophy or ideology of palliative care can 
influence professional decision-making. 
It is debatable whether emotional engagement in the case story by 
professionals is dangerous or provides essential enlightenment. As Elliott 
notes, emotional engagement may either illuminate judgement or cloud it.14 It is 
11 difficult to argue that moral judgement should be completely detached from 
sympathy and the imagination, but it is also clear that too much 'empathy' or 
'suffering with' the patient may lead to personal emotional trauma and loss of 
ability to weigh up all the relevant features of the case. This latter possibility is 
discounted by some writers. For example, Ann Scott considers it important to 
identify imaginatively with the patient, a process which she thinks will enable 
the doctor or nurse to understand what a particular treatment would be like for 
the patient.15 This sort of approach is often encouraged in palliative care, but it 
is associated with risks of emotional distress sufficient to cloud the judgement 
of professionals (and also sufficient to lead to emotional exhaustion). I shall 
discuss this in more detail in chapter 4.  In the present context the important 
point is that the presentation of a case is not simply a matter of neutrally 
describing objective facts; it involves interpretation and therefore value 
judgements. 
Moreover, the way that a case is described and interpreted by 
professionals actually leads to their resolution of it, just as the description of 
symptoms and signs leads to diagnosis and treatment. When specialists in 
palliative care describe a case they will be influenced by their culture and 
values, and that culture and value set is currently strongly determined by the 
ideology described in the WHO statement. So the ideology of palliative care 
determines how specialists in the field perceive the moral issues which arise in 
palliative care. The ideology easily becomes pervasive. 
Since this ideology is not shared outside palliative care, specialists in 
palliative care frequently 'see' cases differently from their non-specialist 
colleagues, and hence often come to different conclusions about what is the 
right course of action. Thus patients in the care of specialists, for example in 
hospices, may well receive different treatment and care from those in the non-
specialist setting. Specialists have tended to want to influence their colleagues 
in other settings to share their own ideology and thus follow the pattern of their 
12 clinical practice. But would this be desirable? Health care aims to provide for 
each individual patient the best treatment and care in the particular 
circumstances. The ideology of palliative care, and the impact it has on clinical 
decisions, should be examined in order to determine whether its adoption more 
widely in  health care would lead to better treatment of terminally ill patients. 
Granted the accuracy of my brief account of the nature and implications 
of the philosophy of palliative care, and the legitimacy of a philosophical 
critique, I can now state the detailed objectives of this study, which are to 
discuss the following theses: 
0.4  Objectives:  five  theses 
1 That decisions regarding the use of treatment to control symptoms or prolong 
life do not need to depend on complex doctrines such as double effect, but 
instead ought to be based on weighing up the benefits, harms and risks of the 
treatment; 
2 that the relatives should not be an equal part of the remit of care; 
3 that quality of life as a global concept should not be used; 
4 that there are constraints of expertise and propriety on attempts to influence 
the patient's psychological, social and spiritual well-being; 
5 that within health care there ought to be a just distribution of resources to 
speCialist palliative care, and then among terminally ill patients regardless of 
their illness. 
Each of the following chapters will discuss one of these theses. 
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14 Chapter  1 
Control  of  symptoms 
Thesis  1:  Decisions  regarding  the  use  of  treatment  to  control 
symptoms  or  prolong  life  do  not  need  to  depend  on  complex 
doctrines  such  as  double  effect,  but  instead  ought  to  be  based 
on  weighing  up  the  benefits,  harms  and  risks  of  the  treatment 
for  the  particular  patient. 
Introduction 
The central aims of health care are the prolongation of life and the relief 
of suffering due to disease. In the context of terminal illness the importance of 
relieving pain and other symptoms is not disputed, and few moral problems 
arise in decisions regarding treatments whose sole aim and outcome is the 
relief of symptoms. In contrast many problems arise in relation to treatments 
which may alter the remaining length of life, either by prolonging it or by 
hastening death. I will mention only briefly the moral issues arising from the 
former group of treatments, and will devote most attention to those arising from 
treatments which either prolong life or which may shorten it. 
I have mentioned in the introduction the importance of language, 
interpretation, and background ideology in the description of a case and its 
subsequent resolution. Where decisions regarding symptom control and 
prolongation of life are concerned, some ways of looking at cases are more 
helpful than others in reaching a solution. Neither the four principles approach, 
nor narrative-based medicine, nor a discussion of 'virtuous character' are 
helpful in resolving moral problems in this area. 
15 On the other hand, health care practitioners do use case description and 
comparison in a way reminiscent of casuistry, both in terms of making 
diagnoses and treating patients, and also in terms of looking at the moral 
problems they identify in symptom control and the use of life-prolonging 
treatment. Health care is very much about deciding 'what is wrong' and 'what is 
to be done' in the particular patient's case.
1 In a similar way casuistry sets out 
to decide what sort of a moral problem the case presents, and then to decide 
what ought to be done in the particular case. Further development of 
professionals' current practice, by encouraging them to employ the rules or 
maxims derived from paradigm cases, but interpreting those rules carefully in 
the context of the patient's particular circumstances, might enhance their 
decision-making. 
1.1  Moral  issues  of  treatment  decisions  where  the  only 
outcome  is  potential  relief  of  pain  and  other  symptoms. 
Unfortunately most treatments for the relief of pain and other symptoms 
have side-effects which are harmful and so may cause further symptoms and 
distress. They may also be associated with risks, particularly when an invasive 
procedure is undertaken. As symptoms in terminal illness, particularly pain, 
breathlessness, and nausea and vomiting may be severe it is often considered 
that some harms and risks are worth tolerating in order to relieve the initial 
symptom. Moral problems arise when the balance of harm and risk to benefit is 
either uncertain, as is often the case, or when the harms and risks are high in 
relation to the potential benefit. In such cases it can be difficult to decide which 
treatments provide sufficient potential benefit in comparison to their harms and 
risks to justify offering them to the patient. 
In palliative care, as in health care generally, the patient's informed 
consent is a pre-requisite for the provision of treatment, unless the patient is 
16 incompetent to make decisions. Moral judgements must be  made by clinicians 
regarding which treatments should be offered, how much information the 
patient actually wants and should be given, and what to do if a patient requests 
a treatment which the clinician considers will not confer overall benefit. 
Judgements about competence may also give rise to problems. All adults are 
presumed competent to give or withhold informed consent, but some are clearly 
judged incompetent to make the particular decision. The responsibility for 
judgements about competence generally lies with the health care team. Such 
judgements are complex and often morally difficult, especially as competence is 
really a spectrum phenomenon but legally a patient must be judged either 
competent or incompetent and cannot be said to be partially competent. 
It makes sense to follow the method of casuistry in reaching solutions to 
these problems. It is easy to describe paradigm cases on which the rules of 
informed consent, the criteria for competence and the maxim that one should 
benefit and not harm patients are based. These rules and criteria must then be 
interpreted in those cases where consent (or refusal) is clearly not fully 
informed, where competence is compromised or where the balance of benefit 
to harm and risk is uncertain or marginal. The process of comparison of the 
incident case with the paradigm case followed by justification of one's decision 
regarding the applicability of the rules or maxims in the incident case would 
enable practitioners to make reasonable and morally justifiable decisions for the 
particular case. 
1.2.  Treatments  which  may  prolong  life. 
The absence of any mention of the aim of prolonging life from the WHO 
definition of palliative care is perhaps surprising since this aim is indisputably 
intrinsic to health care. An expansion of the WHO summary definition of 
palliative care states that 
17 'Palliative care  ... affirms life and regards dying as a normal 
process, ... neither postpones nor hastens death  .. .'2 
It is quite extraordinary that a description of the philosophy of a health 
care activity should actually state that practitioners should not seek or aim to 
postpone death. I shall explore the reasons for this position. 
1.2.i  Postponing  death  or  prolonging  life? 
In stating that palliative care 'neither postpones death' the definition 
probably means that practitioners should not intendto postpone death, for 
clearly there will be circumstances when, as a secondary effect of treatment for 
symptom relief, death may be postponed. For example, patients exhausted and 
immobile because of constant pain will live for a shorter time than those with 
good pain relief. So providing pain relief could be said to postpone death. Yet 
no-one would wish to assert that pain should not be relieved in case death 
were, as a secondary effect, postponed. Indeed, the situation of pain in an 
illness which will shortly culminate in death serves for most people as a 
paradigm case illustrating the importance of pain relief, for pain in this context is 
seen as pointless and meaningless - there is no possible gain from it nor happy 
outcome afterwards. 
Postponing death could be interpreted as meaning the same as 
prolonging life. But this alternative meaning is probably not the one which 
readers are intended to derive from the definition. For 'postponing death' 
suggests merely putting off for a short while the inevitable. It suggests more the 
prolongation of dying rather than the prolongation of living. The idea of 
prolonging dying would not be considered by most people, lay and professional, 
to constitute a benefit and it is more likely that it would be construed as a harm. 
Thus 'neither postpones death' is probably intended to mean 'does not prolong 
dying'. This interpretation is morally unproblematic. 
18 Unfortunately the definition is undoubtedly the source of important 
ambiguity on this point, for many people might consider that postponing death 
is equivalent to prolonging life. They would thus conclude that the definition, 
which describes the philosophy of palliative care, means that palliative care 
practitioners should not intend to prolong life. This concept is the source and 
the cause of many moral problems in palliative care. 
The difficult decisions surrounding the possible provision of life-
prolonging treatment in the context of terminal illness are real and will always 
exist. Unfortunately the WHO definition, when interpreted as meaning that in 
the context of palliative care one should not intend to prolong life, actually 
compounds the problems because it influences the judgement of specialists in 
palliative care whilst at the same time puzzling patients and other health care 
professionals. 
Specialists in palliative care are very aware of their philosophy and it 
influences their thinking. They know that in the early days of palliative care, 
when specialists cared for patients in hospices which were largely independent 
of the National Health Service, life-prolonging measures such as drips and 
transfusions were very rarely provided. There were three reasons for this. 
Firstly, such measures were seen as yielding little benefit in the face of 
inevitable death. Secondly, the technology involved was considered to make 
death less dignified and to prolong the dying phase of the illness attached to 
tubes and machines. Thirdly, the provision of such treatment was thought to 
discourage acceptance of the inevitable approach of death, and acceptance 
was thought to be the attitude associated with least emotional suffering for the 
patient (and probably everyone else as well)! 
On the other hand health care professionals looking after terminally ill 
patients but not coming from a specialist palliative care background remain 
largely ignorant of and uninfluenced by the palliative care philosophy. They 
know that it exists, but tend to pay little attention to it. They tend to consider it 
19 morally acceptable or even morally required that they should try to prolong life. 
Thus they tend to provide a life-prolonging treatment unless it is very clear that 
in the clinical circumstances its harms far outweigh its expected benefits. 
Thus a situation has developed where 'generalist' health care 
professionals looking after terminally ill patients tend to think rather differently 
from specialists in palliative care, despite the fact that both professional groups 
are looking after the same cohort of patients. So a patient in a particular set of 
circumstances is likely to be treated differently by specialist and non-specialist 
health carers. 
It is clearly undesirable for this difference in  philosophy and therefore in 
treatment provision to exist within a single profession and health care seNice. It 
matters morally because one set of health care decisions may yield a better 
process and outcome of care than the other for the patient. It is important to ask 
whether the philosophy of palliative care leads to a better or worse process and 
outcome of care for patients. 
If 'neither postpones death' is interpreted as meaning 'does not prolong 
dying' then it is likely to lead to a good outcome for patients. In this sense it 
would influence health care professionals, patients and their families not to 
pursue treatments which simply prolong the very end of life when 
consciousness is likely to be diminishing and disturbance to the patient is likely 
to be distressing. If non-specialists in palliative care were familiar with and 
accepted this maxim as part of their philosophy then fewer patients would be 
subjected to invasive and non-beneficial treatments in a misguided and 
necessarily futile attempt to prolong life. Furthermore, resources would not be 
expended on the provision of such treatments and care for highly dependent 
patients for a longer period of dying - for example two weeks instead of a few 
days where artificial hydration might prolong life for this period in dying patients 
who have lost the ability to swallow. These resources could be used to benefit 
other patients. 
20 On the other hand if 'neither postpones death' is taken to  mean 'does not 
prolong life' then two serious consequences would arise. The first is that 
patients would not be offered life-prolonging treatments which could provide 
overall benefit as compared with harm or risk. For example, tube feeding would 
not be considered for patients unable to swallow because of motor neurone 
disease or stroke, and stents to keep the ureters patent would not be 
considered or offered to patients going into renal failure because of incurable 
pelvic malignancy. Yet for some patients these treatments could provide 
significant net benefit. 
The second serious consequence is that patients would not be offered 
treatments primarily intended to alleviate suffering but with a secondary effect 
of prolonging life. For example, oesophageal stents to alleviate the symptom of 
dysphagia (difficulty in swallowing) in patients with cancer of the oesophagus 
very often alleviate the dysphagia. However, in so doing they prolong life. If 
palliative care practitioners should not intend to prolong life, then such 
treatments should perhaps not be considered or should be offered less readily 
because the secondary effect of prolonging life was considered to be a harm. 
Both of these consequences lead to major adverse outcomes for 
patients. They constitute sufficient reason for rejecting a philosophy of palliative 
care which suggests that practitioners (and perhaps also patients and their 
relatives) should not seek to prolong life. 
In fact specialists in palliative care do offer life-prolonging treatment to 
their patients. This might indicate either that they do not actually believe that 
they should not intend to prolong life, or that they believe alleviating suffering is 
such an important goal that it should override the 'adverse' effect of prolonging 
life, or that they really do not intend to prolong life but are so unsuccessful at 
achieving other goals that they inadvertently prolong it! Of these three 
possibilities the first two sound the most plausible. 
21 Since the idea of not postponing death can be interpreted as not 
prolonging life it should be rejected as part of the philosophy of palliative care. 
Rather than stating that palliative care 'neither postpones death' the WHO 
definition might say 'does not prolong dying'. The incorporation of this idea into 
health care ethics as a whole (not just palliative care) would discourage the 
provision of invasive, distressing and expensive life-prolonging 
technology in those circumstances where it is likely to provide overall harm and 
risk rather than benefit. 
1.2.ii  Withdrawing  and  withholding  life-prolonging  treatment. 
This leaves the question about what should be said in a philosophy of 
palliative care, and in health care ethics generally, about the provision of life-
prolonging treatment in the context of a terminal illness but when patients are 
not imminently dying. In  1999 the British Medical Association after a process of 
wide consultation produced a document giving professional guidance on this 
issue.3 In this guidance it is clearly stated that: 
'The primary goal of medical treatment is to benefit the patient by 
restoring or maintaining the patient's health as far as possible, maximising 
benefit and minimising harm. 
If treatment fails, or ceases, to give a net benefit to the patient (or if the 
patient has competently refused the treatment), the primary goal of medical 
treatment cannot be realised and the justification for providing the treatment is 
removed.'4 
This guidance instructs doctors to weigh up carefully in the particular 
case the benefits, harms and risks of the treatment, and to consider (where 
possible together with the patient) whether the provision of a life-prolonging 
treatment would be a benefit to the patient. This guidance should be 
incorporated into a philosophy of palliative care, and could and should be 
accepted by all health care professionals to the benefit of patients. 
22 There is one area of discussion in which the SMA guidance does not go 
far enough, but where specialists in palliative care are very aware of difficulties 
in clinical decision-making. Provision of a life-prolonging treatment may not just 
enable the patient to live longer - it is also very likely to alter the way in which 
the patient will die. Patients can die of an illness in more or less pleasant ways. 
Weighing up the benefits, harms and risks of a treatment does not just entail 
considering how long one will live plus the side-effects and risks of that 
treatment. It should also entail consideration of the mode of dying of the illness, 
with and without the treatment. Unfortunately this factor is given insufficient 
attention in the SMA guidance, yet it is a crucial factor for health care 
professionals and patients in making these decisions. Whilst specialists in 
palliative care are aware of the importance of this factor few other health care 
professionals routinely think through the likely illness scenarios with and without 
the treatment. Sometimes specialists in palliative care are less likely to favour a 
treatment in a particular case as compared with their non-specialist colleagues 
for the very good reason that the patient may live longer only to encounter a 
more distressing terminal phase of illness or death. 
For example, providing artificial nutrition and hydration to patients with 
motor neurone disease will prolong their life. Instead of dying of poor food and 
fluid intake or aspiration pneumonia through trying to swallow, they can 
continue to live but will then become largely or completely paralysed and not 
able to speak or swallow, making communication very laborious. Ultimately 
they will become unable to breathe. When this occurs provision of non-invasive 
ventilation can once again prolong their life. They will then live until they 
develop an overwhelming chest infection. The longer their life is prolonged the 
more likely it is that they will develop the frontal lobe dementia which is 
associated with this illness. If this happens they will show personality changes, 
and strange behaviour. Thus decisions about provision of artificial feeding or 
23 ventilation must take into account the future development of the illness and the 
ways in which the patient is most likely to die. 
It is perhaps the awareness that life-prolonging treatment may lead to a 
more unpleasant illness course and death that has tended to make specialists 
in palliative care more reluctant to provide such treatment than their non-
specialist colleagues. Life-prolonging treatment can be provided without 
bringing about a prolonged and undignified death, and it does not necessarily 
prevent patients from reaching a realistic acceptance of their prognosis. 
However, the achievement of a mode of life and death considered acceptable 
by the patient requires consideration of the various illness scenarios and ways 
of dying, as well as the specIfic benefits, harms and risks of the available 
treatments. Not every patient would be willing to tolerate a discussion of the 
ways in which they might die. This important pOint should be stressed in a 
philosophy of palliative care, and in guidance for professional practice 
generally. 
For most people the mode of dying and the period leading up to it are 
very important. They often seek what Margaret Battin calls 'The Least Worst 
Death'. She states that: 
'In the current enthusiasm for natural death it is not patient autonomy 
that dismays physicians. What does dismay them is the way in which respect 
for patient autonomy can lead to cruel results. The cure for that dismay lies in 
the realisation that the physician can contribute to the genuine honouring of the 
patient's autonomy and rights, assuring him or her of "natural death" in the way 
in which the patient understands it, and still remain within the confines of good 
medical practice and the law.'s 
Patients cannot achieve what for them is 'the least worst death' which fits 
into the context of their lives unless health care practitioners consider the 
illness scenarios and explain these to patients who wish to be so informed. 
24 Presenting a list of the benefits, harms and risks of the specific treatment in the 
circumstances is simply not enough. 
1.3.  Treatments  which  may  hasten  death. 
The WHO definition states that palliative care neither postpones nor 
hastens death. There are two sets of ambiguities which arise from the latter 
phrase. The first concerns two possible interpretations of the idea that one 
should not hasten death; either that one should not, in any case, hasten death, 
or merely that one must not intend to hasten death. The second ambiguity 
surrounds the extent to which the term 'hasten' implies that one in some way 
causes the patient's death, as opposed to simply altering the time of death so 
that it occurs earlier. Both of these ambiguities can and do lead to enormous 
confusion amongst health care professionals and patients and so can  lead to 
decisions being made which are not in patients' interests. Unfortunately the 
same confusion almost totally obfuscates any public debate about the issue of 
legalising euthanasia. It is regrettable that the ambiguities of the WHO definition 
of palliative care do nothing to dispel this confusion and actually contribute to it. 
Let us discuss these ambiguities in order. 
1.3.i  Not  hastening  death  or  not  intending  to  hasten  death? 
Regarding the question of interpretation as to whether a requirement not 
to hasten death means that one should not hasten death or merely should not 
intend to hasten death there are two reasons why it is plausible that the former 
interpretation is that which the WHO is trying to put across. Firstly, since human 
beings are vulnerable and death is normally considered an evil there is a 
general social prohibition against causing or contributing to the death of another 
person, whether or not one intends to. Thus one will face legal scrutiny for an 
action, such as a road traffic accident, which contributed to the person's death 
25 even if one did not intend injury to the person. Secondly, since an  intrinsic 
function of health care is normally to strive to prolong life there is a general 
presumption that in health care in particular it is wrong to act so as to cause or 
contribute to the cause of death. 
For these two reasons there may be a tendency to assume that in 
palliative care one must never hasten death, whether intentionally or not. There 
are serious adverse consequences to this interpretation; it leads to failure to 
provide any treatment to alleviate suffering if it may also incidentally shorten 
life, it is associated with confusion around the difference between not providing 
life-prolonging treatment and acting so as to cause death or alter the time of 
death, and it puts forward a totally unattainable goal for health care 
professionals since many treatments are associated with a risk of death 
through misadventure. 
These consequences are so adverse as to constitute sufficient reason 
for interpreting the definition so as to mean that health care professionals 
engaged in palliative care should not intend to  hasten the death of their 
patients. Thus it appears that this first ambiguity could be solved by re-stating 
the definition so that it clearly means that professionals should not intend to 
hasten the death of their patients. Unfortunately, the concept of intending as 
opposed to foreseeing an event is not in itself morally clear to many people in 
the context of health care. The difference, and the importance of recognising 
the difference, is discussed later (1.3.iii). 
1.3.ii.  Killing  versus  letting  die,  the  issue  of  causation. 
The second ambiguity intrinsic to the concept of 'hastening' death gives 
rise to major problems. As stated above, the idea of hastening death can be 
taken to imply actually causing or contributing to death as the outcome, or 
alternatively it may imply simply allowing death to occur as a result of the illness 
so that one can be said either not to prolong life or to allow death to occur 
26 earlier. Whereas causing the patient's death or contributing substantially to it 
are commonly regarded as 'killing', allowing death to result from the organ 
failure consequent upon illness is commonly called 'letting die'.  The use of 
these terms has tended to polarise the whole discussion into crude  contrasts 
between killing and letting die. Unfortunately 'hastening death' could be taken 
to mean either or both. 
Different people will compare the same clinical case to a paradigm case 
about killing or to a paradigm case about letting die. For example, one person 
might compare the act of switching off a ventilator to the act of killing in a 
paradigm case of murder, whilst another would compare it to a paradigm case 
of brain death where it is clearly wrong to prolong life with no prospect of 
recovery. The use of different paradigms leads to the employment of different 
maxims and yields different conclusions if the circumstances are not fully 
considered in interpreting the force of the maxims in the particular case. 
The public debate around euthanasia has tended to produce opposing 
camps of people. On one side are those who agree with letting die, but who 
mayor may not agree with legalising killing in the context of euthanasia. On the 
other side are those who are opposed to letting die and also to euthanasia and 
who think that life-prolonging measures should be pursued whenever possible. 
The definition of palliative care, by prohibiting 'hastening' death has produced 
ultimate confusion in the public mind as to the role of palliative care 
professionals - they may see them either as being willing to allow death to 
occur, or as always providing life-prolonging treatment, or as being willing to 
hasten death as a foreseen but not intended event, or perhaps as practising 
euthanasia under the screen of the latter statement via the doctrine of double 
effect. 
When the discussion is so confused there is no hope of resolution of the 
clinical problems nor of making laws that will actually serve the interests of 
patients in infinitely diverse situations. A commonsense approach which is 
27 based fundamentally on our agreement about paradigm cases is the only way 
forward. In the context of this issue it is vital that the philosophy of palliative 
care forms an integral part of health care ethics, and that it promotes the overall 
welfare of patients within a law that can be upheld and enforced but which 
allows sufficient interpretation to serve the best interests of patients and the 
rest of society. 
It is clear from section 1.2.ii above that allowing death to occur (letting 
die) has to be permitted when the burdens and risks of life-prolonging treatment 
clearly outweigh its benefits, or when the provision of life-prolonging treatment 
so alters the terminal phase of the illness that a more distressing course 
occurs. At the same time society needs to maintain its prohibition against killing 
(murder) in order to protect its members. In order to achieve these two aims 
both the law and professional guidance have to uphold a clear distinction 
between killing and letting die. 
The legal situation is fortunately quite clear. In law an act of killing is 
murder if one person intended to cause and did cause the death of another. It is 
prohibited in most cultures, and is severely punished. A charge of murder would 
be brought against a doctor who intended to cause and did cause the death of 
a patient. Thus if a doctor 'hastened' death by knowingly administering a lethal 
injection he or she would be charged with murder. On the other hand a doctor 
who withholds or withdraws a life-prolonging treatment from a patient because 
its burdens and risks outweigh its benefits, or because the patient refuses the 
treatment, is considered to have allowed a foreseen death to occur from natural 
causes and is not charged with murder. In this situation letting the patient die is 
legally permitted. 
Unfortunately the moral situation is much less clear than the law.  In the 
clinical context the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging technology can 
be seen as 'hastening death'. For example, in the context of irremediable 
dysphagia due to recurrent cancer of the oesophagus a patient regarded 
28 cessation of fluids via a drip as 'bringing death nearer' rather than ceasing to 
put off inevitable and unavoidable death from the illness. The use of the 
ambiguous term 'hastening death' in the WHO definition causes patients and 
professionals to regard withholding or withdrawing a life-prolonging treatment 
as a decision to either cause or bring forward death, and not simply as a 
decision to allow death to occur from natural causes. 
Whilst the use of ambiguous terms such as 'hastening death' has fuelled 
confusion, the advent of technology has unavoidably made the moral distinction 
between killing and letting die appear very blurred in some cases. There are 
two reasons for this. 
The first reason is to do with understandable and perhaps unavoidable 
ambiguity around the cause of death in a minority of cases. In such cases it 
may be argued that the withdrawal of life-prolonging or life-sustaining treatment 
causes the death of the patient. For example, when life-prolonging treatments 
such as artificial feeding and hydration are removed from patients in the 
persistent vegetative state, or artificial ventilation is removed from stable but 
unconscious ventilator-dependent patients, it is overwhelmingly likely that death 
will follow, and so some people consider that such withdrawal of life-prolonging 
treatment actually causes the patient's death. They therefore think that it should 
be considered morally and legally to be the cause of the patient's death. 
Legally, causing the death is one of the two conditions for murder. 
On the other hand I would wish to argue that the patient's death is 
caused by the underlying failure of essential organ function (for example 
permanent unconsciousness or inability to breathe) which renders the patient 
incapable of survival without constant life-prolonging treatment. The 
fundamental cause of death is the patient's condition, not the withdrawal of 
treatment, which should be regarded as incidental. Death would have been 
caused by the pathological conditions of the PVS or inability to breathe. The 
life-support treatments merely prevent on a temporary basis the occurrence of 
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to consider whether the body can resume normal functioning or whether there 
is reasonable hope of improvement. If in these situations there is no reasonable 
hope of recovery of consciousness or the ability to breathe, further life-
sustaining treatment cannot confer benefit and therefore it is not in the patient's 
interests to continue it. When it is removed the body's own causality results in 
death. 
If this line of reasoning is rejected and it is considered instead that 
doctors cause the death of patients when they switch off ventilators or remove 
artificial nutrition and hydration from patients in the PVS, then it must follow that 
in all cases where doctors have withheld or withdrawn life-prolonging treatment 
for any reason they have to some extent caused the patient's death. Since the 
available array of life-prolonging treatment is so extensive, and since the 
precise timing of so many patients' deaths is now influenced by decisions to 
forgo some possible life-prolonging technology, one would have to conclude 
that doctors actually cause the death of the majority of their terminally ill 
patients. For example, one would have to conclude that doctors cause the 
patient's death whenever they discontinue a cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
attempt. The reason is that technically the doctors could have supported the 
patient's circulation artificially for some time longer. Similarly, the withholding of 
antibiotics for pneumonia from patients with a very poor prognosis would also 
be regarded as tantamount to causing the patients death (if it is thought that 
antibiotics might have prolonged life). Such a conclusion is deeply counter-
intuitive. 
Moreover, if doctors were considered to have caused the patient's death 
whenever they withheld or withdrew life-prolonging treatment the law would 
have to examine each incident as a  possible case of murder. If it were judged 
that the doctor might have intended the death of the patient (which he or she 
was considered to have caused) then a charge of murder would have to be 
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withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment is considered to cause 
death this unmanageable legal situation could be avoided only if the prohibition 
against intentionally causing death were abolished. Such an alteration in the 
law would be highly undesirable because it would remove an essential 
protection for all  members of society. 
One must conclude that in health care ethics (including palliative care) 
and the law, 'letting die' in the sense of withholding or withdrawing non-
beneficial life-prolonging treatment must be permitted and even advocated. As 
the BMA states, if there is no expected net benefit to the patient then there is 
no justification for providing the treatment. 
1.3.iii  Intending  versus  foreseeing  death. 
The second reason for the blurring of the moral distinction between 
killing and letting die is to do with the distinction between intending and 
foreseeing the outcome of a decision. The importance of this distinction in 
respect of the ambiguity around 'not hastening death' was mentioned above. 
The moral distinction between intending and foreseeing the death of the patient 
following withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment may be finely 
drawn. For example, it is sometimes argued that when a doctor switches off a 
ventilator-dependent patient's ventilator, or removes artificial feeding and 
hydration from a patient in the persistent vegetative state, that doctor is 
intending to cause the patient's death. Those who take this  position assert that 
the doctor must inevitably intend the patient's death since he or she knows that 
it is overwhelmingly likely that death will follow withdrawal of these treatments. 
The contrary position, which I hold, is that the doctor intends only to withdraw a 
futile and non-beneficial treatment, and foresees but does not intend the 
patient's death. 
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what the doctor wants, desires or seeks as the outcome of the decision. Some 
people  who maintain that the doctor intends the patient's death seem to 
believe that the doctor wants or desires the patient's death. Yet this is surely 
not the most accurate representation of the case. The doctor is in no way 
seeking the patient's death, even if it is agreed that death is the least bad 
outcome because it is considered preferable to continued existence in a state 
of profound disability, distress or discomfort. The representation which I 
consider most accurately describes the case is that the doctor neither desires 
nor seeks the patients death, but rather intends only to withdraw or withhold a 
non-beneficial and possibly burdensome treatment. No doctor should seek a 
patient's death, but equally no doctor wants (or should want) to impose a 
treatment which confers no benefit and which may be burdensome. 
The second aspect of intention relates to the fact that it is intention to 
cause the death of the patient which is being considered. Thus those who 
believe that the doctor who withdraws or withholds life-prolonging treatment 
intends the patient's death must believe that the doctor intends to cause the 
patient's death. In reply I would argue that since doctors quite reasonably do 
not consider that the withdrawal or withholding of life-prolonging treatment is 
the fundamental cause of the patient's death, they cannot logically intend to 
cause death by withholding or withdrawing treatment. It makes no sense to say 
that doctors intend to cause death when they do not think their decision is the 
cause of that death. 
In summary, then, I would argue that doctors who withhold or withdraw 
life-prolonging treatment when its burdens outweigh its benefits do not cause 
nor intend to cause the patient's death. Rather, they withhold or withdraw 
treatment which they consider is inappropriate because its burdens exceed its 
benefits, and they foresee the patient's death but do not desire or seek it,  nor 
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and consistent part of health care ethics, must succeed in making these 
distinctions clear whilst at the same time continuing to prohibit professionals 
from intentionally causing the death of their patients. 
1.3.iv.  Double  effect. 
The preceding discussion centres around the possible interpretation of 
withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment as in some way causing or 
'hastening' death.  However, there are clinical situations in which a treatment 
given with the aim of relieving distressing symptoms at the end of life may 
actually have other effects which may make death occur earlier than it would 
have done without the treatment. It is important to remember that such 
treatments do not cause the death entirely, but in the context of the patient's 
advanced illness and frailty death may occur earlier than without the treatment. 
The doctrine of double effect is commonly used to justify the provision of such 
treatments even though they may 'hasten' death in the sense of bringing it 
forward. One must ask whether this doctrine is essential or even useful in the 
philosophy of palliative care, and whether there is any alternative professional 
guidance which would lead to better decisions. 
It is important to note that the circumstances in which the only way to 
alleviate pain or distress is to use a treatment which may bring forward death 
are really quite rare. There is a common misconception that morphine will 
shorten life by causing respiratory depression and sedation. Properly used, and 
used only as an analgesic (not as a sedative) this is not the case. Patients 
given only the amount of morphine needed to counterbalance and relieve a 
morphine-sensitive pain do not suffer respiratory depression and are not 
sedated. Thus the example of morphine, which is unfortunately commonly 
given in the media, is totally misleading and simply causes the public and 
professionals to maintain fear and reluctance regarding its use. 
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sometimes a technical procedure may bring death nearer. For example, 
patients who are confused at the end of life may become restless and agitated. 
Sedation by drugs like valium alleviates this distress but if the distress passes 
only when the patient is rendered very drowsy or asleep then clearly the patient 
drinks less, moves less and so may be more likely to develop pneumonia. 
Similarly, a procedure like paracentesis (removal of abnormal fluid collections 
from the abdomen) may be the most effective way to alleviate distress due to a 
very distended abdomen associated with difficulty breathing. However, when 
the patient is very ill the loss of litres of fluid from the abdominal cavity may 
precipitate shock and death may occur earlier than if the paracentesis had not 
been done. These are genuine examples of situations where a treatment 
intended to alleviate symptoms may cause death to occur earlier, but the 
treatments are not themselves the cause of death (the same treatments given 
to a healthier person would not bring about death at all, and death occurs in 
these patients primarily because of the advanced state of their illness). 
The doctrine of double effect claims that a single act with both good and 
bad effects is justified if, and only if, four conditions are met. It is important to 
note that all four conditions must be met. The doctrine itself dates from St. 
Thomas Aquinas. The precise description of the conditions is taken from the 
account by Tom L.  Beauchamp and James F. Childress in 'Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics'.6 
The four conditions are: 
1.  The nature of  the act. The act must be good, or at least morally 
neutral (independent of its consequences). 
2.  The agent's intention. The agent intends only the good effect. The bad 
effect can be foreseen, tolerated, and permitted, but it must not be intended. 
3.  The distinction between means and effects.  The bad effect must not 
be a means to the good effect. If the good effect were the direct causal result of 
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effect. 
4.  Proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. The good 
effect must outweigh the bad effect. The bad effect is permissible only if a 
proportionate reason is present that compensates for permitting the foreseen 
bad effect. 
It can be seen that decisions to provide a treatment to alleviate distress 
or pain in the context of terminal illness may sometimes meet all of the above 
conditions and so be considered permitted according to the doctrine. For 
example, the nature of the act of providing symptom relief is morally good, the 
agent might intend only the good effect of relief of distress but not the bad 
effect of hastening death, the relief of suffering is brought about by the 
treatment and not by the bad effect which is the death of the patient, and the 
good of relieving suffering in the face of inevitable death in the near future 
outweighs the bad effect of hastening that death. 
The main problem with the use of the doctrine in health care ethics, even 
in the specialist field of palliative care, is that many if not most health care 
professionals are unaware of the four conditions, or are unable to understand 
them, or are unable to remember them. They therefore tend to think that the 
doctrine means simply that an act with a bad effect, such as the death of the 
patient, is justified if the agent did not intend the bad effect, even though it was 
foreseen. This misconception of the doctrine actually leads to its abuse. For 
example, some people have suggested that euthanasia is justified by the 
doctrine of double effect, whereas this could never be the case because in 
euthanasia the bad effect is intended and good effect is brought about via the 
bad effect, so conditions 2 and 3 above are not met. For these reasons the 
doctrine itself should be  rejected as a part of a philosophy of palliative care, 
even though its proper use might in theory be helpful in clinical practice. 
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should make clear that in making decisions practitioners must weigh up 
carefully the benefits, harms and risks of a treatment in the particular patient's 
case, and that practitioners must not intentionally cause the patient's death. 
Most health care professionals will fully comprehend and use such guidance 
only if examples in the form of case scenarios are used in education. The 
methods of casuistry would help practitioners to judge whether provision of a 
treatment with a foreseen bad effect as well as the intended good effect was 
justified in particular circumstances. 
1.3.v.  Euthanasia  and  letting  die. 
I have stated that I think the philosophy of palliative care, and health care 
ethics in general, should continue to prohibit practitioners from intentionally 
causing the death of their patients. However, since euthanasia is one of the 
many moral questions on which opinions differ some people will inevitably 
disagree with me, and those who do sometimes develop an argument  to 
suggest that the legal  prohibition of 'mercy killing' should be  revoked. (In this 
context I mean by mercy killing or euthanasia an intentional act which causes 
the death of the patient and which is done through compassionate motives.) If 
the legal prohibition of euthanasia were revoked and it were legalised, then 
clearly the philosophy of palliative care and professional ethics in  health care 
would have to be altered in very significant ways with many important 
implications. 
The proponents of euthanasia often argue that there is no significant 
moral difference between intentionally causing the death of a patient (mercy 
killing or euthanasia) and withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment 
(acts fitting my description of letting die). In other words they assert that letting 
die is morally indistinguishable from euthanasia or mercy killing. They also 
assert that the law should treat acts which are considered morally 
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acts of mercy killing or euthanasia be permitted. Their arguments can be 
presented as a logical syllogism as follows: 
Major premise:  Morally indistinguishable cases should not be treated 
differently by law. 
Minor premise:  Acts of letting die are morally indistinguishable from acts of 
mercy killing or euthanasia. 
Conclusion:  Therefore the law should not treat acts of mercy killing or 
euthanasia differently  from acts of letting die. 
Whilst the conclusion does follow logically from the premises I would 
contend that the premises are seriously flawed and so the conclusion based on 
them should be rejected. 
The minor premise has already been examined above, where I 
concluded that there are important moral differences between acts of letting die 
and acts of mercy killing or euthanasia. These differences lie in both intention 
and in causation of death; in cases of 'letting die' the doctors neither intend to 
cause nor cause the death of the patient whereas in acts of euthanasia they 
both intend to cause and do cause the death of the patient. Therefore 
euthanasia and letting die are not morally indistinguishable and so the minor 
premise is false. 
The major premise, that morally indistinguishable cases should not be 
treated differently by law, raises issues about the function of law and its 
relationship to morality. Three essential points should be considered. Firstly, it 
should be remembered that the function of th~ law is to safeguard the interests 
of everyone in the community and not just the interests of a minority, however 
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the law could ever be.  An enforceable, consistent and comprehensible law is 
necessarily a relatively 'blunt instrument' compared with the great complexity of 
moral judgements in particular cases. Yet it is with this blunt instrument that the 
good of the community must be upheld. So the law has to make distinctions 
which are unambiguous and comprehensible to ordinary folk, and it cannot 
possibly follow all the intricacies and nuances of thought and feeling which exist 
in morality. Thirdly, in treating acts of letting die differently from mercy killing or 
euthanasia the law is not saying that there is a/ways a moral difference 
between letting die and killing.  It is saying only that for legal purposes related to 
the best outcome for the whole community it is necessary to make this 
distinction. Indeed, the purpose of law is not to say which acts are or are not 
morally indistinguishable. In addition I would argue that in general there is a 
significant moral difference between acts of mercy killing and letting die, 
although it may be possible to produce scenarios where there is no significant 
moral difference, as shown by James Rachels? It follows from all of these 
considerations that it is likely that there will  be unusual occasions when morally 
indistinguishable cases will have to be treated differently by law, in the interests 
of everyone in the community. Although at first sight this situation appears 
morally undesirable it is not wrong if the good of everyone requires it.  Moreover 
it appears to me that whether it is right or wrong this situation is probably 
unavoidable. 
I have asserted that both premises are false. Nevertheless, if they are 
accepted by some people the conclusion will logically follow, and so we should 
consider the consequences of accepting the conclusion. The conclusion 
suggests that letting die and mercy killing or euthanasia should not be treated 
differently in law. This would mean treating intentional acts of 'causing death' in 
the same way as acts of withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment in 
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prohibited, or both should be permitted. 
I have already argued that disastrous consequences for patients would 
ensue if the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment were 
prohibited. All patients would then be allowed to die only after the application of 
all possible means to prolong life. Indeed, the phrase 'allowed to die' would no 
longer have any application; patients would in fact die if but only if they 
defeated the medical technology! This would have disastrous results; the 
autonomy of patients and doctors would be grossly infringed by the law, life-
prolonging treatments could not be withheld or withdrawn even if their harms 
outweighed their benefits, thus increasing suffering, and intensive care units 
would consume the lion's share of the community's resources for health care. 
In fact it is much more common to  hear it argued that both letting die and 
mercy killing should be permitted. For example, it might be suggested that 
withdrawal of feeding from patients in the PVS (persistent vegetative state) is 
morally indistinguishable from euthanasia and that both should be permitted. 
The consequences of such a view must be examined. Proponents of this view 
would  contend that when doctors withdraw feeding from a PVS patient they 
have intentionally caused the death of the patient because they consider that 
the patient's quality of life is so poor that he or she should not be kept alive. 
They would then conclude that if allowing to die is permitted for this reason in 
the PVS cases then voluntary, and indeed non-voluntary euthanasia for the 
same reason must also be permitted. This would mean that if it was thought 
that a person's quality of life was considered so poor that he or she should not 
be kept alive by means of life-prolonging treatment, then a deliberate act to 
cause the death of that person should also be permitted. It would then follow 
that doctors, and indeed perhaps anyone, would be permitted to kill such 
patients. This would severely weaken the prohibition against killing which 
currently protects such vulnerable patients. Together with the vast majority of 
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survey carried out by the Association for Palliative Medicine in  1997) I consider 
that any benefit of legalising euthanasia is outweighed by the harms which 
would result from weakening the prohibition against killing which currently 
protects them. 
1.4  Conclusions. 
1 The philosophy of palliative care should be consistent with health care ethics 
in general, and should form an integral part of the latter. 
2 The WHO statement that palliative care 'neither hastens nor postpones death' 
should be rejected because of its intrinsic ambiguities. Health care practitioners 
may justifiably hasten death as a foreseen but not intended effect of treatment 
whose aim is the relief of pain and distress at the end of life, where the benefit 
of symptom relief outweighs the harm of bringing an inevitable death nearer. 
Prolonging life (thereby postponing death) is a goal of health care, and is often 
appropriate in the palliative context. 
3 Guidance for practitioners should state that the benefits, harms and risks of a 
treatment in the patient's particular circumstances should be weighed up 
carefully. This includes analysing as far as possible the illness scenarios and 
ways of dying which are likely to occur with and without the treatments. 
4 In the philosophy of palliative care, and in health care ethics and law 
generally, 'letting die', in the sense of withholding or withdrawing a life-
prolonging treatment when its harms and risks exceed its benefits, must be 
permitted. Health care practitioners who so act neither cause nor intend to 
cause the patient's death. 
40 5 There is a significant moral difference between intentionally causing the death 
of a patient by administering lethal medication (mercy-killing or euthanasia) and 
withholding or withdrawing a life-prolonging treatment because of lack of net 
benefit with the result that the patient dies of the underlying illness (letting die). 
6 The philosophy of palliative care, health care ethics in general, and the law, 
must continue to uphold the prohibition against killing which protects all 
members of society. In law, in professional codes and in clinical practice, it is 
necessary to distinguish between intentional acts which cause the death of 
patients (acts described as 'killing' or euthanasia) and the withholding or 
withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment so that the illness causes death (acts 
regarded as letting die). 
6 The methods of casuistry are the most helpful in both education and clinical 
practice for resolving the moral problems associated with treatment decisions in 
palliative care. 
7 The doctrine of double effect is too complex for practitioners to use in clinical 
practice. It should be replaced by guidance to the effect of points 2 and 3 above 
together with education in the methods of casuistry using real case scenarios. 
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42 Chapter  2. 
Relatives 
Thesis  2:  that  the  relatives  should  not  be  an  equal  part  of  the 
remit  of  care. 
Introduction. 
In stating that the goal of palliative care is 'the best possible quality of life 
for the patient and family' the World Health Organisation description of palliative 
care clearly implies that the welfare of the patient's family is the concern of the 
health care team. Moreover, it also implies that the welfare of the family is as 
much their concern as that of the patient. In terms of clinical activity this implies 
that the obligation to improve the relatives' quality of life is as strong as the 
corresponding obligation to improve the patient's quality of life. 
Yet professional codes of conduct for doctors and nurses do not include 
statements about any obligations to relatives but only obligations to patients. 
For example, it is clear in such codes that obligations of confidentiality towards 
patients should override requests from relatives for information about the 
patient's illness, unless patients give consent to the sharing of that information. 
These codes are accepted by the National Health Service which employs 
health care professionals, and so are implicitly accepted by the community 
which funds and uses the service. 
Similarly, whilst the law clearly states that health care professionals have 
a duty of care to patients it does not state that there is a duty of care to the 
relatives, and it too upholds the interests of patients (versus the relatives) in 
terms of confidentiality and informed consent, and in decision-making for 
incompetent patients. 
43 In general, health care (outside the sphere of palliative care) 
professionals consider that their obligations are to patients; when a patient has 
a myocardial infarction, or would benefit from an operation, members of the 
health care team consider that their obligations are to the patient, not the 
relatives. Thus the team would act in accordance with the patient's best 
interests, not the relatives' interests. When a patient is incompetent, both 
professional guidance and the law dictate that decisions made by the health 
care team must be made on the basis of the patient's best interests, bearing in 
mind what can be known about the patient's wishes. Professional guidance and 
the law do not state that professionals have obligations to the patient's family. 
So specialists in palliative care are in a very small minority in maintaining 
that they have obligations towards relatives. The marked difference in view on 
this point between the philosophy of palliative care and what we might call the 
philosophy of health care in general raises the following questions: 
1 Do health care professionals have obligations towards the patients' relatives, 
and if so, what are those obligations? 
2 Is the moral situation sufficiently different in palliative care from general health 
care to justify different obligations to relatives from those of general health 
care? 
3 In the context of palliative care, how should health care professionals decide 
how they ought to act when there is a conflict between their obligations to the 
relatives and to the patient? 
4 What, if anything, should the philosophy of palliative care say about 
obligations to relatives? 
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patient's  relatives,  and  if  so,  what  are  those  obligations? 
Despite the fact that professional codes and the law do not mention or 
recognise obligations towards relatives, professionals seem to be spending an 
increasing amount of time with them, even at the expense of time available for 
patient care. They divulge information about the patient's illness to relatives 
without the patient's consent, and they may sometimes pursue the relatives' 
interests at the expense of the patient's interests. 
Of course, the fact that professionals are so acting does not lead to the 
conclusion that they believe that they ought to be doing so . From the way that 
people actually behave we cannot conclude that they believe they ought to 
behave in that way. Whilst in general people will act as they believe they ought, 
they may also act because of desires, or pressure or coercion. 
It does seem reasonable to assume that professionals are not pursuing 
the relatives' interests simply because they have a desire to do so. Granted this 
assumption, then professionals may behave in this way either because they 
consider that they are under some form of obligation to do so, or because they 
are under some form of pressure or compulsion to do so. 
Recent guidance from the British Medical Association on decision-
making for incompetent patients may signal a change towards the view that 
there may be some sort of obligation to the families of patients. This guidance 
stresses that, wherever possible, the approval of the family regarding decisions 
made for the patient should be obtained.
1 This statement implies that there is 
some form of obligation to gain the family's approval, even though it is 
acknowledged that the family are not in any way consenting to or refusing a 
treatment plan, responsibility for which lies with the health care team. 
Is this assumption justified? The various methods which have been 
advocated for approaching moral problems in health care might be used to try 
to answer this question. 
45 The 'four principles' approach, as described by Childress and 
Beauchamp, is unhelpful in this respect as it does not make clear to whom the 
obligations of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice 
are owed.
2 Similarly, virtue ethics is unable to provide an answer to the 
problem; it is not clear what the compassionate, courageous professional who 
also has practical wisdom might decide in this regard. An  ethic of care would 
seem to apply equally to all potential recipients of that care, so cannot 
discriminate between duties to patients and to relatives. Narrative based 
medicine would suggest that the stories of the family as well as the patient 
should be heard and used in making a judgement regarding treatment, so this 
too is unable to clarify to whom obligations are owed once those stories have 
been heard. 
On the other hand casuistry, in comparing cases about which we are not 
clear with those about which there is no apparent doubt regarding obligations, 
might provide some method for determining professional obligations to 
relatives. For example, in acute care decisions regarding the patient's treatment 
are made on the basis of the patient's best interests - if a patient has heart 
failure or asthma then treatment is given promptly (on the basis of the patient's 
consent). Professionals do not  consider that they are under an obligation to 
consult the relatives or devote time to them while the patient struggles for 
breath! Alternatively, if a patient was expecting relatives to lift him bodily, rather 
than use a hoist, professionals would insist that such a manoeuvre was 
dangerous to the relatives and should not be expected of them, thus upholding 
the interests of the relatives in opposition to the patient's wishes. Such 
paradigm cases could be analysed and maxims drawn from them. Those 
maxims would yield some conclusions regarding the obligations which we are 
certain we owe (or do not owe) to relatives in particular situations. Clinical 
cases could be compared to the paradigm cases leading to justifications of 
views regarding obligations to relatives. 
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them? 
Perhaps the most helpful analysis of this issue would be based on the 
ideas of W.  D.  Ross as described in his book 'The Right and the Good' 
published in 1930.
3 Ross initially described the obligations of beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice which were subsequently taken up and elaborated by 
Childress and Beauchamp for application in health care ethics. But Ross also 
considered it important that we should bear in  mind to whom obligations were 
owed, and he distinguished between general obligations which were owed to all 
others and obligations of special relationship which were owed only to those to 
whom we stand in particular  relationships. His arguments are convincing and 
help to clarify the debate about possible obligations to patients' families. 
At the outset it should be noted that Ross believed that the moral 
convictions of ordinary people should form the basis of our moral philosophy. In 
a foot note he comments that 'The main moral convictions of the plain man 
seem to me to be,  not opinions which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, 
but knowledge from the start'.4 Later on he states that 'the moral convictions of 
thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics  ... [They] are rejected 
only when they are in conflict with other convictions which stand better the test 
of reflection ... The existing body of moral convictions of the best people is the 
cumulative product of the moral reflection of many generations, which has 
developed an extremely delicate power of appreciation of moral distinctions; 
and this the theorist cannot afford to treat with anything other than the greatest 
respect'.5 
It should be noted that in casuistry also the moral convictions of ordinary 
people regarding paradigm cases provide the maxims used in moral 
justification. 
47 In terms of health care ethics, 'the existing body of moral convictions' 
which has developed over many generations is encapsulated in professional 
codes of conduct and the law. It seems reasonable to assert, following Ross, 
that those convictions should be treated with the greatest respect. They do not 
include obligations towards relatives! Since the new philosophy of palliative 
care conflicts with those long-established codes it should be exposed to 
scrutiny or 'reflection', as Ross suggests, to see if this new idea of obligations 
to relatives stands the test of moral reflection. 
Ross considered that the tendency of acts to promote the general good 
is one of the main factors in determining whether they are right, but it is not the 
only factor. He asserts that right acts are not right only in virtue of promotion of 
the general good, for special obligations such as promise-keeping are also very 
important. So production of the maximum good is not what makes all right 
actions right.6 He states that 'we are all in fact sure that it makes a vast 
difference' to whom we have the duty to· produce the good? 
Ross distinguishes duties of general obligation (beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice) from duties of special obligation (promise-keeping, 
gratitude, and reparation of a wrong). We owe to our fellow human beings 
(including patients) the duties of beneficence - the duty to make the condition of 
others better in terms of virtue, intelligence or pleasure, non-maleficence - the 
duty not to harm, and justice. He notes that the duty of non-maleficence is more 
stringent than that of beneficence. 
It is reasonable to assert that the health care professional has duties of 
special obligation to the patient, as is laid down clearly in professional codes 
which are upheld by the law. In establishing and funding the National Health 
Service, the community has explicitly promised health care to the sick, and the 
relationship between health care professionals and their patients is 
characterised by that promise. Ross notes that 'To make a promise  ... is to put 
oneself in a new relation to one person in particular, a relation which creates a 
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the general well-being of society.'8 
Ross's account of special obligations is reflected in the moral style of 
professional codes. But professional codes, the law and general health care (as 
distinct from specialist palliative care) do not imply any sort of promise (explicit 
or implicit) to the relatives of patients. It is only the relatively new philosophy of 
palliative care which makes an explicit promise that health care professionals 
will work to improve the quality of life of the relatives of patients  Ross 
asserts that the prima facie rightness of certain types of acts, such as promise-
keeping, is apprehended by us, and is self-evident to us. He claims that 'The 
moral order expressed in the proposition that these acts are right is part of the 
fundamental nature of the universe'.9 He uses the example of promise-keeping 
to illustrate the idea that maximising the good is not the only criterion which 
makes an act right, but that honouring a duty founded in a special relationship 
is also important and indeed, is often considered to be more important. He 
illustrates this point by saying: 'If, so far as I can see,  I could bring equal 
amounts of good into being by fulfilling my promise and by helping some one to 
whom I had made no promise, I should not hesitate to regard the former as my 
duty. Yet on the view that what is right is right because it is productive of the 
most good I should not so regard it. '10 
Ross acknowledges that duties or obligations may conflict, and the term 
prima facie duty means that it is only a 'conditional duty' or 'tending to be our 
duty', rather than a duty proper. Whether it is a duty proper depends on the 
circumstances regarding other co-existing duties - where duties conflict we 
have to make a judgement regarding which is more pressing, and this 
judgement is not certain in the sense that a logical deduction from premises is 
certain. He says 'Our judgements about our actual duty in concrete situations 
have none of the certainty that attaches to our recognition of the general 
prinCiples of duty  ..... Where a possible act is seen to have two characteristics, 
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facie wrong, we are (I think) well aware that we are not certain whether we 
ought or ought not to do it; that whether we do it or not, we are taking a moral 
risk. We come in the long run, after consideration, to think one duty more 
pressing than the other, but we do not feel certain that it is so  .... Again, our 
judgements about our particular duties are not logical conclusions from self-
evident premises  ...  .in the moral case we have more or less probable opinions 
which are not logically justified conclusions from the general principles that are 
recognized as self-evident.'11 
It should be noted that promise-keeping and other duties are 'duties 
proper' if, but only if, other things are equal. Whatever one actually does when 
duties conflict, one does not feel good about the decision, because one has 
failed to do something which is prima facie right. This position contrasts with 
utilitarianism, according to which one can always feel good about a decision 
which results in maximum happiness or benefit because maximising happiness 
or benefit is seen as the only duty. Utilitarianism effectively ignores the moral 
relevance of the bad feeling which one has when there are conflicts of duties. 
Ross stresses the importance of reflection. He states that 'we are more 
likely to do our duty if we reflect to the best of our ability on the prima facie 
rightness and wrongness of various possible acts in virtue of the characteristics 
we perceive them to have, than if we act without reflection. With this greater 
likelihood we must be content.'12 This point regarding reflection is important, for 
it is likely in the context of health care that we may often have to decide 
between two conflicting sets of duties, those of general obligation and promise-
keeping to patients, and those of general obligation to relatives. In making 
these judgements, some ideas on the stringency of these obligations are 
helpful in deciding which duty is more pressing. For example, we might be able 
to draw distinctions between acts which it would simply be morally appropriate 
or fitting that we should perform, and those which are  prima facie duties. 
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developed the original classification of Ross in  his book 'Moral Judgement', 
published in 1955.
13 He divided moral acts into those which are obligatory and 
those which are merely fitting. Acts which are obligatory are further subdivided 
into those of general incidence, corresponding to Ross's general obligations, 
and acts of specific incidence where special obligations arise from the 
relationship between particular persons. His classification could be represented 
as follows: 
Obligatory acts: 
1 of general incidence - obligatory upon all moral agents and 
obligatory towards all persons and other sensitive creatures whom they may 
affect by their actions. These are 
i non-interference with the liberty of others to pursue their 
desires where these raise no moral issue, 
ii  relief of pain, and refraining from giving pain 
iii veracity or non-deceit 
iv treatment on a basis of equality. 
2 of specific incidence, i.e. determined by the specific character of 
specific situations. The moral character of the act is that of obligation arising 
from the relationship between particular persons. The obligations may arise 
from: 
a.  past acts of the individuals involved, 
obligations of promise-keeping and reparation 
or obligations towards the claimant arising from gratitude 
or past acts of agent and claimant as in fulfilling contracts 
b. association between particular persons, such as the 
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obligations arising from loyalty to a group or person. 
Fitting acts: 
are only of general incidence, aim at the good or prevention of 
evil, and always relate to the interests of persons. 
Raphael stated two qualifications which apply to all specifications of 
obligatory and fitting acts; firstly, they apply only 'if one can', or 'as far as one 
can', and secondly, obligations may conflict with and be overridden by other 
instances of obligation. This second qualification resembles Ross's concept of 
prima facie obligations or duties. Raphael does not deduce that a fitting act 
would always by overridden by an obligatory act, although such a deduction 
would be  important in health care ethics if fitting acts towards relatives were 
always to be overridden by obligations to patients. 
He also pOints out that there is an underlying condition that the agent 
must be capable of making a free choice, and that the obligation (and therefore 
the claim by the recipient) depends on the awareness of the agent of the 
desires and interests of the recipient. In respect of the latter condition it is 
important to note that perceiving the wishes of others does not necessarily 
entail an obligation. He says 'The sympathetic imagination of the wishes of 
others is not always held to involve an obligation. It is so far as negative action 
is concerned. If there are no countervailing ethical considerations, there is 
always an obligation not to thwart the desires of others. But positive action to 
satisfy the desires of others is sometimes obligatory, sometimes merely 
fitting.'14 
In distinguishing obligatory acts from fitting acts, Raphael asserts that 
obligation depends on the satisfaction of the interests of others plus some form 
of inter-personal tie. Where it is an obligation of general incidence the tie is 
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passed before between the agent and claimant, whereas obligations of specific 
incidence do depend on what has previously passed between them. Raphael 
asserts that an act which is merely fitting is one which satisfies anyone's 
interests or 'promotes happiness no matter whose'.1Slt resembles a general 
policy statement and no inter-personal tie is involved.  However, he admits that 
there are some desires which are bad, and which it is fitting to repress and not 
to satisfy.  16 
Like Ross, Raphael acknowledges that obligations to satisfy the interests 
of others, in situations of general incidence or in special relationships, may 
conflict. He addresses this problem as follows: 'Our capacity to serve the 
interests of others, however, is limited, both because of the strength of egoistic 
desires which may conflict with the thought of altruistic action, and because my 
serving the interests of A will often prevent my serving the interests of B. 
Therefore implicit conventions have arisen that only in certain types of situation 
is altruistic action strictly obligatory as opposed to fitting, and that in such-and-
such a set of circumstances my obligation to A is greater than my obligation to 
B. These conventions are usually due to the relative strength of most people's 
natural dispositions or to proved social utility, and often to a combination of 
both .... Particular types of situation in which one person can make the ends of 
others his own, are singled out, by the growth of convention, as specifically 
obligatory on particular groups of persons.'17 
Raphael goes on to say that promises and contracts are specific 
obligations which bind people by a specific inter-personal tie. The relationship 
between health care professional and patient is one of specific obligation, 
founded on the promise of health care for the patient. That promise entails the 
provision of the benefits of health care, namely life-prolonging or life-sustaining 
treatment, relief of pain and other symptoms of illness, and some forms of care 
required because of illness. This promise has obvious social utility. In some 
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between the individuals and the state, whereby a contribution via taxation is 
rewarded by health care to a certain level. 
The obligations of promise-keeping are contrasted with those of general 
incidence by Raphael as follows: 'A promise is the conscious setting-up of an 
inter-personal tie by pronouncing that some event, the production of which is 
thought to be in the agent's power, and which will benefit the future claimant, 
will be brought about by the agent. He thereby gives rise to the expectations of 
benefit from himself and 'binds' himself to fulfil them.'18 At the first meeting of a 
patient and health care practitioner the implicit promise of health care by the 
practitioner is mutually accepted. At this meeting an inter-personal tie is 
consciously established between patient and professional. This promise 
underlies their subsequent relationship. 
In contrast Raphael states that obligations of general incidence do not 
depend on the thought of what has passed between the agent and claimant. 
Instead, they 'do depend on knowing or believing that the person to whom the 
obligation is due has affective-conative dispositions to be satisfied.'19 The 
obligations that health practitioners may have to relatives do not depend on the 
thought of what has passed between them. 
In the context of health care we must ask whether there are any grounds 
for asserting that there is a special relationship between the relatives of patients 
and health care practitioners. The moral convictions of health care 
professionals, as expressed in their codes of conduct, do not entail a promise-
keeping obligation between health practitioners and relatives of patients. Nor do 
those convictions entail any form of contract between the relatives and health 
professionals, nor any debts of gratitude, nor any special ties based on loyalty 
and friendship. Since these special relationships, associated with specific 
obligations, do not exist between health professionals and the relatives of 
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general incidence. 
It might be objected that the existence of a close bond between the 
patient and relative should provide the justification of a special relationship 
between the professional and relative, by way of a sort of extension of the 
patient-professional relationship. There are three linked arguments which refute 
this assertion. Firstly, the patient and relative are still separate persons, with 
individual and frequently different interests, and conducting a separate 
relationship with the health care professional. Secondly, only the relationship 
with the patient is characterised by the promise of health care. Thirdly, since 
the interests of patient and family will often conflict, it is impossible simply to 
extend to the relative the promissory relationship which exists between the 
patient and professional. It would frequently be impossible, by the same act, to 
further the interests of both patient and relative. Whilst it is important to 
acknowledge the very strong bonds of love and loyalty within families and 
friendships, their existence does not provide sufficient grounds for claiming that 
the promise-based relationship of professional to patient can or should be 
extended to close family and friends. 
If it is accepted that only obligations of general incidence (Raphael's 
classification) are owed to relatives, then it follows that those obligations 
comprise non-interference with the liberty of relatives to pursue their desires 
where those desires raise no other moral issue, veracity, and justice. The relief 
of pain hardly applies in the general sense because a health care practitioner 
confronted with a member of the community in pain might be said to have some 
obligations to that relative as a patient. 
According to Ross's classification, general obligations towards the 
relatives would comprise non-maleficence, beneficence and justice. It should 
be remembered that non-maleficence is more stringent than beneficence, and 
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of virtue, intelligence or pleasure. 
It seems reasonable to assert that in most circumstances the specific 
obligations of promise-keeping which health practitioners owe to patients would 
outweigh the general obligations owed to relatives. Serving the interests of 
patients, to whom health practitioners have specific obligations (as well as 
general obligations) WOUld,  in most circumstances, rightly prevent them from 
serving conflicting interests of relatives. For the duty of promise-keeping by 
providing the benefits of health care WOUld,  in the vast majority of clinical 
situations, constitute a more pressing duty than the duty of beneficence as a 
general obligation to relatives. 
Fortunately, there is not always a conflict between obligations to patients 
and obligations to relatives. For example, it is unlikely that providing health care 
for the patient would infringe the liberty of relatives to pursue their own 
interests, for most often the relatives are capable of continuing to pursue their 
own interests if they so wish - they can decide how much they are willing to do 
for the patient. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine a situation where the provision 
of health care for the patient would be enhanced by deliberately deceiving or 
lying to the relative or by acting towards the relatives in an unjust manner. 
On the other hand, orie type of conflict which health practitioners 
experience frequently is that between the promise to provide health care to 
patients and a perceived duty to act beneficently towards relatives. It should be 
noted that whilst Ross includes beneficence as a general obligation Raphael 
does not - for him it seems that beneficent acts of general incidence are 
classified as 'fitting' rather than obligatory. This stance would considerably 
weaken the force of any duty to further the interests of relatives as opposed to 
the health interests of patients. 
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It should also be noted that there is a fundamental difference between 
the health care benefit promised to patients and other, non-health care benefits, 
which practitioners may consider they should provide for relatives. The explicit 
purpose of health care services is to deliver health care to patients. The 
intrinsic aim of palliative care must be to provide that health care benefit to 
patients. In contrast to patients, the relatives are not 'ill' - merely having a family 
member who is terminally ill does not itself constitute an illness, nor is 
bereavement an illness. The relatives will not derive a health care benefit from 
palliative care. It follows that improvement in the quality of life of relatives 
cannot be an intrinsic aim of palliative care. 
Instead it might be described as an extrinsic aim, something which it is 
'fitting' to achieve. Since an intrinsic aim cannot be trumped by an extrinsic aim, 
it is fitting for health practitioners to work to improve the quality of life of 
relatives if, and only if, so doing will not significantly compromise the 
achievement of health care benefits for patients. 
An extrinsic aim, something which it is merely 'fitting' to achieve, cannot 
give rise to an obligation. If it is accepted that improving the quality of life of 
relatives is an extrinsic aim, then there is no obligation or duty binding on  health 
care professionals towards relatives. Obligations to patients do not extend to 
relatives - their close relationship to the patient provides no grounds for an 
obligation to improve their quality of life. 
The point here is that if there were an obligation towards relatives it 
could not be an obligation to provide health care, since the relatives are not ill. 
Hence it could not be an obligation for health care professionals as such. Of 
course it might be argued that health care professionals have obligations wider 
than those to provide health care. For example, they might have an obligation 
to improve quality of life. But this, as we shall see later, would be an open-
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service. 
The philosophy of palliative care, in stating that health care professionals 
have an obligation to improve the 'quality of life' of relatives,  leaves health care 
professionals delivering palliative care with the difficult conclusion that 
somehow, outside the realm of the treatment of illness, they have an obligation 
to improve the relatives' quality of life. The problems associated with the 
concept of quality of life are described in chapter 3, whilst the problems 
associated with the concept of an obligation to improve the relatives' lives in 
some way are the subject of this chapter. 
The philosophy of palliative care functions as an ideology or set of 
beliefs which practitioners try to live out in clinical practice. The belief in 
obligations to relatives is rarely questioned, as is shown by statements such as 
the following in a systematic review of the level of need for palliative care: 
'Clearly, palliative care services must address the psychological as well 
physical symptoms associated with the disease process, not only in the patient, 
but also in the family units supporting the patient.'2) 
It might be asserted that bereaved relatives are ill, and that interventions 
by health care practitioners towards relatives may prevent depression during 
the patient's lifetime or in bereavement. Not surprisingly, there is some 
evidence that depression is common in the spouses of patients who are 
dying.21  But it is not really appropriate for the health practitioner to treat the 
spouse's depression as part of his or relationship with the patient. Moreover, 
normal bereavement is not an illness. Depression and adjustment disorders 
can occur and may then constitute a mental illness, but it is not clear that the 
professional caring for the dying patient has any obligation to try to treat the 
possible future illness of the relative, particularly as attempts to do this are likely 
to compromise the patient's care as is noted later in section 2.2. 
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as patients, do not have an obligation to provide those relatives with health 
care, and do not have an obligation of promise-keeping to those relatives, it 
remains to describe in more detail those obligations of 'general incidence' 
which they do have to patients' families. 
A plausible list of obligations owed to relatives can be drawn from 
Raphael's obligations of general incidence plus Ross's general obligations; 
non-interference with the liberty of relatives to pursue their desires where these 
raise no moral issue, non-maleficence or prevention of harm, veracity and non-
deceit, treatment on the basis of equality or justice, and beneficence. I shall 
discuss these in turn. 
2.1.iii  Non-interference  with  the  liberty  of  relatives  to  pursue 
their  desires  where  these  raise  no  other  moral  issue. 
In the context of health care this duty implies that practitioners should not 
impede relatives' pursuit of their own aims when those aims do not conflict with 
the good of the patient. Unfortunately, there are many circumstances where tht1 
relatives' goals may compromise the patient's welfare, and in this case the 
health care professionals may rightly decide that they should have no part in 
furthering the relatives' goals, and may directly oppose them. Some clinical 
examples illustrate common problems. 
It still happens that relatives may be told the diagnosis of a terminal 
illness before the patient and they then request health care practitioners either 
to withhold the information from the patient or deliberately to deceive the 
patient. But those practitioners, in virtue of their special obligation of health care 
to the patient, and also because of their general obligation of veracity, have a 
clear duty to provide the patient with any information he or she desires 
regarding the illness, or which is necessary as a basis for consenting to or 
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obligation to the relative.  It  is now generally agreed that the wishes of relatives 
should not prevent professionals from answering patients' questions truthfully 
and from providing them with the information they need in order to participate in 
decisions regarding their care. At the very least there is an obligation to offer 
patients information about their illness. Patients are able to indicate whether or 
not they want information, and the degree of detail they require. 
Strangely, despite this general agreement and unequivocal statements in 
codes of professional ethics that patients should be informed about their illness 
and treatment options, professionals still sometimes deliberately withhold 
information from a patient in order to comply with the relatives' request. Even 
more strangely, in 1999 the British Medical Journal published a short piece 
entitled 'A lesson to be learnt, A word out of place' which clearly imparts the 
lesson that it was 'right' and correct professional practice to withhold 
information from a patient (who had not indicated that he did not want 
information) in order to comply with the relatives' wishes.
22 Some professionals 
deliberately withhold information regarding a terminal illness from patients if 
relatives have said the patient will be distressed by it, or will give up hope and 
so die sooner, or would not want it.  It is clear that none of these reasons can 
justify failure to offer the patient the amount of information he or she wants. 
The most likely explanation, but not justification, of such professional 
conduct is that it is simply easier to comply with the relatives' wishes than to 
explain to them that the patient is entitled to information and that one's 
professional duty requires one to make it available. It is always tempting to take 
the easiest way out of this situation, and to justify it either by stating that one's 
obligation to relatives in this case overrides one's obligation to the patient (a 
very implausible account) or by stating that one should not 'harm' patients by 
informing them of the nature of their illness. Even if relatives consider it is not in 
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assured that any questions he or she asks will be answered willingly and 
truthfully. Furthermore, the necessity for adequately informed consent to 
treatment may require that the patient is given certain information. This is one 
example of circumstances where relatives appear to exert considerable 
pressure on professionals. This situation still occurs only because professionals 
appear extraordinarily reluctant to uphold the patient's interests versus those of 
the relatives. 
In other circumstances the relatives' pursuit of their own goals may harm 
the patient. For example, sometimes relatives sitting with a dying patient who is 
semi-conscious may attempt to give the patient oral food or fluids when the 
patient's ability to swallow is seriously compromised, and there is a risk of 
aspiration of food into the lungs. Since this is a risk of serious harm, 
professionals must try to prevent relatives from continuing feeding, (although if 
this occurs when the patient is at home they have a limited ability to prevent it). 
Usually, all that is required is adequate explanation regarding the dangers of 
the practice, and the lack of benefit from food and fluids when the patient is 
actually dying. 
Many conflicts between relatives' desires and the interests of patients 
arise when decisions regarding treatment and care have to be made for 
incompetent patients. In the UK, decision-making authority and responsibility 
for incompetent patients lies with the health care team, not the relatives, 
(although in the future this situation may change). This means that no adult can 
consent to or refuse treatment on behalf of another adult, nor can any adult 
demand for the patient a treatment which the health care team consider is not 
in the patient's interests. The relatives do have a role in decision making in that 
they should inform the health care team about the  patient's wishes, so far as 
these are known or can be deduced from previous statements. 
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professionals consider should not be provided because they judge that in the 
circumstances its harms and risks outweigh its benefits. It is clear that in this 
situation the health care team should bear in  mind what can be known of the 
patient's wishes and consider carefully the balance of benefit to harm. But they 
should not provide a treatment they believe to be harmful in order to fulfil the 
family's desires. However, in this situation it is easier to comply with the family's 
wishes, particularly if the patient is not likely to be in a position to complain or to 
litigate afterwards. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that where treatment 
decisions are concerned the obligation of every member of the health care 
team to the patient, in context of the promise of health care and the general 
obligation of non-maleficence, outweighs any obligation to the relatives. 
In other circumstances it seems clear that health care professionals 
ought not to thwart the relatives' desires or goals. For example, if the patient is 
at home the relatives are quite free to decide how much care they are willing 
and able to give. This is a decision for which family members must take 
personal responsibility, and whilst professionals can and should give 
encouragement, realistic reassurance and explanation regarding the patient's 
care needs it is clearly not the professionals' duty to try to coerce relatives to 
provide care. Indeed, such coercion would be wrong, for relatives must be 
permitted to decide what they are willing to do in this situation. The patient 
should be informed of their decision (preferably by the relatives themselves), 
unless the patient is confused or not fully conscious. In this case there is an 
obligation to respect the relatives' liberty to decide how much care they are 
willing to provide for the patient, and relatives take responsibility for the 
decisions they make in this regard. 
On the other hand, if relatives wish to prevent a patient from returning to 
his or her own home, the health care professionals generally have a stronger 
obligation to further the patient's interests than those of the relatives. If the 
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relative does not want to provide care), and if the patient wishes to go home, 
then the health care team have an obligation to enable that patient to return 
home despite the relative's desire to prevent this. This situation does occur 
where the relationship between the patient and relative has been poor, or 
where the relative is frightened of the presence of the very sick patient or of the 
possibility of a death in the home. 
It is not an obligation of the health care team that they should ensure that 
patients who wish to be at home and to die at home are enabled to do so, for 
often it is not possible to meet the patient's care needs at home. Patients who 
are living alone but require 24-hour supervision cannot have 24-hour care 
provided within the NHS budget. In the UK, enabling the patient to go home is 
taken to entail ensuring that adequate care can be provided there. If not, then 
patients are free to discharge themselves home, but health care profeSSionals 
are prevented by law from discharging them to their homes. 
In those cases where the patient's care needs can be met within 
available resources, professionals have an obligation not to prevent the patient 
from going home - a hospital should not be used as a custodial institution at the 
request of relatives. Whilst the ability to be in one's home cannot be described 
as a health care need, there is a freedom to go to one's home, and a freedom 
to leave hospital. When the patient's care needs can be met by outside 
agencies at home these freedoms require that health care practitioners do not 
prevent the patient from going home. Instead, it is clear that they should co-
operate with discharge according to the patient's wishes - even in the face of 
opposition from relatives. 
The idea of not restricting the liberty of relatives to pursue their desires 
resembles the more recent use of the concept of respect for autonomy in health 
care ethics. This concept has now come to mean respect for what a person 
wants, (as distinct from respect for a person's considered decision which has 
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could be universalised}. It is likely that, given this current concept of respect for 
autonomy, health care practitioners may consider that respect for the relatives' 
autonomy entails enabling them to achieve their wants, or at least not 
preventing them from doing so. But autonomy is self-rule, it relates to the 
conduct of the individual's own life, not that of another. So respecting the 
autonomy of relatives entails permitting them to make choices regarding the 
conduct of their own lives. It does not entail respecting their choices about the 
conduct of the patient's life. 
Raphael notes that the liberty of others to pursue their own desires 
should not be impeded provided there is no other moral issue. In the health 
care context, this means that one should respect the relatives' autonomy 
provided that there is no other moral issue - but there is usually another 
pressing moral issue, that of the welfare of the patient. Respecting the 
autonomy of one person cannot entail assisting that person to attain a goal 
which is harmful to another person to whom one has a special duty, such as the 
duty of health care professionals towards the health of their patients. 
2.1.iv  The  obligation  of  veracity  to  relatives. 
Although relatives sometimes request that patients be deliberately 
deceived, it seems very rare for patients themselves to request that health care 
practitioners deceive their family about the illness. Occasionally, mothers who 
are ill request that news about a grave illness be kept temporarily from their 
children during particularly stressful periods, such as examinations. Sometimes 
middle-aged patients who are seriously ill want to withhold information about 
the gravity of the situation from their elderly parents. The rarity of requests by 
patients to deceive their relatives suggests that patients themselves recognise 
the general obligation of veracity which health care professionals owe to the 
families of patients. (Perhaps it is surprising that relatives of patients frequently 
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to patients). 
When health care professionals divulge information to relatives about the 
patient's illness (with the patient's consent) they seem to be very truthful. This 
may not be because of consciousness of an obligation of veracity, but may 
simply be because they have no motive to be otherwise. In the case of children 
or other very vulnerable groups, such as slightly confused elderly relatives, they 
may give information cautiously and in stages, but I cannot recall an occasion 
where professionals deceived relatives. 
The obligation of veracity to relatives does not entail an obligation to 
divulge information to the relatives about the patient's illness. It requires 
professionals to be truthful in such disclosure, but it does not bind them to 
divulge confidential information about the patient's illness. 
Professional codes and the law regarding confidentiality of patient 
information are clear. Practitioners seem to accept (in theory) that whenever 
the patient is competent to consent to or refuse the disclosure of information 
about the illness to others there is an obligation on professionals to seek 
consent to disclosure. Despite these clear rules the issue of how much 
information the family of the patient should be given is perceived as a  common 
problem in clinical practice. In fact it frequently happens that the patient's family 
is given information without the consent of the competent patient, so that family 
members often have more information than the patient! There are several 
reasons for this. 
Firstly, some members of the public and a few professionals believe that 
family members, especially next of kin, are legally and morally entitled to 
information about the patient's illness whether or not the patient consents to 
such disclosure. Whilst the state of the law is a matter of verifiable fact, the 
moral issue of the family's entitlement to information is more complex. There 
are a few circumstances where it is justifiable for health care professionals to 
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will be seen that in those cases the justifications rest on ideas of non-
maleficence rather than veracity. 
The example of relatives caring for an HIV positive patient is often 
discussed, but in this situation it is very rare for patients not to disclose their 
HIV status. If they did not, the significant risk of serious harm to a relative who 
was providing intimate care would justify divulging to the relative the information 
about the risk of infection. The justification for a breach of confidentiality in this 
case is the significant risk of serious harm to the relative. This justification rests 
more on the general obligation of non-maleficence than on the obligation of 
veracity. 
Sometimes it is thought that sharing the information with the family may 
be essential in order for them to provide safe care for the patient, for example if 
the latter is an unstable diabetic. In this situation it is also very uncommon for 
patients to withhold consent to divulging the important facts. If the patient was 
at significant risk of serious harm because the relatives were ignorant of 
important facts regarding the illness, then the health care professionals would 
have an obligation to divulge the necessary information to the relatives. This 
breach of confidentiality is justified more by the promissory relationship of 
health care and the obligation to prevent harm to the patient, than by any 
obligation of veracity to the relatives. 
It is the case that breaches of confidentiality by divulging information to 
relatives are justified by an obligation to prevent a significant risk of serious 
harm to someone. 
Whilst family members often think that a breach of confidentiality is 
justified by some obligation of health care professionals to divulge information 
to them, it is clear in law and professional codes that there is no such 
obligation, nor could one be derived from the obligation of veracity. 
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relatives, by divulging information without the competent patient's consent, 
outweighs the obligation of confidentiality. This possible justification is 
discussed in the section below on an obligation of beneficence towards 
relatives. 
Thirdly, when patients are incompetent, and health care professionals 
are charged with the responsibility of making a 'best interests' judgement 
regarding the patient's treatment, then it is necessary for them to ask the 
relatives what the patient's wishes in the circumstances might have been. A 
best interests judgement is based on outcome in a medical sense plus what 
can be known of the patient's wishes. Clearly, where practitioners are required 
to make best interests judgements for incompetent patients, then they have an 
obligation to describe the patient's current circumstances to the relatives in 
order for those relatives to explain what they think the patient's wishes in the 
current circumstances might have been. This process inevitably entails 
divulging information about the illness. The justification for divulging such 
information in this case, and the basis for the obligation to do so, is the benefit 
of the patient. It is not a 'free-standing' obligation to relatives of incompetent 
patients, but derives solely from the obligation to the patient. 
Fourthly, professionals may divulge information to relatives without the 
competent patient's consent because this is the easiest course of action for a 
variety of reasons. Seeking consent from the patient takes time, and requires 
explanations to the family that such consent must be sought. Family members 
may then think that the patient's interests are being placed above their own 
(which of course they are) and they may not be pleased by this. Refusing to 
divulge information without patient consent basically entails opposing the 
relatives' wishes, and opposing people's wishes means that one may have to 
confront their anger/frustration/distress which is unpleasant or uncomfortable. 
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done does not mean that professionals believe they ought to do so. 
2.1.v  The  obligation  of  non-maleficence  to  relatives. 
Health care professionals have an obligation not to harm relatives. This 
is the same obligation that all members of the community have to each other. 
There are not many circumstanceswhere the treatment of a patient could be 
said to harm the family, but there are some circumstances where the treatment 
of the patient could prevent harm to the family members. 
In the latter case conflicts of interest do not arise - professionals have an 
obligation to treat the patient and by so doing they protect the relatives from 
harm. Two examples illustrate this clinical situation. 
Patients who are mentally ill (violent or demented) may become a 
danger, not just to themselves but also to those around them. In such a case it 
is considered morally obligatory to treat the patient, even against his or her will, 
and the law makes provision for this. The grounds for the obligation to treat the 
patient are both the obligation to benefit the patient and the obligation to 
prevent harm to the family. 
Occasionally competent patients at home request that their family lift 
them bodily, rather than using a hoist.  In this situation health care practitioners 
have an obligation to prevent harm to the relatives, and they therefore inform 
both relatives and patient of the dangers involved (to both parties) in not 
following safe lifting procedures. 
It is very difficult to imagine realistic examples where treating the patient, 
in the context of general health care, could give rise to a harm to the relatives. It 
might be argued where a patient is seriously ill, and life-prolonging measures 
may result in him surviving in a very disabled condition, and requiring care from 
the family, that the survival of the patient constitutes a harm to the family. 
Patients who are very ill (for example, after a severe stroke) are frequently 
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the health care professionals, whose codes of conduct, backed up by the law, 
indicate that they should actin the patient's best interests, not the best interests 
of the family. Professionals working in general health care do seem to follow 
these codes and the law. 
For example, during cardiopulmonary resuscitation, it is the patient's 
condition and prognosis which determines the actions of the resuscitation team, 
not the fact of whether the family might suffer harm if the patient survives! 
When patients have had a severe stroke, if their condition is stable but they 
cannot eat and drink, they are now fed and hydrated via nasogastric or 
gastrostomy tube because many of them will improve considerably. Feeding 
and hydration are not withheld if the family consider that the patient's continued 
existence is likely to be harmful to them. 
Even if one considers that one's life would be more pleasant, and some 
of the factors which are harmful to oneself could be removed if a sick relative 
died, it would clearly be wrong for health care professionals to use such a factor 
in making treatment decisions for a patient. In general health care it is 
acknowledged that any suggested obligation to remove or prevent harm 
(entailed in the patient's continued existence) from relatives could never justify 
a decision to withhold life-prolonging treatment from a patient. The British 
Medical Association's guidance on withholding and withdrawing Life Prolonging 
Treatment, published in 1999,23 does not include the prevention of harm to the 
relatives as a justification for allowing the patient to die! 
Although treatment decisions rarely cause harm to the relatives of 
patients, decisions regarding the place of care of the patient - where he or she 
should live - can have a major impact on the mental and physical well-being of 
the relative. Sometimes relatives may consider that it would be harmful to them 
if the patient with moderate care needs were to return home from hospital or 
residential care. This situation commonly arises where the patient is physically 
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relative. Such care is often physically or mentally burdensome to the relative, 
who is often elderly. There may then be a significant risk to the relative of the 
serious harm of mental and physical exhaustion. If the patient is competent, 
then he or she should make a decision, together with the relative, about the 
most appropriate place of care, taking into account the interests of both.  If the 
patient is incompetent, then health care professionals (mainly social workers), 
will usually be involved in deciding, together with the relatives, where the 
patient should live. This decision does pose moral difficulties for all concerned. 
One of the problems is that, strictly speaking, where the patient should 
receive the necessary care is not a 'treatment' or 'health care' decision, 
assuming that the required care could be provided either at home with outside 
assistance or in residential care. Such a decision is really a matter for patient 
and family together, provided that they are funding the care themselves. Apart 
from providing advice and information, health care professionals would not take 
or bear responsibility for such a decision. 
However, if governmental agencies supported by taxation will be 
required to pay the greater cost of residential care, then clearly social workers, 
as agents of the government, must be involved in the decision. They are 
responsible for allocating the budget available to fund residential care, and 
must ensure that this limited budget is used to obtain maximum benefit, and 
that such benefit is distributed justly. In this situation social workers often have 
conflicting obligations. 
The following example is common in clinical practice and does pose 
genuine problems.  A mildly demented patient would be happier at home in 
familiar surroundings, but the frail elderly relative might find the care of this 
patient mentally and physically exhausting and therefore harmful. Assuming 
that this couple have little money and only a limited amount of help is available 
at home, care at home will mean considerable and continuing input from the 
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because the relative is not 'paid' much via state benefits for looking after the 
patient. The social worker's budget for residential care is too small to fund 
every patient who would ideally be in residential care. 
The social worker has conflicting obligations; an obligation to prevent 
harm to the relative, an obligation to benefit and prevent harm to the patient 
(both as a general and as a special promissory obligation) and obligations to 
make the best and fairest use of scarce state funds. The social worker has to 
make a judgement about which obligation is the most pressing in the 
circumstances, and also about the balance of good to harm achieved for both 
patient and relative. The patient is likely to be incompetent to make such a 
complex decision, but may well be able to express a Simple preference, usually 
for being at home! The patient is the subject of a special relationship to the 
social worker, who in this case is functioning partly as an advocate for the 
patient. 
In this situation there is no clear rule which can be applied to decide 
whether the social worker should place and fund the patient in residential care. 
This decision will depend upon the patient's care needs, the relative's ability to 
meet those needs without exhaustion, and the competing needs of other 
patients for state funded residential care. 
There is also a complex interaction between the well-being of the patient 
and that of the relative. For example, an exhausted relative is less able to give 
adequate care to the patient. On the other hand, if the patient is unsettled in 
residential care the relative may feel guilty or distressed. A patient who feels 
secure in the environment of his home may be less agitated and distressed and 
may require less medication than when in an unfamiliar institutional 
environment. But if the patient is at home, with only a single carer day and 
night, then night sedation for the patient may be essential if the relative is to be 
able to sustain supervision and care. 
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about where mentally infirm patients should receive the health care benefit of 
treatment and continuing care and supervision. Health care professionals, 
especially social workers, will take part of the responsibility for such decisions 
for incompetent patients (their relatives will share responsibility, for they must 
decide what they are willing and/or able to do for the patient). 
There will be some circumstances where the risk of mental and physical 
exhaustion to the relative outweighs a risk of harm to the patient arising from 
residential care. The latter risk is small, and is probably confined to the 
requirement for sedation initially because of disorientation and agitation. The 
risk to the relative from exhaustion may also outweigh the patient's preference 
for being at home (where the patient is moderately demented and so not 
competent to make a considered decision). If the patient is incompetent to 
make the decision regarding place of care, then care needs are likely to be 
much greater, and to constitute a real risk of exhaustion for the relative. 
At other times, where dementia is mild and the patient is able to bear in 
mind the welfare of the relative in making a choice regarding place of care, and 
where care needs at home are very limited, then clearly placement in 
residential care against the wishes of the patient could not be justified. This is 
because the patient is largely competent to decide to remain in his own home, 
and also because the care needs of the patient are small. 
As the population ages and the incidence of dementia rises this problem 
will become increasingly common. Health care practitioners will have to make 
judgements in each case regarding competing obligations to patients and 
relatives, and will have to make a just use of state funds. Unfortunately, owing 
to the scarcity of state funding for residential care, some patients will remain at 
home when the ideal solution from a moral perspective is residential care. Their 
relatives may be harmed by exhaustion. 
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The general obligation of beneficence, which we owe to people to whom 
we do not stand in a special relationship, might require health care 
professionals to benefit the relatives. As has been argued above, this general 
obligation could not override the special obligations owed to patients, and so 
benefits to relatives could not be pursued if this resulted in compromised care 
for patients. 
Health care professionals might benefit relatives in four ways, which may 
or may not be morally justifiable. Firstly, they might give them information about 
the patient's illness. Secondly, they might offer 'counselling' or other emotional 
care to the relatives. Thirdly, they might assist relatives to achieve the relatives' 
goals in respect of the patient's treatment. Fourthly, they might assist relatives 
to achieve other life goals not related to the patient's care. 
With respect to benefiting the relatives by divulging information about the 
patient's illness it was clear from the preceding discussion [2.1.iv] that there is 
no such obligation unless there is a significant risk of serious harm to either the 
patient or relative. It was also clear that when health care professionals are 
obliged to make best interests judgements regarding treatment for incompetent 
patients, and so divulge information, the justification for so doing is the 
obligation to benefit the patient, not an obligation to provide information for the 
benefit of relatives. 
With regard to giving counselling or some other form of emotional care to 
relatives, conflicts almost inevitably arise between obligations to the patient and 
possible obligations to relatives. Two factors are very important in judging 
which obligation should override the other. 
Firstly, it should be noted that 'counselling' normally entails giving 
explanations and answering questions about the nature of the illness, its likely 
progress and prognosis, and the patient's care needs in the future, all of which 
is information confidential to the patient. Health care professionals have a 
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and it can be difficult for them to remember their obligations in respect of 
patient confidentiality. In this context it is clear that counselling the relatives is 
not possible without the consent of the competent patient. If the patient is 
incompetent, then health care professionals have to consider whether divulging 
the information would benefit the patient, and whether the patient would have 
wished the information to be shared with family members. 
Secondly, emotional care and counselling require time, and since 
professional time is often the most scarce and valuable health care resource it 
must be apportioned justly. It is widely recognised that the illness of a loved one 
is traumatic, and health care professionals therefore feel obliged to try to 
support relatives by giving the latter time to air their feelings and obtain realistic 
reassurance, thereby assuaging to some extent the relatives' distress. But 
there must be limits to this obligation, for the time required is necessarily taken 
from the time provided for the care of patients because health care teams are 
not provided with resources of time to care for relatives. 
Clearly, relatives who are less distressed are more able to be supportive 
to the patient, and to care for the patient. But this factor cannot justify time 
given to the relatives at the expense of time essential for adequate care of the 
patient. The obligation to benefit patients overrides the obligation to relatives. 
The problem for health care professionals is not the moral judgement here -
they are very likely to consider that their primary obligation is to the patient -
instead it is the fact that the relatives are usually far more assertive than the 
patients in requesting the time of practitioners, so it is much easier to give in to 
the relatives' demands at the expense of patient welfare. 
Moreover, health care practitioners have fears regarding litigation, and 
such litigation is frequently instigated by relatives of patients. So professionals 
may consider that there is a moral obligation to spend time with relatives in 
order to reduce the possibility of distress and financial cost to the health service 
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now considerable, and consumes a significant proportion of the resources 
gathered for patient care, then perhaps there is an obligation to try to avoid or 
forestall litigation. But surely this obligation should not override that to provide 
direct patient care. 
It might be objected that the relatives may themselves be mentally ill, or 
verging on mental illness. If this is the case, then they are patients in their own 
right. Care should be provided for them from the appropriate source, usually the 
primary care team or perhaps the psychiatric service. There is a risk in this 
situation that the team caring for the original patient find themselves devoting 
most of their time to the disturbed relative, so that patients lose out on the care 
they can reasonably expect. The benefit to the relative does not justify the harm 
to the patient. The solution to the relative's problems should be sought from the 
appropriate health care team, who then have a promissory relationship to the 
relative. 
With regard to any possible obligation of health care professionals to 
benefit relatives by treating patients according to the relatives' interests, it is 
clear from the preceding discussions that a general obligation to benefit 
relatives could not override the promissory relationship of practitioner to patient 
plus the general obligation not to  harm patients. One might try to imagine 
situations where the benefit to the relatives of complying with their wishes might 
be so great as to outweigh the special obligation to the patients. 
It might be argued that where a patient is incompetent, and relatives 
wish the health care team to institute a treatment which the team considers to 
be of no benefit to the patient, it is just possible that administering the treatment 
might be justified if the harms to the patient are so small as to be almost 
negligible, and if the resource consequences are so small that there will be no 
appreciable opportunity cost to other patients. In this situation it is undoubtedly 
easier to give the treatment, thus pleasing the relatives, and it may be justifiable 
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perhaps a costly complaint or litigation may be avoided. 
The problem with these justifications is that they may still not outweigh 
the obligation based on the promise to provide health care in the best interests 
of the patient. In UK law, and according the SMA guidance, treatment given 
without the consent of the patient must be justified by an expected balance of 
benefit over harm. In this case, administration of the useless treatment cannot 
be justified because there is no benefit to the patient and there may be some 
harm. 
It should be noted that the 'benefit' to the relatives of providing the 
treatment they want may be very small or non-existent. When the treatment is 
ineffective they still have to face the reality of the situation, and they may feel 
guilty for having been partly responsible for the administration of the ineffective 
treatment. This is particularly likely if the treatment has associated harms, such 
as chemotherapy or side-effects like diarrhoea or nausea from antibiotics. 
In some circumstances the benefits of a treatment to a patient, for 
example antibiotics, may be uncertain. In this case the views of the relatives 
regarding the patient's wishes are very important. If the balance of benefit to 
harms and risks is very unclear but there is a reasonable possibility of overall 
benefit, and the patient is not thought to have been opposed to the treatment, 
then clearly it is quite acceptable to provide the treatment. However, in these 
circumstances the justification for doing so is the best interests of the patient, 
not the benefit of the relatives. 
It remains very difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a clinically realistic 
situation where it is justifiable to conclude that an obligation to benefit the 
relatives outweighs the obligations of the health care professionals towards the 
patient. It is therefore not surpriSing that professional codes and the law 
stipulate that health care professionals must make health care decisions only 
on the basis of the interests of patients. 
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care  from  general  health  care  to  justify  different  obligations  to 
relatives  from  those  of  general  health  care? 
The philosophy of palliative care, in describing attainment of the best 
possible quality of life of the relatives as a goal, effectively establishes a 
promissory relationship between the health care practitioners and the patients' 
relatives. Once the quality of life of the relatives has been accepted as part of 
the remit of specialist practitioners in palliative care, and has been accepted 
publicly and professionally by them, then a specific obligation towards the 
relatives has been established.  By accepting this philosophy and enacting it in 
clinical practice, practitioners implicitly and often explicitly promise to try to 
improve the quality of relatives' lives. By so doing they enter the moral realm of 
specific obligation - the special relationship between the agent who makes the 
promise and the beneficiary of that promise. 
Not only have specialists in palliative care accepted this philosophy, but 
they have also advocated its adoption by all health care professionals in the 
context of palliative care. It has become known as part of  'the palliative care 
approach', and has been advocated as an essential part of the care of patients 
who are terminally ill. Indeed, it has been held up as an example of excellent 
care in context of terminal illness. But is it morally acceptable as a model of 
care, let alone morally preferable to the model of general health care where 
obligations to relatives are considered as limited to those of general obligation, 
as described in section 2.1.i.? 
The establishment of a promissory relationship between practitioners 
and relatives in specialist palliative care requires justification, and such 
justification entails several steps.  Firstly, it must be shown that there is some 
sort of benefit to relatives from the care promised. Secondly, that benefit should 
really be a health benefit in some way, otherwise health care funds are being 
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misuse of public funds, at best it is a deception of the public regarding the use 
of taxes gathered to fund health care. Thirdly, the health benefit to relatives 
must be considerable, for it is resourced at the expense of some health benefit 
to patients, for an opportunity cost is attached to all health care. Fourthly, a 
promissory relationship between professionals and relatives should not 
compromise patient care, but rather should enhance it. 
2.2.i  Is  there  some  sort  of  benefit  to  relatives  from  the  care 
promised? 
In trying to ascertain whether there is a benefit to relatives from the 
promissory relationship it is necessary to have some idea of what sort of benefit 
specialists in palliative care consider that the relatives might gain. Benefit is 
closely related to the concept of need. Specialists in palliative care speak of the 
'needs' of family members. In so doing they are meaning both that there will be 
certain benefits for the family (and perhaps patient) if those needs are met, and 
also that there is a moral obligation to try to meet those needs. The use of the 
term 'need' in the context of health care implies a moral obligation on 
somebody to try to satisfy that need. 
The suggested benefits of meeting those needs are that the relatives will 
be less distressed by the experience of the patient's illness and death, and will 
be less likely to suffer abnormal bereavement reactions, and will be better able 
to give love and care to the patient. 
The relief of distress and prevention of abnormal and severe 
bereavement reactions are the most obvious benefits to relatives, and thus 
constitute goals for the specialist palliative care team. Attainment of such 
benefits is often referred to as satisfaction of a 'need'. The 'needs' of the 
patient's family members have been studied, and results are quoted by Mary 
Vachon in her chapter on the emotional care of patient, family and professional 
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24 Where patients are at home 
family members have felt stressed, have perceived the patient's suffering as a 
personal discomfort, have had difficulty coping with the uncertainty about the 
course of the disease and have worried about their inability to provide care for 
the patient and to handle the patient's depression and anger.25 
Vachon accepts the results of a study by Hampe in 1975 which identified 
eight needs of family members of dying patients; to be with the dying person, to 
be helpful to the dying person, to receive assurance of the dying person's 
comfort, to be informed of the dying person's condition, to be informed of 
impending death, to ventilate emotions, and to receive comfort and support 
from family members and health care professionals.a; Vachon comments that in 
this study only three of the needs were met in more than half the sample. 
With reference to this (and other) studies, Ilora Finlay, concludes 'These 
studies suggest that the relatives have very specific needs related to the 
process of loss  ... .'27 She goes on to say that 'The family members each need 
information to make decisions about their future and to develop ways to cope 
and adjust to their loss'. Whilst she notes that this need for information may 
sometimes conflict with the patient's right to confidentiality, she does not 
suggest how health care profeSSionals ought to act when this conflict of 
obligations occurs. 
In a paper which questions the extent to which 'we' (presumably health 
care professionals) are achieving the WHO goals of palliative care, Gail 
Johnston and Charles Abraham state that 'Research to date indicates that 
carer's needs can be identified, but that they are often unmet'.a3 But what does 
meeting those needs mean, and is it always a proper goal for health care 
practitioners? 
No-one could reasonably doubt that the close relatives of patients would 
find the experience of the loved one's illness and death very stressful and 
distressing. It is also normal to find uncertainty difficult to deal with, whether it 
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challenge or to cope with a new emotional situation. But do these normal 
reactions in some way indicate a 'need' - something which can be satisfied and 
which ought to be satisfied? What are the clinical implications of describing 
these emotions and anxieties as potentially 'unmet needs'? The use of this 
terminology suggests both that health care practitioners can somehow satisfy 
these needs, and secondly that they ought to do so. 
But is it possible to 'meet' these needs? It is implausible to suggest that 
anything the health care practitioners could do would abolish the emotional 
distress. Indeed, it would be rather a sinister undertaking to try to abolish 
normal human anxieties and sadness surrounding the death of someone much 
loved. Perhaps meeting these needs means simply to diminish the distress, but 
if this is the case, and relatives still speak of their remaining distress, then have 
the health care professionals failed to  'meet' the relatives' needs? 
Furthermore, it may often be impossible for practical reasons to meet 
some of the relatives' needs. For example, the health care practitioners are not 
in control of either the time of the patient's death or times that relatives choose 
to come and go, so they are hardly in a position to ensure that the relatives are 
present at death. Relatives can sit with patients for hours, but then the patient 
dies when they slip out for a shower or a meal break! Have the health care 
team then 'failed to meet the relatives' 'need'? 
On those rare occasions when the patient has not wanted information 
about the illness divulged to relatives it is not possible to give relatives the 
information they apparently 'need' unless the professional codes of 
confidentiatity are breached. In such circumstances practitioners ought not to 
divulge the information, so ought not to meet the relatives' needs. It is perhaps 
surprising that in discussing the giving of information to relatives the obligation 
of confidentiality to patients is not mentioned in the Oxford Textbook of 
Palliative Medicine, but this is not uncommon in texts on palliative care. Most 
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meant by this. It must include information and reassurance, where possible. 
Since it will not always be possible to provide that information and truthful 
reassurance it is not always possible to 'meet' the need for support. 
Even if it is possible to 'meet the needs' of relatives, it may not be just in 
terms of allocation of scarce resources. Johnston and Abraham note that 
'Clearly, further investment is required in this area if this final WHO guideline is 
to be implemented across palliative care settings.'29 The implication here is that 
more resources are required, and ought to be provided, to  meet the various 
needs reported by relatives and written up in studies. If no more resources are 
available, as is usually the case, the implication is that resources provided for 
patient care should be used, thus potentially disadvantaging patients in order to 
'meet relatives' needs'. 
It is interesting that the relevant WHO guideline is not itself questioned in 
this paper. The guideline states that palliative care 'Offers a support system to 
help the family cope during the patient's illness and their own bereavement'. It 
would be possible to spell out exactly what giving support entails, the ethical 
limits (such a patient confidentiality) to that support, the practical limits, and the 
limits imposed by a just allocation of scarce resources. Yet no attempt is made 
to consider such moral limits. 
1I0ra Finlay concludes that resources should be allocated for the care of 
relatives in the context of palliative care. She argues 'The allocation of health 
care resources must take account of situations, such as intensive care and 
palliative care, where demand by relatives is high because it reflects an 
underlying need .... When difficult decisions are taken, the continuing care of the 
patient must also encompass continuing profeSSional care of the close 
relative ..... Time spent with relatives is not assessed in estimates of workload, 
yet the needs of families as secondary patients must be recognised in resource 
allocation.'3) 
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resources are not allocated for the care of relatives, it follows that if that care is 
given then resources provided for patient care will be expended on relatives 
and lost to patients. Secondly, the use of the term 'secondary patients' 
definitely implies that she is committed to the idea that the promissory 
relationship of professional to patient should also exist between professionals 
and the relatives of patients. Thirdly, she admits that relatives 'demand' care 
from professionals, she claims that they do this because of an underlying 
'need', and she concludes that because of this need resources mustbe 
provided. But it does not follow that because a need, (in the sense of something 
which would benefit relatives if it were satisfied), is shown, that the need should 
be satisfied. For it is not possible to satisfy all needs within available health 
care resources. This paper illustrates the problems of asserting that simply 
because something has been declared a 'need' it ought to be satisfied. 
It is important to consider the type of benefit that has been described by 
following the WHO philosophy in the context of specialist palliative care. 
Johnston and Abraham comment that when patients have been cared for within 
a hospice programme, the relatives received the following benefits; decreased 
feelings of guilt, dependency, loss of control, despair, numbness, shock, and 
disbelief.31 
Whilst it initially seems to be a good thing that these distressing 
emotions were experienced less, one must ask what the cost of achieving 
these benefits was in terms of patient care. One must also ask to what extent it 
is desirable for health care professionals to try to diminish the normal emotional 
pattern, albeit distressing, of grief in bereavement. 
The perception that the patient had 'a good death' is considered by 
Johnston & Abraham to lessen the relatives' distress and so benefit them. 
However, these authors point out that it has been shown that patients and 
relatives may differ in the factors considered important for a good death, so that 
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phase of the i1lness.31 This poses problems for health care professionals, for if 
they wish to pursue the relatives' agenda in order to alleviate their distress, 
then factors important to patients may be overridden, or worse still, completely 
ignored. 
Whilst it may seem improbable that health care professionals could 
knowingly fail to consider the patient's wishes and interests, unfortunately this 
situation does occur. Indeed, in the Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine, in 
the chapter on domiciliary care, Dr Derek Doyle discusses 'treating the patient 
for the sake of the relatives'. In this section he considers that doing what is in 
the interests of the relatives (rather than the patient) may be justified, and in 
one example he completely fails to mention the factor of the interests of the 
patient.$ 
In the example given he states that if a patient develops status 
epilepticus as a result of cerebral metastases from a recently diagnosed 
bronchogenic carcinoma, then it is justifiable to commence high doses of 
dexamethasone 'so that in the following weeks as the doses are gradually 
reduced, the family may enjoy the patient's final days with him'. In his example 
Dr Doyle omits to mention any consideration of the patient's interests. Instead, 
he advocates striving for a temporary improvement in the patient's condition 
(hopefully with a return to consciousness), followed by a slow decline, with the 
sole aim of giving the relatives time to come to terms with the patient's death. 
Clearly, a very temporary revival in an uncertain state of consciousness, 
followed by a steady decline as practitioners reduce the steroid dose, may not 
be a benefit to the patient at all! One might argue that the patient's dying is 
protracted for the sake of the relatives. 
The presence of the above example in such a prestigious textbook 
illustrates the important clinical implications of considering that there is a 
promissory relationship between the health care professional and the patient's 
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The patient's goals, which may be different from those of the relatives, may be 
completely ignored in favour of the relatives' goals. Whilst there is not a 
promissory relationship between health care professionals and the patient's 
family, unfortunately palliative care effectively establishes a fictitious promissory 
relationship by including as a goal of such care the improvement of quality of 
life for relatives. 
It is possible to argue that the fiction that there is a promissory 
relationship between health care practitioners and the relatives of patients may 
diminish the relatives' distress, although it could not abolish it completely. In 
particular, the relatives may benefit if their interests are pursued even when 
they conflict with those of the patient. On the other hand, it is equally possible 
that relatives may feel guilt in bereavement if they judge that the patient 
suffered in some way because of the pursuit of their own interests. In such 
cases their overall  dis~ress will not be diminished and may even be increased. 
So it cannot be concluded that establishment of a promissory relationship 
between health care professionals and the patient's family will inevitably 
decrease the relatives' distress. 
It must be noted that giving information and realistic reassurance (within 
the constraints of confidentiality) to relatives who are helping to care for the 
patient will very often assist the family to continue to provide effective care. 
Indeed, there are occasions when such explanation and encouragement may 
enable relatives to continue to care for a patient at home, so achieving the 
patient's goal of avoiding institutional care. The point is made by Robert 
Twycross and Ivan Lichter that 'Much of the support that the dying person 
needs can be given only by the family. Their love and attention are of 
paramount importance to the well-being and psychological comfort of the dying 
patient'.34  They go on to say that 'They in turn need support at this critical time, 
and should have easy access to those providing care for the patient'. The 
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providing care for the patient can sometimes mean that care for the patient 
necessarily suffers! 
Clearly, a sense of balance is required by health care professionals. 
Giving time to relatives to provide explanations and realistic reassurance is 
likely to diminish relatives' distress and at the same time enable them to 
continue to give love and attention to the patient. However, excessive amounts 
of time devoted to the relatives are likely to have a detrimental effect on patient 
care. It is also possible that spending a great deal of time with the relatives may 
not achieve much extra benefit for them in terms of relief of distress or 
avoidance of severe bereavement reactions. Furthermore, pursuing the 
relatives' interests at the expense of the patient's interests may later result in 
feelings of guilt on behalf of the relatives, exacerbating their distress. 
2.2.ii  Is  the  benefit  to  relatives  a  health-related  benefit? 
Alleviation of emotional distress and avoidance of abnormal 
bereavement reactions are health-related benefits, since they are both likely to 
lessen physical and psychiatric morbidity. However, the fictitious promissory 
relationship established between relatives and practitioners by the palliative 
care philosophy entails that the practitioners strive to achieve goals not related 
to health for relatives. Indeed, the practitioners are bound by that philosophy to 
try to achieve for the family 'the best possible quality of life'. This might entail 
suggesting that they plan a holiday, or make alternative career plans, or take 
any number of measures which could enhance their lives. 
It seems totally unreasonable to suggest that health care practitioners 
should have an obligation (via a promissory relationship) to pursue non-health 
goals for the relatives of their patients, especially as many of these goals could 
conflict with the interests of the patients. Moreover, using community health 
care resources to pursue non-health-related goals of relatives does seem a 
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of the sick. 
2.2.iii  Is  the  health  related  benefit  to  relatives  sufficient  to 
justify  the  expenditure  of  resources? 
It is impossible to answer this question in the absence of research 
comparing the benefit to relatives with the benefits patients could receive if 
those resources were devoted instead to patient care. What is interesting is that 
within the field of palliative care there seems no interest in pursuing such 
research. In the context of scarce resources, where evidence of benefit is 
increasingly required in order to secure funding for services, it is surprising that 
such studies have not been done. Perhaps it is because health authorities 
allocating resources are assuming that they are expended on patient care, 
rather than on the care of relatives. 
At a very simple level it would be interesting to measure the time spent 
with relatives, and to work out how many more patients the specialist team 
could care for if varying proportions of that time were used for patient care. 
Obviously a comparison of the benefit to relatives and to patients would have to 
be conducted and considered in parallel. 
This work may not have been undertaken because a considerable 
proportion of the funding for specialist palliative care services (more than 50% 
in many areas) actually comes from charitable sources, not the NHS. Where 
palliative care services are not under NHS management the benefit derived 
from resources may be less closely scrutinised, and charitable trusts are able to 
use their funds in whatever way they consider best. 
In the absence of evidence it is impossible to make a judgement about 
whether the health-related benefits to relatives could justify the expenditure of 
resources which are withdrawn from patient care. However, since it is clear that 
time spent with relatives is lost to patient care it seems reasonable to argue that 
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rationed between relatives and patients. 
It may be objected that health care professionals in the course of their 
clinical work already ration the resource of time between patients, even though 
they have a promissory relationship and associated obligations to each patient. 
The rationing process entails an obligation to distribute benefit justly, as well as 
to maximise benefit. This raises the question of whether giving benefit to 
relatives instead of patients represents a fair distribution of resources. It can 
and should be argued that patients have a prior claim to health care resources 
over relatives. So where time is scarce, priority should be given to patients. 
This is not to say that absolutely no time should be given to relatives, but only 
that patients ought not to be deprived of care essential for their comfort in order 
to benefit relatives. 
2.3  What  should  be  the  basis  of  decisions  when  professionals 
perceive  a  conflict  between  their  obligations  to  the  patient  and 
to  the  relatives? 
I have concluded from the above discussion that obligations to relatives 
should be those of general incidence, and not those of a promissory 
relationship. Since obligations to patients are those of a promissory relationship 
(plus those of general incidence) then they will normally override obligations to 
relatives if there is a conflict between the two. 
I am not suggesting that the professional's attitude or behaviour towards 
relatives should be inhumane, but only that they must balance carefully their 
obligations to both parties, and constantly be aware of the moral requirement to 
consider which is the most pressing duty. 
Clearly, members of the health care team will need to weigh up the 
nature, magnitude and likelihood of the benefit (or the avoidance of harm) to 
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avoidance of harm) to the patients, bearing in mind that the special relationship 
of promising pertains in their bond with the patient, and is absent from their 
links to the relative. The concepts of a bond to the patient but a link to the 
relatives might be useful as a way of using language to remind the 
professionals of the difference in their relationship between the two. 
It is possible to argue that a benefit to relatives could be so large as to 
outweigh a very minor harm or forfeit of a small benefit to the patient. Health 
care professionals may use this argument to try to justify pursuing the interests 
of the assertive relatives at the expense of the often vulnerable and unassertive 
patient. But even if the harm to the patient is considered small it cannot be 
justified by a benefit to the relatives because of the overriding obligations of the 
promissory relationship to the patient and lack of similar obligation to the 
relatives. If health care professionals, following careful consideration, decide 
that what the relatives seek would constitute any sort of harm to the patient, 
then they should not accede to the relatives' wishes. 
2.4.  What,  if  anything,  should  the  philosophy  of  palliative  care 
say  about  obligations  to  relatives  of  patients? 
Whilst it may be best to say nothing about our obligations to relatives, 
the idea that their well-being is part of the specialist's remit is so entrenched 
that it is very unlikely that a new philosophy statement without any such 
mention would be accepted. Granted this situation, then the statement about 
any obligation to relatives must be explicit about the nature of the obligation 
and its limits. 
It would be possible to state that relatives should be given information 
and explanation about the illness within the constraints of confidentiality to 
patients, that they should be given realistic reassurance, encouragement and 
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should be given with due regard to the time required and the opportunity cost to 
patients. Furthermore, when patients are incompetent the relatives should be 
asked what they think the patient would have wanted, and if possible, their 
agreement should be reached with the treatment plan, but the patient's 
interests should not be significantly compromised in order to reach such 
agreement. 
Many specialists in palliative care would not want to accept the above 
statement, preferring to extend a promissory relationship to relatives, as is 
illustrated by referring to them as 'secondary patients'. Within clinical contexts 
of health care in general, but particularly in specialist palliative care, 
assumptions regarding this topic are being accepted without question, despite 
absence of mention in professional codes of conduct. A discussion at 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels about professional obligations to 
relatives is long overdue. 
2.5  Conclusions. 
1. Whereas a special relationship, founded on an implicit promise and 
associated with specific obligations, exists between professionals and patients, 
there is no special relationship, and no implicit promise, between professionals 
and the relatives of patients. 
2.  Improvement in the quality of life of relatives of patients is not an intrinsic aim 
of palliative care. 
3. Pursuing the relatives' interests at the expense of the patient's health 
interests cannot be justified, even in the palliative care setting. 
89 4.  Patients should not be deprived of the care essential for their comfort in 
order to devote time to relatives. Achieving a benefit for the relatives cannot 
justify inflicting a harm on the patient. 
5. The philosophy of palliative care should not state that the aim is to achieve 
the best possible quality of life for the relatives of patients. 
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92 Chapter  3 
Quality of Life 
Thesis  3:  that  quality  of  life  as  a  global  concept  should  not  be 
used. 
Introduction. 
The concept of quality of life is central to the philosophy of palliative 
care. The WHO definition cites the quality of life of patients and their families as 
the goa/ of such care. If health care professionals, patients, their families and 
the community are to have some shared understanding of the philosophy and 
aims of palliative care, then a clear and shared concept of 'quality of life' is 
essential. The first question is whether such a clear and shared concept exists 
now or could be developed. 
The achievement of explicit goals is the measure of success of a health 
care service or treatment. When decisions regarding either the funding of 
services and treatments or the appropriateness of treatments for individual 
patients are made, the evidence regarding success of those services and 
treatments must be considered. If the success of palliative care services or 
palliative treatments in achieving their explicit goal is to be assessed, then it 
must be possible to assess whether the best quality of life has been achieved 
for the patient and family. The second question is whether it is possible to 
asses quality of life, and in particular to measure it. 
Since the goal of palliative care is achievement of 'the best possible' 
quality of life, success depends upon achieving a better quality of life than 
conventional services and alternative treatments. Thus in order to asses 
success it must be possible to compare the outcome, in terms of quality of life, 
of palliative care services and treatments with the outcome of conventional 
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for the function of resource allocation. It has also been suggested that quality of 
life data might improve decision making for individual patients. The third 
question is how quality of life data are currently used and whether it 
successfully fulfils those functions, together with consideration of  whether 
qualitative information would also fulfil those functions. 
If, following discussion, the thesis that quality of life as a global concept 
should not be used is accepted, then a fourth question is posed - what should 
be the goal or goals of palliative care? We have, then, four questions, and they 
will be discussed in order. 
3.1  Is  there  a  clear  and  shared  concept  of  quality  of  life,  and  if 
not,  could  such  a  concept  be  developed? 
3.1.i  The  context  of  quality  of  life. 
At the outset it should be noted that the concept of quality of life makes 
sense only in the context of human mortality, and our acceptance of that 
mortality. R.  S.  Downie comments that 'whatever its quality, human life by its 
very nature is a transient affair. Indeed, it can be argued that what makes the 
very idea of quality possible, is that death comes to us all in the end; death 
supplies the framework or the parameters within which we can talk of value and 
quality'.1 Campbell et al comment that 'A longing for some form of human 
immortality is a longing for more of the same: a longing for a prolonged earthly 
life, which itself has profound limitations. Once we acknowledge and accept our 
finitude, we can devote our attention to living well and establishing important 
priorities for the time that remains to us as mortal and finite human beings.'2 
Awareness of mortality is heightened in the context of a terminal illness, 
and it is perhaps this inescapable arid inevitable link between the fact of 
mortality and ideas of 'living well' that contributes to the importance placed on 
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that little life remains, and loss of opportunity now cannot be compensated by 
future actions, patients and all around them become focused on achieving the 
ideal of the best possible quality for the remaining life. 
3.1.ii  The  use  of  the  term. 
The term 'quality of life' has become part of the English language, and is 
now commonly used both within health care and also in daily life. The ways in 
which the term is used lead to conclusions regarding what it might mean.  In 
the context of health care, it is often used to mean 'health-related quality of life'. 
This is the sense in which it was used when unpleasant life-prolonging 
treatments first became available for illnesses such as cancer - one often heard 
patients and health care professionals say that in the context of a terminal 
illness it is 'quality of life that matters, not quantity'. Similarly, some authors 
have noted that the most appropriate aim for health care is 'not to add years to 
life, but life to years'.3 Such statements arose from the realisation that 
prolonging a life characterised by pain and other symptoms, plus perhaps 
disability and dependency, without hope of restoration of health, might not 
constitute an overall benefit to the patient. 
In contrast the term quality of life is also used more broadly outside the 
context of illness and in this sense applies to various characteristics of life as 
people perceive it. For example, people may speak of the quality of life in inner 
cities as compared with a rural environment, or of differences in quality of life of 
people living in different cultures or with differing incomes. It is in this broader 
sense that the term is discussed by Professor Storrs McCall in the Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy4 where the following three alternative meanings are 
described. Firstly, it may be defined in terms of social indicators such as 
nutrition, educational services, health care, crime rates etc. but it is noted that it 
is very difficult to rank or weight each factor in importance. Secondly, it may be 
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summed over the members of the population. Thirdly, it may be defined as 
perceived happiness or availability of the requirements for happiness. 
In the following discussion 'health-related quality of life' and the broader 
interpretations of the term are described separately, although there is of course 
a degree of overlap of factors which are considered important or relevant to 
each. 
3.1.iii  Health-related  quality  of  life. 
Since disease and subsequent health care have major effects on 
physical and mental functioning, but disease and health care are not the only 
factors which affect the many possible components of quality of life, it seems 
reasonable to assume that those providing health care should concentrate only 
on 'health-related quality of life'. 
This assumption is based on two premises. Firstly, whatever health care 
is provided, the patient's (and family's) overall quality of life is outside the 
control of the health care team, and so that team cannot take responsibility for 
it. It may be argued that many of the factors of quality of life in the broader 
sense, such as satisfaction in employment or relationships, are not determined 
by health, which is neither necessary nor sufficient for their achievement. These 
factors are outside the remit of health care. Secondly, it may be argued that 
those providing and funding health care should recognise the responsibility of 
patients and their families for their own quality of life, and should respect their 
privacy in governing their own lives. Thus those involved in health care should 
not endeavour to interfere in those factors related to overall quality of life which 
are not directly determined by or strongly influenced by health. 
This position is controversial, and further discussion arises in chapter 4 
in relation to psycho-social care, and chapter 2 with regard to care of the 
relatives. However, it is a justifiable position in a cash-limited health service 
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concept of health-related quality of life, and perhaps to assess or measure it, 
rather than to achieve the same for the broader concept. 
Ann Bowling, a medical sociologist, in her book 'Measuring Health, A 
review of quality of life measurement scales' on quality of life measurement 
scales, acknowledges that the conceptualisation and measurement of the 
outcomes or consequences of health care are controversial. However, she 
states that 'There is now a recognition that meaningful measures of health-
related quality of life should be used to evaluate health care interventions'.5 Her 
book is about the measurement of health-related quality of life as the outcome 
of health care. 
She further states that 'In order to measure health outcome a measure of 
health status is required which in turn must be based on a concept of health.' 
She notes that health status should take into account two concepts; 
firstly, that of 'disease' which is a pathological abnormality indicated by a set of 
signs and symptoms, and secondly, the person's 'ill health' which is indicated 
by feelings such as pain or perceptions of change in usual functioning and 
feeling. A general statement about the importance of the patient's subjective 
experience follows: 'What matters in the 20th century is how the patient feels, 
rather than how doctors think they ought to feel on the basis of clinical 
measurements. Symptom response or survival rates are no longer enough; 
and, particularly where people are treated for chronic or life-threatening 
conditions, the therapy has to be evaluated in terms of whether it is more or 
less likely to lead to an outcome of a life worth living in social and 
psychological, as well as physical, terms.' 
The latter statement illustrates a current confusion in health care. 
Bowling begins by stating that 'what matters  ... is how the patient feels' implying 
that this is what really matters. She further states that how the patient feels 
matters 'rather than' how they might be expected to feel on the basis of 
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However, she later concedes that symptom response and survival rates must 
be relevant in health status, for she says that they alone are 'not enough', 
which implies that they are necessary in assessing health status. 
There is a current fashion in health care and health care ethics for 
considering that the only factor of importance in health status or in the outcome 
of health care is how the patient feels, and that other evidence, even that which 
is uncontroversial such as whether the patient is alive or dead, is simply 
irrelevant. This makes little sense. Moreover, the term 'feels' is ambiguous and 
might refer to bodily sensations of discomfort or to unhappiness at one's lot in 
life. Bowling's initial implication that what matters is only how the patient feels 
must be rejected. 
Returning to her model of the derivation of health outcome measures, it 
is apparent that such measures depend on measures of health status, which in 
turn depend on a concept of health. She goes on to note that there is no 
satisfactory definition of health. This would appear to pose an insoluble problem 
for health outcome measurement if the latter depends on our being able to 
describe concisely what we mean by health. She rejects as insufficient the 
typical indices of health status which are built around negative concepts of 
health such as illness, disease and disability, and which measure biochemical 
factors, symptom rates or role performance. 
Her proposed solution is to approach the problem from the opposite 
direction of health outcomes, and to work backwards from those factors which 
influence health outcomes to construct a model of health: 
'There are multiple influences upon patient outcome, and these require a 
broad model of health. The non-biological factors which can affect recovery and 
outcome include patient psychology, motivation and adherence to therapy, 
socio-economic status, availability of health care, soCial support networks and 
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measured more comprehensively in relation to people's value systems.'6 
In this statement Bowling makes it clear that her model of health, 
constructed so as to serve as the basis for health outcome measurement, is 
very broad indeed! Based on that model of health, health-related quality of life 
must include many aspects of life including one's beliefs. 
Furthermore, ambiguity marks her final statement regarding people's 
value systems. It is not clear whether she means that the outcome of health 
care must be measured in terms of the patient's own value system, or in terms 
of some value system which is shared broadly among 'people'. In the light of 
her reference to individual cultural beliefs and behaviours it seems likely that 
she believes that health-related quality of life as an outcome should be 
measured in relation to each individual's value system. This returns us to the 
earlier confusion about whose assessment of outcomes in  health care is 
relevant - is it just the subjective view of the patient in the context of his own 
value system, or are there some objective aspects of outcome which are also 
relevant and essential? 
This discussion on Bowling's approach to the measurement of health 
care outcomes illustrates the problems created by trying to solve conceptual 
issues by providing a list of definitions which effectively stand one upon the 
other leading logically to a definition of a concept such as health-related quality 
of life. Her proposed solution is essentially circular - finding no generally 
accepted definition of health to serve as a basis for health status and health 
related quality of life, she uses a selection of factors relevant to the latter as a 
basis of the definition she then creates for health. She has resorted to defining 
health in terms of some notions of health-related quality of life, which is the 
concept she was trying to define in the first place. The problem here is that 
there simply is no generally accepted and comprehensive description of the 
concept of health, so that there can be no generally accepted and 
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concludes that there are essentially two parts to the concept of health-related 
quality of life. The first includes functional ability, which is to do with being able 
to carry out the acts of self-care and domestic activity, as well as functional 
status which is directly related to the ability to perform social roles. The second 
part is a concept of positive health, which implies 'full-functioning' or 'efficiency' 
of mind, body and social adjustment, plus related concepts such as social well-
being and quality of life which she sees as components of a broad concept of 
positive health. 
Whilst functional ability would seem to be a straightforward measure of 
what a person can actually do, and can be evaluated subjectively and 
objectively yielding a verifiable result, the idea of functional status is less easily 
assessed and more loosely connected to health. For example, one's ability to 
fulfil a social role such as parenting is dependent on many factors other than 
health. 
The second part of her concept of health-related quality of life, that of 
positive health, is problematic. She recommends the following description of 
positive health: 'the ability to cope with stressful situations, the maintenance of 
a strong social-support system, integration in the community, high morale and 
life-satisfaction, psychological well-being, and even levels of physical fitness as 
well as physical health.'7 She also states that social health is a matter of 
whether people function adequately as members of a community, and notes 
that there is no consensus definition of quality of life, which she has also 
included as an aspect of positive health and which includes 'perceptions of 
well-being, a basic level of satisfaction and a general sense of self-worth.'B 
In a later discussion on measures of life-satisfaction and morale, Bowling 
mentions happiness and self-esteem and states that 'indicators of these 
concepts are useful in assessing the mental health or well-being of people.' 
Happiness is generally considered a mood-state, whereas self-esteem and 
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to the psychiatric state of depression, further extends her concept of health-
related quality of life. 
One must conclude from her description of these two parts of the 
concept of health-related quality of life that it is a very broad concept indeed. It 
includes many characteristics of life which are not solely or principally 
determined by health, as well as concepts for which there is no generally 
accepted comprehensive definition or description. 
This apparently unsatisfactory conclusion is inevitable, for there simply 
is no comprehensive and coherent description of the concept of health-related 
quality of life, with clear boundaries between it and non-health-related quality of 
life. Such an account is not achievable, since the concepts which are part of 
quality of life in a broader sense are fundamentally incoherent and possibly in 
conflict with each other, as the following discussion illustrates. 
3.1.iv  Quality  of  life  in  the  broader  sense. 
Those funding and providing health care have recently become 
persuaded that the impact of health care on overall quality of life is what 
matters (and what must therefore also be demonstrated and measured). Thus, 
increasingly clinical trials include some evaluation of the impact of a service or 
treatment on the quality of life of the patient. Yet there is no agreement on the 
components of this concept, their relative importance, or how they are linked to 
each other. 
Lesley Fallowfield, a lecturer in psychology also qualified as a nurse and 
counsellor, published  her book 'The Quality of Life, The Missing Measurement 
in Health Care', in 1990.
9 Her purpose was to stress the importance of looking 
at the overall effects of treatment on the patient, especially in those 
circumstances where the benefit of prolonging life may be outweighed by the 
unpleasant aspects of treatment and continued existence in a state of disease 
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with the aim of influencing resource allocation, but in order to make health care 
professionals and the public more aware of the overall effects of treatment so 
that better individual treatment decisions might be made. Her book is 
particularly relevant to palliative care, not least because her inspiration for 
studying the subject was her observations of the adverse effects of palliative 
chemotherapy on a close friend, which stimulated her to look particularly at 
quality at the end of life. 
At the outset she says of quality of life 'Trying to define it, explicitly, in a 
fashion which would permit objective measurement, is another matter.' 
It is important to note that implicit in this statement is the assumption that 
if one can only define a concept, objective measurement will be possible. This 
assumption is questioned in section 3.ii. 
Since explicit definition is considered to be a pre-requisite for 
measurement, she is committed to producing a definition which is the following: 
quality of life is a 'complex amalgam of satisfactory functioning in essentially 
four core or primary domains' which are then listed as psychological, social, 
occupational and physical. The following table is reproduced from her book,10 
102 Core Domains 
1  Psychological 
2 Social 
3 Occupational 
4 Physical 
Quality  of  Life 
Typical items 
depression 
anxiety 
adjustment to illness 
personal and sexual relationships 
engagement in social and 
leisure activities 
ability and desire to carry out paid 
employment 
ability to cope with household duties 
pain 
mobility 
sleep 
appetite and nausea 
sexual functioning 
One must ask whether the importance of the above factors alters in the 
context of a terminal illness. It is possible that some factors, for example pain, 
have a greater influence on quality of life in palliative care than in chronic 
illness. 
Fallowfield  considers psychological function to be very important. She 
states: 'Healthy psychological functioning, that is freedom from anxiety and 
depression and the ability to adapt and adjust to different illness states, is 
crucial for maintenance of quality of life. It may even sustain life.' In the context 
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remain free of anxiety or frustration, and most people would consider sadness, 
perhaps even depression, to be a normal human response. It is difficult to 
interpret Fallowfield's idea of healthy psychological functioning in the context of 
palliative care. 
In the social domain she mentions the importance of the continued 
support and company provided by friends and family, noting particularly the 
fears expressed by some patients that their friends may abandon them, 
especially if the illness is prolonged. She states that these factors are 
'immensely important contributory factors to quality of life'.11 The comments of 
patients bear out the importance she attributes to close loving relationships -
many say that they could not have coped with their illness without the sensible 
and constant support of close friends and family. On the other hand, those 
close to the patient can be unhelpful, for example by 'smothering' attention, 
putting undue pressure on the patient to be positive, to strive to get better, or by 
burdening the patient with their own distress. Conversely, the family may find 
the illness more distressing if the patient is not considerate towards them. Love 
and well-intentioned efforts will not alone improve quality of life for patient or 
family. Some people seem to know how best to help the patient and to lessen 
distress, others unintentionally add to it! The mere presence of friends and 
family does not mean that they are necessarily helpful to the patient. 
The importance of paid employment is stressed in Fallowfield's account. 
She notes that 'Part of an individual's concept of self is derived from the various 
social roles he or she engages in, such as work  .... Any forced retirement due to 
ill-health severely threatens self-image, self-worth and self-respect, which can 
produce considerable psychological distress.' She also notes that being 
dependent on others for everyday household tasks may lessen self-esteem. 
These comments introduce the idea of self-respect into her concept of quality of 
life. She does acknowledge employment is 'not always particularly satisfying', 
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detracts from quality of life. She thus introduces the concept of satisfaction in 
one's job. In the context of palliative care the majority of patients are not 
physically fit enough to continue in their paid employment, and so this factor 
becomes less relevant in quality of life. Strangely, Fallowfield does not mention 
the financial consequences of reduced income, which can definitely cause 
physical hardship and anxiety. 
In summary one might say that Fallowfield, like Ann Bowling, comes up 
with a list of many factors which impact on quality of life and are relevant to it. 
Their lists combined would include satisfaction in one's job and with one's life, 
self-respect and self-esteem, morale, happiness, the love and company of 
family and friends, the freedom and ability to pursue leisure activities, freedom 
from anxiety and depression and ability to adapt to life changes. All of these are 
thought to be necessary for a good quality of life, in addition to good physical 
health. When speaking of the outcome of health care Fallowfield concludes that 
'Clearly, many covariates in any given patient's world must be considered, and 
if possible their contribution evaluated, when the therapeutic effects on quality 
of life are being assessed:
12 
3.1.v  A  coherent  concept  of  quality  of  life? 
One must ask whether the many factors considered relevant to quality of 
life are compatible with each other, and whether together they form a complete 
and coherent model of quality of life. One must further ask whether this model 
is applicable in the context of palliative care. 
Prof. Robin Downie addressed the first question in a lecture and 
subsequent paper for the Royal College of Physicians.
13 
• He noted that 'While 
the term 'quality of life', is used frequently in everyday discourse, perceptions of 
what it might actually mean differ greatly and are often incompatible.' 
105 Prof. Downie described the various models of quality of life. In addition 
he argued that the factors which health care researchers have considered 
relevant to quality of life are those same factors which they consider give value 
to life, hence 'a typical medical view of the value of life seems to be that life, or 
a life, has value to the extent that it exhibits certain qualities.' 
Using the legend of Sisyphus as an illustration, he described models 
which represent the various factors which may make life valuable or worthwhile. 
They are the 'significant toil' model, the 'happiness or well-being' model, the 
'choice' model and the 'social factors' model. 
The significant toil model portrays Sisyphus (following the intervention of 
Asklepios) enduring punishment but able to pursue a worthwhile job building 
cairns or shelters out of boulders, and occasionally assisting mountaineers, in a 
healthy and aesthetically pleasing environment, with time for leisure pursuits 
and able to meet friends who encourage and support him. This model is based 
on ideas of realising our essential human nature, which has its roots in Greek 
mythology and later in Christianity, where the pursuit of our work for the glory of 
God and the benefit of others, and the development of our nature in the image 
of God is emphasised. 
The happiness model is based on the idea that 'your quality of life is just 
how you happen to be feeling', where happiness or well-being are states or 
moods in which pleasant feelings dominate. This is reminiscent of Ann 
Bowling's statement that what matters is how people feel. The problem with this 
is that it implies that so long as a person has predominantly nice feelings they 
have a high quality of life, even if they are constantly confused or demented, or 
if their mood state is dependent on anti-depressants and lack a satisfying 
occupation or even good health. 
The choice model is currently very popular, for it is based on the idea 
that what is most valuable in life, what gives it an essentially human quality, is 
our autonomy or ability to choose our way of life. This model uses Kant's term 
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health care ethics, focuses simply on what the patient wants, rather than Kant's 
ideal of a choice based on universalisable maxims. The problem with the 
choice model is that possessing choice does not necessarily yield lives which 
would be considered to be of high quality, for example if people choose to lead 
a life of crime, substance abuse or even poor relationships. 
The social factors model stresses 'human inter-relatedness or solidarity, 
and the quality or the worthwhileness of the life of one person has a bearing on 
that of another'. As Professor Downie pOints out, this model is particularly 
relevant in a society with a publicly funded health care system and other 
publicly funded benefits. In this context an adequate discussion of quality of life 
must be based on an equitable distribution of the resources which give 
important benefits to everyone. The problem with this model is that one may 
have a financially impoverished society where benefits are distributed equitably, 
but where standards of nutrition and living are so poor that quality of life would 
not generally be judged to be good. 
The point which is being made is that these four models are actually in 
conflict with each other and represent incompatible pOSitions. Thus from these 
common and plausible accounts of factors which give value and quality to life it 
is not possible to construct a coherent account of quality of life. As Professor 
Downie states 'This makes it impossible to combine all the models into a single 
measure for evaluating health care, still less any wider social dimension.' 
It is interesting to note that Ann Bowling, Lesley Fallowfield and Robin 
Downie have all described a similar list of factors which give value or quality to 
life. The first two authors agreed that there is no generally accepted definition 
or account of quality of life, while Downie's account provides a convincing 
argument that this is the case simply because it is not possible to construct a 
coherent account from our various everyday notions about what quality of life 
means. 
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whether any of the models or accounts of quality of life is applicable to palliative 
care. 
The life of significant toil, where one's contribution brings about self-
development, self-respect and a satisfying life, is often inapplicable to those 
terminally ill who become increasingly incapable, because of ill health, of 
working either outside or within the home. According to this model, their quality 
of life would, on the whole, be very low. 
Similarly, on the happiness model, they will also appear to have a very 
low quality of life because of the low moods which most experience because of 
natural sadness, anxiety or periods of depression. Whilst some patients report 
interludes of an elated or happy mood state, it is unlikely that the predominant 
state would be one of pleasant feelings. 
On the choice model patients who are terminally ill would also seem to 
fare badly, for the illness removes from them so many of the choices in life -
they have not even a choice to go on living, for medical science cannot prolong 
their lives indefinitely. Whilst enabling them to participate in treatment choices 
does restore a measure of control over their lives, the inexorable progress of 
the illness fundamentally and severely limits choices for them and their families. 
Ironically, the social factors model perhaps provides the background 
against which such patients may have a moderate or even good quality for life. 
For if death is seen and "accepted as a natural end to life, and good care is 
provided for those terminally ill, so that they still feel valued by the community 
and know that they are receiving a fair share of resources, then self-respect, 
satisfaction with their lot and perhaps even contentment are possible. 
It should be noted that in all the previous discussion about factors 
important in quality of life none of the authors has mentioned the matter of 
dignity, a factor which patients and their families quite often mention 
spontaneously. 
108 3.2  Is  it  possible  to  asses  quality  of  life,  and  to  measure  it? 
Professor Downie concluded that since quality of life is multifactorial, and 
its component factors are inherently incommensurable, any attempt to produce 
a quality of life scale is bound to fail,  no matter how sophisticated the 
mathematical techniques applied. This is a convincing argument. 
However, there is a prevailing view in health care that however difficult 
the project we simply must provide measurement of the impact of health care 
on quality of life. The motivation behind this perceived duty is basically good - it 
is considered that if scarce resources are to be expended to best effect and 
distributed justly, then we need to be able to compare the outcome of one 
service or treatment with another. At the level of the individual patient, some 
authors, such as Lesley Fallowfield, consider that measurement of quality of life 
outcome of treatments will enable better decisions to be made for each patient. 
Added to these primarily good motivations is a current enthusiasm for 
expressing everything as a number or statistic, which is associated with a lack 
of regard for the results of qualitative research not presented numerically. The 
consequence of these strong trends is an overwhelming drive to establish 
quality of life measurement techniques and scales. The use of such a scale in 
every clinical trial of a service or treatment is now considered essential. 
It is interesting that this drive has persisted despite obvious problems in 
measuring quality of life in terms of the theory of measurement. These 
problems are grave, and appear insurmountable. It is surprising that despite 
acknowledgement of this difficulty sociologists, statisticians and health care 
professionals persist in the belief that it is possible to overcome them, and they 
continue to try to measure quality of life. 
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Measurement tools must meet certain criteria in order to be considered 
acceptable for research purposes. These criteria include validity and reliability. 
These are widely accepted concepts and tests to demonstrate validity and 
reliability have been established. Conclusions drawn from invalid measurement 
tools are themselves invalid. Therefore measurement tools failing to meet these 
criteria should be rejected. 
Validity is the extent to which a tool measures what it purports to 
measure. The following factors are important for overall validity. 
Face validity is the extent to which the items in the tool are relevant to 
the purpose of the test. In the case of quality of life there are obvious problems 
here - is a mood state like happiness relevant, or choice, or self-esteem, or 
ability to work? 
Content validity is the extent to which the tool covers all the aspects of 
the attribute to be measured. Considering the very large number of factors 
thought relevant to quality of life, and the fact that some are perhaps in conflict, 
it seems very unlikely that a clinically useful quality of life scale could be 
created which would meet this criterion. 
Criterion validity is the extent to which the variables can be measured 
with accuracy - the considerable difficulties with this criterion will be mentioned 
below when scales are discussed. 
Construct validity is to do with underlying theories and assumptions 
about what is being measured and how items relate to each other. The 
arguments raised by Professor Downie illustrate the apparent impossibility of 
satisfying this aspect of validity. 
A crucial question pertaining to validity is the identity of the person 
completing the assessment. The subjective nature of many of the items in 
quality of life measurement tools, such as pain and other symptoms, mood and 
self-esteem, make it essential that the patient completes his or her own 
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the opinion that neither the patient's family nor health care professionals are 
able to asses the items sufficiently accurately. Research on cancer patients by 
Slevin et al showed poor correlations between professionals' and patients' 
scores.  14 In the context of palliative care, where patients may be weak and 
weary, any measurement tools must not be too long, since it would clearly be 
morally unacceptable to use tools which are burdensome to patients. 
Reliability is the extent to which a tool consistently produces the same 
results, particularly when applied to the same subjects at different times. There 
are three common tests of reliability. 
The first, termed 'multiple form reliability' is carried out by using two tools 
in parallel on the same subjects. A high correlation of results between the two 
tools is said to indicate reliability. This test would not seem applicable for quality 
of life tools, where different tools may be measuring or giving more weight to 
different factors. 
The second test, termed 'split-half reliability', entails dividing the items in 
the tool into two equivalent halves and comparing the scores obtained by each 
half. The higher the correlation, the greater the reliability. The problem for 
quality of life tools is that it is very difficult to divide the items into two equivalent 
halves, as the items are too disparate. Any questionnaire which could be 
divided into two equivalent halves would be too long. 
The third test, termed 'test-retest reliability', entails using the same tool 
on the same subject on two separate occasions. If the tool is reliable, the 
results will show a high correlation. The problem with this test in the context of 
palliative care is that the patients' condition changes with time and it would not 
be reasonable to expect a high correlation between results obtained on 
different occasions. Thus it seems very difficult, if not impossible, to devise a 
quality of life measurement tool which  ~eets standards of reliability. 
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Lesley Fallowfield, who are both committed to the pursuit of establishing quality 
of life scales, admit that currently there is no satisfactory scale of quality of life 
in terms of validity and reliability. Whilst they may hold out the hope that such a 
scale may be developed in the future, the problems inherent in the goal appear 
insurmountable. 
3.2.ii  Scales  and  numbers. 
Measurement is the act  of attaching  a number to an entity which is not 
itself a number. In using tools which measure quality of life a number is used to 
represent the patient's quality of life. We use numbers in three distinct ways, as 
described by Downie and Macnaughton in their book on clinical judgement.
15 
The first is as a method of identification or labelling. For example, after a 
clinical trial the state of the patient could be identified as either alive or dead 
and a number, such as 1 or 2 could be used to identify that state. The number 
in this case is simply serving as a sort of short-hand label, and this is not really 
measurement as is commonly understood. However, Bowling calls this a 
'nominal' or 'classification' scale  and describes it as the weakest form of 
measurement.
16 She asserts that there are methods of data transformation 
which permit even this use of numbers as labels, 'nominal  data', to be made 
quantitative for the purposes of analysis. Yet as Downie and Macnaughton 
point out, the numbers used as labels have no relationship with each other and 
they are assigned in a totally arbitrary fashion. For example, 'dead' could be  1 
and 'alive' 2, or any other numbers we choose. It is simply not plausible to 
assert that numbers used simply as labels can be made into quantitative data, 
since the numbers put into the initial calculations do not represent a quantity -
they are serving only as identifying symbols. It is not reasonable to suggest that 
from numbers used as labels any quantitative  data can ever be obtained. 
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series. Bowling calls this an 'ordinal' or ranking scale, and points out that many 
health-status measures are strictly of this type. For example,  the Karnofsky 
Performance  scale rates physical ability between 0 and 100. On this scale 0 is 
dead, disabled requiring special care and assistance is 40, normal activity with 
effort is 80, and 100 is normal with no complaints. These numbers are simply 
placing the patients' abilities in order; rating a patient's ability at 40 does not 
mean that the ability rated 40 is half as good as that rated at 80, or that being 
normal is one hundred  times as good as being dead! The points on this scale 
are identified with numbers which happen to be separated by intervals of 10. 
This gives the impression that one states is ten units of something better than 
the state below, and that the difference  between each state and its neighbours 
is the same. This is misleading, as the numbers are simply ranking disability (or 
ability). 
Downie and Macnaughton pOint out that 'when qualities are arranged in 
a series and identified with numbers, the use of those numbers to perform 
calculations like averages or percentages is meaningless, as the relationship 
between points 1 and 2 and between 5 and 6 in the series may be completely 
different. Distinctions between qualitative entities can very often only be 
expressed through descriptions like 'more and less' or 'better and worse' as 
they have no true numerical meaning.' 
Despite this convincing argument attempts have been made to convert 
descriptions of entities into numerical scores on ordinal scales which are then 
subjected to statistical analysis. For example, a patient might be asked 'Do you 
feel depressed?' and the patient  ticks one of four possible response 
categories, such as 'very much', 'moderately', 'somewhat' or 'not at all'. These 
responses are each given a score from 0 to 3 or 0 to 4. Offering too few 
response categories, for example just yes and no, produces too crude a scale 
and insufficient opportunity for the patient to express his opinion accurately. On 
113 the other hand offering too many categories makes it difficult for patients to 
discriminate between categories.
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When the measurement tool requires patients to answer a number of 
items grouped into subsets, and the scores for all the subsets are added 
together, this is called a Likert scale. It must be noted that such a scale is at 
best producing an ordinal or ranking result. The patients have not assigned any 
number to their response - this is done by the test scorer - they have instead 
chosen a statement which most agrees with their own view. It cannot be 
assumed that a score of 4 for 'very much' is twice as bad as a score of 2 
representing 'somewhat', or that the distance between 0 and 1 equals that 
between 3 and 4. All one can really say is that the patient is indicating 
progressively more depression from the 'not at all response' to the 'very much' 
response. The same comments apply to Guttman scales in which patients 
make a 'yes' or 'no' response to various items grouped together in degrees of 
severity, and the responses are scored 0 to 3 or 0 to 4. 
Bowling is aware of the problems of subjecting data from ordinal scales 
to statistical analysis. She notes that the most appropriate statistic to draw from 
ordinal scales is the median, where the number of scores above and below the 
median is the same and the median itself is not altered by what those scores 
actually are. She notes later that summing up scores from two or more ordinal 
scales 'erroneously converts what is at best ordinal data into interval levels of 
measurement when applying statistical techniques. Statistical caution is 
required'.18 Unfortunately quality of life measures  require the scoring of several 
sorts of entities (such as mood, symptoms, self-esteem) on ordinal scales and 
then adding together the results and subjecting them to statistical analysis. This 
is clearly an invalid process and it is difficult to see how even 'statistical caution' 
could render the results valid. 
The third use of numbers it to describe a quantitative relationship 
between entities. Bowling calls this an 'interval' scale. The items on the scale 
114 are arranged in a series, as on the ordinal scale, but in addition it is known that 
the distances between any two numbers on the scale are of a known size. 
Usually they  are the same size -: the exception would be logarithmic scales. On 
the interval scale there is a constant unit of measurement, and so we can 
assign a 'real number' to the entity  being measured. It should be noted that 
zero may be arbitrary, for example the Centigrade and Fahrenheit  temperature 
scales have arbitrary  zero points since on neither scale does zero represent 
the complete absence  of heat. Downie and Macnaughton describe  entities 
which can be measured in this way as 'additive'.19 A 'ratio' scale  is like an 
interval scale but there is a true zero point, such as in weight when zero is 
scored when there is, in theory, no mass at all. A measurement  of blood sugar 
or the entities of a full blood count  are ratio scales as it is possible (in theory) to 
have no white blood cells or no blood glucose. 
The interval scale is truly quantitative and can be used for entities whose 
scores can be added together. All the common statistics such as means and 
standard deviations are applicable. 
The obvious problem for quality of life tools is that the entities being 
measured, such as physical performance, role performance, mood, social 
support etc. can be represented on an ordinal scale but cannot be represented 
on an interval scale, since it cannot be said that a constant unit of 
measurement separates each point on the scale. As Bowling says 'The most 
rigorous methods of data analysis require quantitative data. Whenever 
possible, measures which yield interval or ratio data should be used, although 
this is otten difficult in social science. Measures of functional disability and 
health status never strictly reach a ratio- or interval-scale of measurement.,a:> 
Yet she goes onto assert that methods of data transformation permit even 
nominal data(and by implication also ordinal data) to be made quantitative for 
the purposes of analysis. If an entity is such that it simply cannot be measured 
on an interval scale, but only on an ordinal scale, surely no method of 'data 
115 transformation' can enable one to obtain the valid statistical data that can be 
derived only from data which can be legitimately  represented on an interval 
scale. 
Information about the domains of life thought relevant to measurement of 
quality of life is inherently qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) in nature. This 
gives rise to two problems relating to the use of ordinal scales. The first is that it 
is open to question whether such information can even be represented on an 
ordinal scale. The second problem is that in trying to represent it only by a 
number the information is diluted, weakened or impoverished in some way. 
These problems arise persistently when attempts are made to represent 
entities such as mood or acceptance of dying on an ordinal scale. 
The first problem is well illustrated and acknowledged by John Hinton in 
his paper on the awareness and acceptance of dying.21  His research was 
conducted by interviewing patients and relatives and scoring their level of 
acceptance between 1 and 9 depending on the phrases they used to describe 
their thoughts. He states that "Acceptance ratings of 1- 4 represented degrees 
of troubled rejection of a fatal outcome, five for noncommittal and 6-9 indicated 
increasingly positive acceptance  .... Examples of brief quotations with the ratings 
for the full interview were: 
Rated 2  'I'm frightened he won't get better' (said with agitation and 
tears). 
Rated 3  'I feel depressed, lonely at night. I cry if I talk about it.' 
Rated 5  'I want to stay hopeful and don't want to look much farther.' 
Rated 7  'I'm rather resigned to the situation.' 
Rated 8  'I've got no fear of death, I've had my life - what happens after 
that who knows?' 
Rated 9  'We both know all about  it, it's accepted as God's will.''' 
116 It is clear that this data can be presented only on an ordinal scale, for it is 
not possible to assert that there is a standard unit of difference of acceptance 
between each state. Indeed, one might consider that such descriptions are not 
always amenable to an ordinal scale, for it is surely a matter of opinion whether 
the statement rated 3 above actually shows more acceptance than that rated 2. 
Hinton acknowledges this difficulty, for he says 'Certain phrases about ways of 
accepting death became familiar and fell into clusters which help describe the 
ways that people saw their situation. These clusters were not clearly 
demarcated one from another.' If the clusters are not clearly demarcated one 
must question whether the descriptive phrases can be represented on an 
ordinal scale at all. Perhaps, if one must use numbers, all one can legitimately 
achieve is to attach a number as a label to each cluster of phrases, yielding 
only a nominal scale. 
Despite the ordinal nature of the data Hinton still subjected it to statistical 
analysis. For example, he states that the mean weekly score for acceptance 
increased from 7.0 eight weeks before the patients' deaths to 7.5 in the week 
before death, and quotes a P < 0.05. In so doing he has definitely (and 
erroneously) converted what is at best ordinal data into interval data, (the 
problem identified by Bowling and mentioned above). 
The second problem, that of trying to represent  a statement said in a 
certain way and in a context by a single numerical score, is also appreciated by 
Hinton. In the same paper he says 'During interviews, measuring acceptance 
by quantitative ratings alone could seem as incomplete as estimating 
illumination in candlepower. Most people indicated or explained the nature and 
quality of their acceptance.' The analogy with illumination is powerful, for who 
would consider that the quality of moonlight could be represented by the 
numerical value of its candlepower! 
The attempt to reduce the meaning of the patients' phrases to a 
numerical score greatly impoverishes our understanding of what they were 
117 trying to communicate. Thus much can be lost in the drive to obtain quantitative 
results from studies of entities which can be adequately represented only in 
language. Hinton does realise this, for he writes 'The shaping of questions and 
measurements to give standardised and more reliable answers is necessary for 
research, but it may limit or distort people's self-descriptions and free accounts 
of feelings. This particular study aimed to explore and elucidate people's 
progress, so it was decided to rely  on observed weekly changes assessed by 
the same interviewer and compare different occasions or different groups. This 
choice means that the 'absolute' values are questionable (when are they not).' 
Hinton is so committed to the ideal of producing quantitative data that he 
persists in doing so, despite being aware of these major shortcomings in his 
method, whilst commendable honesty compels him to remark on the 
shortcomings of this method. 
3.2.iii  Weighting  and  summing  scale  items. 
The simplest way to obtain a final score from a measurement tool is to 
sum the scores obtained from each item or subset of items. Thus in order to 
obtain a score for the patient's quality  of life one would simply sum the scores 
from the physical, social, emotional and symptom domains. However, some 
items or subsets of items may be more important in quality of life than others. 
For example, it is possible that freedom from pain and nausea may be more 
important  in quality of life in terminal illness than ability to perform one's social 
roles. If this is the case then the more important  items should contribute more 
to the overall score. Weighting certain items deemed to be very important is 
often suggested or carried out. The problem in quality of life scoring is to know 
which domains should be given more weight, especially as certain domains will 
be more important to one individual than another. If quality of life is really just 
how the individual feels, and a score must represent that individual's value 
118 system, then the weighting would have to vary from one individual to another. It 
is doubtful if such a scoring system could work in practice. 
Summing scores from the various domains to obtain a final quality of life 
score also hides information about the differences in quality between one 
domain and another. Fallowfield noted this problem in relation to quality of life 
studies comparing lumpectomy for breast cancer with mastectomy.22 She notes 
that several studies showed no difference in quality of life outcomes between 
the two treatments. She comments that 'The impact that a diagnosis of cancer 
has on quality of life is not necessarily ameliorated by sparing women the 
trauma of breast loss'. The reason for the lack of difference in quality of life 
outcome may be that women who have a mastectomy have more physical 
trauma due to a larger operation, so that they score worse on the physical 
domain, but they may have a lower score on anxiety because they may have 
fewer fears of cancer recurrence. Telling patients only that the quality of life 
outcome of the two treatments is the same does not really give adequate 
information; patients should be told how the different domains of quality of life 
are affected by each treatment, since this knowledge is likely to have an impact 
on their decision. 
The summing of domain scores and subsequent disclosure only of the 
total quality of life score might well be used by drug companies to conceal the 
adverse effects of chemotherapy. For example, recent advertising material for 
the drug irinotecan
Z3 indicated that quality of life and performance status were 
maintained for longer (about 2 months) when irinotecan was used in 
combination with standard chemotherapy as compared with standard 
chemotherapy alone. The advertising material also states that the toxic effects 
of Campto are 'generally reversible, manageable and non-cumulative'. 
However, the prescribing information for doctors indicates that Campto can 
cause delayed diarrhoea, and 'if not properly treated, diarrhoea can be life-
threatening, especially if the patient is concomitantly neutropenic.' The use of 
119 quality of life information in the advertising effectively hides the existence of this 
severe side-effect which may make a difference to both doctors' and patients' 
willingness to use the drug. 
3.2.iv  The  use  of  the  mean  and  other  statistics. 
The presentation of qualitative data by reduction to numbers and 
statistics can hide important information or mislead readers to erroneous 
conclusions. For example, John Hinton in his paper on the progress of 
awareness and acceptance of dying, stated that awareness of dying rose from 
a mean of 7.6 eight weeks before death to 8.1  at the last available assessment, 
(paired t = 2.45, P < 0.05).24 However, he goes on to say that many individuals 
did not follow the group's average path in the final two months. Out of 154 
scores from 77 patients and their relatives, 72 patients and relatives showed 
that awareness may follow any direction. This important message is completely 
lost by focusing only on the mean score which leads to the erroneous 
conclusion that the average patient or relative increases awareness in the last 
eight weeks. Hinton goes on to explain that progress in awareness actually 
increased in only 15% of patients and relatives, and the change in this groups' 
awareness caused the increased mean score. An important lesson for 
clinicians from this paper should be that nearly half of the patients and relatives 
did not increase their awareness of dying despite the increasing evidence of the 
last eight weeks of life. Unfortunately this message is obfuscated or perhaps 
completely lost to most readers because of emphasis laid on the rise in mean 
scores. Understanding of progress in awareness of dying may actually be 
impeded by presentation of this important qualitative data in a quantitative form. 
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Economists have devised a series of scales which are attempts to assign 
a numerical value to health states and thus to quality of life. Bowling  describes 
these as utility rating scales. Five types of scale have been used.25 
The first is a version of a visual analogue scale(VAS) which is a line, 
usually 10cms long, one end of which represents health or the most desirable 
state and is scored as 1 and the other end of which is death or least desirable 
state and is scored O.  The scorer, usually a member of the public and less 
commonly a patient, marks points on the line corresponding to the 
desirableness of various health states. Since the distances along the line of the 
various points is measured to obtain a score between 0 and 1 for each health 
state it is assumed that results can be presented as an interval scale. Bowling 
comments that subjects find this method difficult, and it cannot be assumed that 
in using any VAS the subject is using an interval scale - it might actually be 
closer to a logarithmic scale. 
The second method is the standard gamble. In this case the subject is 
asked what probapility of getting the desirable (or least desirable) outcome will 
make him indifferent between taking the gamble as opposed to choosing the 
certainty of one option. For example, he may be asked to consider whether he 
would prefer to continue in a poor health state or to undertake a risky but 
curative operation. He would be asked what probability of success in the 
operation would make him equally disposed to either continue in poor health or 
take the operation choice. If the health state is considered very poor he will 
choose operation even when the risk of intra-operative death is high. From 
subjects' responses to this type of question a score is allotted to the poor health 
state described. 
The third method is equivalence studies. Subjects are asked whether 
they would choose to keep alive a group of fairly well people or a larger number 
of less well people. Each subject is asked to identify the numbers at which they 
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equivalences a score relating to the health states is allotted. 
The fourth method is the time trade-off. Subjects are asked to judge how 
long a period in one health state could be traded for a different period in 
another health state. Bowling states that this is the method which subjects find 
easiest to use. 
The fifth and most widely discussed method of assessing health 
outcomes is the quality adjusted life year or OAL  Y.  Members of the public are 
asked to consider life in various health states and rate the value of that state 
between 0 and 1. The number of OALY's gained by a health intervention is the 
number of years gained or spent in the new health state multiplied by the value 
(between 0 and 1  )of that state. Since OAL  V's have been used in discussions 
regarding resource allocation a more detailed discussion of the moral problems 
inherent in that use follows in section 3.3.i on the use of quality of life scales. 
Bowling comments that none of the utility scales has been tested 
adequately for reliability or validity, and subjects very rarely have experience of 
the illness state they are being asked to value. It is difficult to maintain that 
people who have no experience of an illness state can evaluate that state. 
Bowling further comments that all the utility rating scales assume that 
'people are being rational when assessing quality of life, and that individual 
value judgements are not interfering with their ratings.' This statement returns 
us to the initial problem of whether your quality of life is just what you think it is, 
i.e. it is entirely subjective, or whether there are entities which we all consider 
important so that it is possible and legitimate to derive an objective opinion on 
someone's quality of life. At the beginning of her book Bowling comments that 
quality of life should be evaluated according to each individual's values, yet at 
this point she seems to be saying that individuals should not allow their own 
value judgements to interfere or influence their scoring of the quality of a health 
state. This fundamental confusion is inherent in discussions of quality of life 
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of life. 
Bowling also comments that it is also difficult to quantify quality of life, 
which is a multi-dimensional concept, in terms of one figure. One must 
conclude that she considers that subjects should score each domain 
separately. It is not clear whether she considers it is then useful to sum or 
otherwise combine those scores to obtain a single score, as most quality of life 
scales do. Fallowfield is aware that acceptance of combining all the domain 
'scores' to establish a single score 'implies that a patient with a lowish score in 
one domain can be compensated in some way by high scores in other areas.'a5 
It seems absurd to conClude that a patient's quality of life really improves 
because a package of care is put into the patient's home to compensate for 
increasing weakness and exhaustion. 
In the conclusion of her book Lesley Fallowfield acknowledges that  it 
has not been possible to create a satisfactory tool with which to measure 
quality of life, and she also notes that 'in taking the straight statistical route we 
may forget or artificially invalidate some other interesting and important paths 
and byways. The immeasurable aspects of life which give colour, meaning or 
purpose may be subtly altered or affected by different treatments; they should 
not be ignored because we cannot yet find a suitable number with which to tag 
them.' This last comment suggests that she believes that if we keep trying we 
will find a way to represent as a number the many qualitative entities which are 
part of our incoherent  concept of quality of life. She is committed to this ideal 
and says 'No one seriously involved in the scientific measurement of quality of 
life can doubt the need to develop and refine our assessment tools; if we really 
want clinical medicine to embrace quality of life variables as valid outcome 
measures then we must produce good quantitative tools.'27 
Despite appreciating the problems of quantitative assessment of quality 
of life Fallowfield remains convinced that it is possible and desirable to create 
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discussion has shown that it is very questionable whether it is possible or 
desirable to use quantitative tools to create numerical representations of quality 
of life. 
3.2.vi  Should  quality  of  life  be  represented  as  numerical  data? 
I have concluded that research data on quality of life is essentially 
qualitative, not quantitative data. Downie and Macnaughton ask whether 
researchers involved in qualitative research should use numbers to present 
their findings - they concludes that they should not.:B There are five problems 
associated with presenting qualitative data on the entities relevant to quality of 
life as numerical scores with attached statistical analysis. 
Firstly, since we have no shared and coherent concept of quality of life 
we are not really sure what we are measuring. For example when people say 
they are satisfied with life, we cannot say quite what they are satisfied with, and 
there is no clear concept of happiness or even dignity - the latter being a 
relevant but little discussed entity of importance at the end of life. 
Secondly, on the ordinal scales which researchers have tried to develop 
from questionnaires it is difficult to identify discrete points on what is usually a 
continuum of experience or meaning. 
Thirdly, since the scales used are basically ordinal rather than interval 
they are not amenable to statistical analysis (apart from identifying the median 
score). Statistical analyses are often carried out on such ordinal data but are 
misleading. Such analysis is often presented because the researchers believe 
that only statistical knowledge will be generalizable outside the study context 
and might therefore be useful in clinical work and worthy of publication. 
Fourthly, whether an interviewer is used or the subject fills out his own 
questionnaire it is possible that the act of thinking about the questions and 
dwelling upon one's diagnosis, prognosis, mood, social support and physical 
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he or she is part of the measurement tool and may have a major effect on the 
score allotted to the patient's response. As Downie and Macnaughton say in 
their previously mentioned discussion of scales 'the measurement tool might 
distort what is being measured.' 
Fifthly, the results of a quality of life study in a particular clinic or by a 
particular team may well be context-specific, and care must be exercised in 
extrapolating from them to other settings. C Salisbury et al  make this pOint in 
their review of the evidence of the effect of speCialist palliative care on quality of 
life, where they comment  that the generally rapid but variable process of the 
patient's decline makes comparative studies across different settings and 
models of organisation very difficult.
3l 
One must conclude that research on quality of life is qualitative in nature. 
It cannot be satisfactorily quantified. Therefore it is not generalisable to other 
clinical settings in the way that quantitative research is. This is not to say that 
qualitative research in this context is useless. It is important to review the ways 
in which people are currently attempting to use quality of life tools, and to ask 
how the relevant qualitative data which we can gain might be useful in those 
areas. 
3.3  How  is  quality  of  life  data  used,  would  qualitative  data 
suffice? 
The plethora of studies on quality of life has developed because 
those providing and funding health care have come to consider that data on 
quality of life is essential for two main functions. The first is the allocation of 
resources for treatments and services, and the second is to improve decision 
making for individual patients. 
125 For each of these functions it is important to ask whether quantitative 
quality of life assessment tools are really essential, and whether the qualitative 
data we can obtain could be used instead. 
3.3.i  Allocation  of  resources  to  services  and  treatment. 
The first function is assessment (usually measurement is considered 
essential) of the outcomes of health care services and treatments for the 
purposes of allocating scarce resources so as to gain maximum benefit and 
distribute that benefit justly. A new body, the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) has been set up in the United Kingdom to assess the 
outcomes of new and existing treatments and it will require quality of life data 
for those assessments. Already Health Authorities are asking for evidence of 
the outcome and quality of life impact of treatments for cancer.ro 
Many studies have attempted to assess or measure the impact of 
specialist palliative care services on patients' and relatives' quality of life, in 
order to provide the information which those allocating resources require, and 
in order to justify the present existence of such services. No-one would wish to 
work in a specialist service which was clearly of no more benefit to patients 
overall than the conventional care provided. 
It may be thought surprising that attempts have been made to assess the 
effects of a whole service - usually it is the outcome of individual treatments 
which is assessed. For example, it is not thought necessary to assess the 
impact of the orthopaedic service as a single entity on quality of life, but instead 
the outcomes of individual treatments such as hip and knee replacements are 
evaluated. No-one seriously disputes the benefits of availability of orthopaedic 
surgery. In contrast, palliative care is a relatively new specialty which feels it 
has to justify its continued existence by proving that it provides a greater overall 
benefit to patients than good conventional care by non-specialists. For, unlike 
orthopaedic surgery, palliative care can be carried out by non-specialists. 
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assessing the impact, on quality of life, of a specialist diabetic or stroke 
rehabilitation service. But if one were evaluating a diabetic service one might 
look for outcomes in terms of the various complications of diabetes, such as 
condition of feet and eyes and cardiovascular complications rather than global 
quality of life. 
Since palliative care philosophy states that the aim of such care is the 
best possible quality of life for patients and their families it appears essential to 
evaluate outcome in terms of quality of life. Whilst pain and symptom control 
are important, evaluating these factors alone will not suffice to prove that 
palliative care services are capable of achieving their stated goal. Palliative 
care services are committed, via their philosophy, to evaluating their effect on 
quality of life. This becomes particularly important in the context of a service 
which explicitly states that it will not increase quantity of life. If that specialist 
service has no impact on quality of life its justification for existence and funding 
is removed. 
In 1999 a systematic literature review of the impact of specialist palliative 
care services on patients' quality of life was carried out by Salisbury et ai, and 
was published in the journal 'Palliative Medicine'.31 Eighty-six relevant papers 
were reviewed but the overall conclusion was that 'there is little robust evidence 
that any form of organisation of specialist palliative care offers significant 
advantages in terms of the impact on patients' quality of life.' The reviewers 
offer several possible interpretations of the findings. 
Their first suggestion is that the models of specialist palliative care do 
not in fact benefit patients in terms of well-being more than conventional care. 
Their second suggestion is that the research methods may have been 
inadequate to answer the relevant questions, and the tools used may not have 
been sufficiently sensitive or may not have been truly relevant to the values and 
aims of palliative care in terms of quality of life. They admit that whilst 
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problems and none have yet achieved widespread acceptability.' They 
acknowledge that in some circumstances, particularly regarding quality of life in 
palliative care, it is impossible to carry our randomised controlled trials. They 
conclude that 'Outcome measures should assess separate components of 
quality of life, particularly pain control, as well as allowing global assessments. 
Researchers should use measures which have been validated among 
terminally ill patients in similar settings.' They note the considerable difficulties 
of using relatives or health care professionals as proxies for patients, since 
some studies have shown a poor correlation between patients' and proxies' 
assessments. 
Despite these monumental difficulties Salisbury et al still assert that 
'Although the methodological difficulties must not be under-estimated, there 
remains a need for rigorous comparative research (both randomised and non-
randomised) to evaluate all models of specialist palliative care, if expansion of 
these forms of care is to be justified by evidence of improvement in patients' 
quality of life.' 
The philosophy of palliative care appears to have chained researchers to 
the wheel of a task which is unachievable. It would be preferable to conduct 
qualitative research, of a comparative nature, on the impact of specialist 
palliative care on separate domains of quality of life. This would be difficult but 
is not logically impossible. If such qualitative studies indicated benefit to 
patients, then those allocating resources would have to make value 
judgements, using qualitative data from the research, regarding the amount of 
resources that should be expended to improve patient's well-being. 
It would be unhelpful to try to combine the evaluation of the domains of 
quality of life because they are so different in nature that they are 
incommensurable - they cannot logically be weighed against each other or 
added to make a single global assessment. A global assessment, even in 
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domains - a service which improved pain control but also managed to increase 
psychological distress would not be very helpful. 
The problem that remains for those funding and providing health care is 
that using the available measurement tools the evidence suggests that 
specialist palliative care is not achieving its goal. I would suggest that this result 
has occurred because the goal is unattainable - it simply is not possible to 
measure quality of life. If I am correct, it will never be possible to produce 
evidence to suggest that palliative care achieves its goal, so funders and 
providers of health care will have great difficulty justifying its provision. (They 
might argue that it is more cost-effective than other forms of care, or that 
patients prefer it, and the first of these arguments might justify its provision. 
Patient preference alone cannot justify provision of a costly service which has 
no demonstrable benefits.) 
The lack of evidence of improvement in quality of life from specialist 
palliative care is crucial if the gain in terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years is 
considered when funding decisions are made. If it were possible to 
demonstrate a quality of life improvement resulting from palliative care it is 
likely that the change would be small, especially as the patients' condition is 
deteriorating anyway. Moreover, an improvement in quality score, say from 0.5 
to 0.6, would be of very short duration since patients usually receive such 
specialist care for only a short time - perhaps only 3 to 6 months, and 
sometimes only a few weeks. The combination of an increase in quality of 0.1 
for only 3 weeks to 3 months would yield a very low QAL  Y score. Yet the 
public, who annually contribute millions of pounds to specialist palliative care 
services, consider pain control and excellent nursing care to be very important 
at the end of life. They would be outraged if, on the basis of low QAL  Y scores, 
a decision was made not to fund such care. 
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life and its 'measurement', is here to stay. It is likely to give rise to more 
problems in resource allocation in health care than it ever solves, and gives rise 
to counter-intuitive results in terms of resource allocation. Even if the QAL  V 
itself is abandoned, some global assessments of outcome in terms of quality of 
life will be attempted. It seems that there is an unshakeable  commitment to 
measuring the unmeasurable. In the darkness of this reality  the moral 
problems created by QAL  V's (and similar outcome measures) are important, 
and they are discussed in chapter 5. 
The best way forward seems to be the abandonment of quantitative and 
global assessments of quality of life, together with abandonment of quality of 
life as the goal of palliative care. Qualitative studies on the separate domains, 
with presentation of results in descriptive terms, should be accepted as the 
most valid and applicable data that can be achieved. Health care providers and 
administrators, with input from the public, must then use this information to 
make the difficult but inescapable choices required in resource allocation. 
3.3.ii  Decision  making· for  individual  patients. 
Fallowfield suggests that filling in a quality of life questionnaire might aid 
in the process of choosing the best treatment or management with the patient.
32 
She considers that this use of the measurement tools produces few problems. 
Quality of life assessment might help in clinical decision making in two ways. 
Firstly, knowledge about the impact of various treatments on the domains of 
quality of life would help patients, together with their health care team, to make 
better informed treatment choices. Secondly, it is possible that quality of life 
assessments might enable better identification of physical, psychological, 
emotional or social problems in the individual patient. 
With regard to the first possibility it seems plausible that qualitative 
research on the effects of treatments and services on the various domains of 
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research would be helpful in the clinical context (and would be more helpful 
than invalid results of quantitative research). Of course, clinicians would always 
have to exercise judgement in applying the information from such studies to an 
individual patient - but this is also true of the generalisation of results from 
quantitative studies. 
Fallowfield considers that future research and measurement techniques 
might tell us 'about the changes in quality of life variables which might cause 
any given patient to accept or reject  a particular treatment.'33 It is inconceivable 
that any statistical result from quality of life scales could possibly tell us which 
patients might accept a particular treatment. Moreover, even if such a predictive 
power were demonstrated, the moral and legal requirements for discussion of 
all suitable treatment options and for informed consent would remain, so that it 
is difficult to see how any such predictive power would be helpful either to 
patients or their doctors. Assuming that quantitative results from quality of life 
scales could predict patients' choices is analogous to assuming that knowledge 
of average life expectancy from a given cancer will tell us how long a particular 
patient will live! 
With regard to the second possibility, it seems that clinicians  are 
increasingly convinced that the use of questionnaires or structured interviews 
relating to the domains of quality of life is the best way to identify patients' 
physical symptoms, emotional and social problems and psychiatric morbidity. 
This method of assessments contrasts with the traditional method of taking a 
history, listening carefully, and asking some open questions. This traditional 
method allows the patient much more freedom of expression and ability to 
communicate what he or she feels is important than does a questionnaire. Of 
course, taking the traditional history takes time and can be frustrating for the 
doctor or nurse, especially when the patient persists in mentioning or dwelling 
upon aspects of the story which appear irrelevant to the professional. 
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partly on the idea that they are more cost-effective in that they  obtain the 
answers the professional seeks in the minimum of time, and partly for the less 
good reason that they place the professional firmly in control of the interaction. 
It is ironic that workers in specialist palliative care, who have long been 
advocating a 'patient-centred' approach, should show  enthusiasm for methods 
which are very 'professional-centred'. It should also be  noted that the trend 
towards structured interviews and questionnaires runs completely contrary to 
the ideal of the patients relating their own narratives, and to the associated 
ideas of narrative-based medicine. Some examples of papers published in the 
journal Palliative Medicine in  1999 illustrate the growing enthusiasm for tool-
based diagnosis as opposed to traditional history taking and allowing the 
patient to tell the story. 
Peter L Fevre et al published their paper on 'Screening for psychiatric 
illness in the palliative care inpatient setting: a comparison between the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale and the General Health Questionnaire -
12'.34 In this study they compared the performance of the two questionnaires 
against the 'gold standard' of a semi-structured psychiatric interview. They 
concluded that the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale(HADS) 'was found 
to be an effective screening tool' with acceptable sensitivity and specificity. 
They suggest that the HADS should be used to confirm a diagnosis of anxiety 
or depression, and furthermore that 'the provision of a validated screening tool 
opens the door for future 'treatment validation' studies.' This latter comment 
suggests that they consider that a study to assess the outcome of a treatment 
cannot be carried out unless there is a tool to confirm the original diagnosis. 
Whilst this is plausible in the case of physical examinations to diagnose a 
physical pathology, it is less plausible in the context of emotional, psychological 
or social problems. 
132 Similarly, Peter Maguire et al in 'Physical and psychological needs of 
patients dying from colo-rectal cancer', reported on the use of a semi-structured 
interview, a concerns checklist, and the Psychiatric Assessment Schedule to 
determine patients' physical complaints.
35 They compared the patients' scores 
with those of their proxies, both informal carers and their GPs, and found poor 
correlations between the patients' scores and those of the proxies. This group 
concluded that whilst the use of systematic assessment schedules has been 
advocated as an effective way of assessing patients' and family problems, 
'there is probably no substitute for better training in assessment skills of health 
care professionals involved in palliative care.' One can only hope that such 
training emphasises the importance of allowing the patient to divert from the 
semi-structure that the professional has imposed on the interview! 
Sheila Payne et ai, working with the informal carers (usually family 
members) of patients, used a semi-structured interview and the General Health 
Questionnaire - 30 and the Carer Strain Index to assess the psychological 
distress and strain experienced by carers.a> They stated that the purpose of this 
study was 'to identify the perceived support needs of informal carers (family 
and friends) of cancer patients receiving palliative care in the community.' It is 
interesting to note that whilst the questionnaires yielded results showing above 
normal levels of psychological distress and strain, the most informative part of 
the paper is the section giving direct quotes from the carers' interviews. This 
section actually allows the reader some insight into what the carers were 
experiencing. It is difficult to see how a score on a questionnaire could be 
helpful in comparison with the carer's own description of the problems. The 
latter information is essential in drawing together possible assistance and 
solutions, whereas a questionnaire indicating distress and strain is no help in 
identifying solutions. 
Lastly, it should be noted that some questionnaires are highly 
judgemental in their scoring. This is illustrated in the paper by Ruth Powazki 
133 and Oeclan Walsh who describe psychosocial assessment of patients and 
primary caregivers in a specialist palliative care unit using a questionnaire.
37 
The  purpose of this questionnaire was to identify patients' and caregivers' 
psychosocial 'needs'. 
However, the scoring system in this paper is highly judgemental; a low 
score was taken to indicate 'high psychosocial risk and need for further 
intervention, e.g. education and counselling'.  Patients would be accorded a low 
score if they said they indicated they were unaware life was threatened (but 
some patients actually cope best by not confronting this issue), or if they asked 
or allowed others to  make decisions, or if they avoided conversation with 
professionals or were regarded as being in denial. 
The danger of this sort of questionnaire is that it is identifying some 
characteristic of the patient as a 'need' for intervention when that intervention is 
not necessarily a benefit and may be harmful. Perhaps some patients fare 
better if they do not acknowledge that life is threatened, if they allow others to 
make decisions, and if they avoid conversations with professionals. Perhaps, 
rather than this questionnaire, a conversation with the patient might have 
yielded more information about and acceptance of the patient's chosen way of 
adjusting to the illness and coping with it. 
With regard to decision making for individual patients it seems that the 
hazards of using quantitative questionnaires and structured interviews outweigh 
any benefits. Questionnaires which permitted recording of the patient's actual 
description of the situation, or less structured interviews, might best serve to 
bring to light patients' concerns and point to the possible solutions. 
3.4  What  should  be  the  goal  or  goals  of  palliative  care? 
Since there is no shared and coherent concept of quality of life attempts 
to measure it are bound to fail. Whilst it may be possible to agree about which 
factors may be important in quality of life, a quantitative assessment of those 
134 factors either separately or together is not possible. Quality of life a global 
concept should not be used as a goal of palliative care, and it follows that 
attempts to quantify it should be abandoned. Instead, qualitative studies of pain 
and other symptoms, of physical functioning, of mood and emotional distress, 
and perhaps of perceived social support and self-esteem should be attempted. 
The relief of pain and other symptoms and the maximisation of physical 
functioning should be goals of palliative care. Giving people the information 
they seek about their illness and so enabling them to take part in decisions may 
also lessen emotional and psychological distress. The treatment of depression 
and anxiety are also appropriate goals. 
Whilst competent and humane care in these areas might increase self-
esteem and life-satisfaction, these entities are dependent on many factors 
which are unrelated to health care and which lie outside the influence of health 
care professionals. Increasing patients' self-esteem, life-satisfaction, happiness 
or morale are not appropriate goals for palliative care, even though such care 
may contribute in some small way to their achievement. 
Although health care professionals may come to know patients quite well 
in the context of the illness those professionals are not actually the patients' 
friends or family, and cannot substitute for them as a social support for the 
patient. I have argued elsewhere (chapters 2 and 4) that psychosocial care and 
care of the family should not be put forward as goals of palliative care, even 
though they may such care may sometimes be of benefit to the patient. 
Specialist palliative care may improve aspects of our patients' lives. We 
should begin by carrying out more qualitative studies on those entities which 
are legitimate goals of palliative care, and of health care in general. 
135 3.5  Conclusions. 
1.  It is not possible to construct a coherent account of quality of life from our 
everyday notions about what it means. 
2 Quality of life is multi-factorial, its component factors such as happiness, 
significant toil, well-being, choice and social factors are incommensurable, so it 
is not possible to construct a quality of life scale. 
3.  Research data on quality of life is essentially qualitative and not quantitative -
it cannot be rendered quantitative. 
4. The quantitative and global assessment of quality of life should be 
abandoned, and global quality of life should be abandoned as a goal of 
palliative care. 
5. Qualitative studies on the impact of specialist palliative care on the various 
domains of quality of life should be undertaken. 
6. The hazards of using quantitative questionnaires and structured interviews 
for individual patients outweigh any benefits for those patients. 
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139 Chapter  4 
Psychological,  social  and  spiritual  problems 
Thesis  4  :  There  are  constraints  of  expertise  and  propriety  on 
attempts  to  influence  the  patient's  psychological,  social  and 
spiritual  well-being. 
The WHO definition which summarises the philosophy of palliative care 
clearly states that practitioners should control psycho-social and spiritual 
distress: 
'Control of pain, of other symptoms, and of psychological, social and 
spiritual problems, is paramount.'1 
The definition assumes that control of such problems is possible, and 
then goes on to state practitioners have a professional responsibility to 
undertake the task. This raises two questions; firstly, should professionals be 
attempting this task at all as part of the remit of care, and secondly is it possible 
for them to achieve the resolution of such problems. 
4.1.  Should  professionals  be  attempting  to  control  the 
patient's  psychological,  social  and  spiritual  problems? 
4.1.i  The  nature  of  the  goal. 
In health care ethics in general there is little emphasis on professional 
responsibility for psycho-social care in the hospital sector, although recognition 
of the patient's emotional state has always been considered important in 
primary care. However, such recognition is different from assuming 
responsibility for altering the patient's psychological, social and spiritual state, 
as is suggested by the definition of palliative care. 
140 In contrast, since the beginning of the modern specialist palliative care 
movement there has been emphasis on the importance of enhancing the 
patient's emotional, social and spiritual well-being. Dame Cicely Saunders, in 
her foreword to the first edition of The Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine, 
publishe.d in  1993, describes the development of palliative care. She says: 
'The message was: "You matter because you are you, and you matter 
until the last moment of your life. We will do all we can, not only to help you die 
peacefully, but also to live until you die". These words together with the concept 
of ''total pain" - a combination of physical, psychological, social and spiritual 
elements - were built into St. Christopher's and from thence into the modern 
hospice movement'.2 
Two important points emerge from this description; firstly, it seems that 
the professional should be absolutely dedicated to the welfare of this particular 
person as a unique individual (and not just because this person is a human 
being and/or a patient), and secondly, that addressing the patient's psycho-
social and spiritual distress was seen as necessary in order to control 'total 
pain'. The control of pain is uncontroversially part of palliative care. 
The term 'total pain' can simply mean the physical pain which the patient 
complains of but which we know is influenced by emotional and mental factors 
via a very complex neurological network. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as 
including the patient's entire experience of distress resulting from terminal 
illness. During my time at St. Christopher's in the early 1980's I understood the 
term to mean the former - physical pain which has a very complex aetiology. 
There seems no moral problem in recognising that perceived pain has such a 
complex aetiology, but there are problems in considering that one should try to 
alter the patient's psycho-social and  spiritual state in order to modify the pain. 
Later in the same foreword Dame Cicely Saunders enlarges on the 
professional role: 
141 'All the work of the professional team - the increasingly skilled symptom 
control, the supportive nursing, the social work, the home care, and the 
mobilization of community resources - are to enable the dying person to live 
until he dies, at his own maximum potential, performing to the limit of his 
physical activity and mental capacity with control and independence wherever 
possible. If he is recognized as the unique person he is and helped to live as 
part of his family and in other relationships, he can still reach out to his hopes 
and expectations and to what has deepest meaning for him and end his life with 
a sense of completion.' 
Here she is setting out very high goals for the patient who is expected to 
achieve his maximum potential, physically, mentally, socially and spiritually - an 
achievement which few of us attain at any time in our lives, let alone when 
terminally ill. Moreover, the professionals involved are supposed to make it their 
responsibility to enable him to do so. The corollary of this is that their care is in 
some way lacking if the patient fails to achieve these lofty goals. It is important 
to ask not just whether such goals are attainable, but whether they are 
appropriate for both patients and professionals in the first place. 
4.1.ii.  The  nature  of  the  patient/professional  relationship 
required  to  achieve  the  goal. 
Given that the professionals are supposed to be able to enable the 
patient to reach out to his hopes and to end his life meaningfully, it is important 
that the nature of the patient/professional relationship required to do this is fully 
appreciated. Dame Cicely does state that this can be achieved if  the patient is 
recognised as the unique person he is and is helped with his family and other 
relationships. This entails a relationship of a close personal nature between 
professional and patient, for the combination of recognising the patient's 
uniqueness and becoming involved in the way he conducts his closest 
relationships must logically require a close personal relationship. 
142 The reasons for this conclusion are as follows. Becoming involved in the 
way a person conducts his relationships will entail making some critical 
comment (albeit constructive) as well as approbation, and only close personal 
relationships can stand this degree of honesty which serves as a marker of 
intimacy. Moreover, recognising the patient's uniqueness in the context of his 
terminal illness and life will entail feelings of sympathy and compassion which 
tend to connect the professional to the patient in a personal link. Dame Cicely 
Saunders seems here to be advocating a very genuine and personal concern 
for the patient. She states clearly that the patient as a unique individual must 
matterto the professional. 
One might object that perhaps she means that the patient must matter to 
the professional simply because he or she is a patient, and it is a feature of the 
traditional professional/patient relationship that every patient's welfare must 
matter, or be important to, the professional. This sense of 'matter to' does not 
entail a close personal relationship. However, the stress put by Dame Cicely on 
the patient's uniqueness, the idea of helping the patient in his  relationships, 
and the professional responsibility she describes for enabling the patient to 
attain the life and death most meaningful to him  all imply a close personal 
relationship, not the traditional professional doctor/patient relationship. The 
latter would seem to have no prospect of achieving the goals that she (and 
many others in specialist palliative care) set for practitioners.  Other 
writers outside the field of specialist palliative care are also beginning to 
advocate a more personal relationship with the patient. This may be because of 
the development, particularly in nursing, of 'an ethic of caring' which seems to 
entail a more personal relationship. Anne Scott, a senior lecturer in nursing and 
ethics writes: 
'Health care professionals have a duty to engage actively at a level 
which allows them to gain sufficient insight into the personal world of the patient 
to perceive the likely implications of certain treatment decisions for this 
143 particular patient. Engagement of this sort, I suggest, only comes through 
activating moral imagination  ..... Without to some extent entering imaginatively 
into the world of the "person-who-is-the-patient", it is impossible to achieve 
much of the understanding upon which compassion depends'.3 
In declaring that professionals have a dutyto try to gain insight into the 
patient's personal world Anne Scott is clearly advocating that they try to 
establish a personal relationship with the patient, for surely such insight could 
not come from any less intimate relationship. She grounds this duty in the idea 
that without such insight professionals cannot have compassion, and 
compassion is seen as central to an ethic of caring in nursing. 
Verena Tschudin regards caring as a basis for ethics in nursing.
4 She 
states that 'Nursing, however, is a practical, hands-on job, where experience, 
emotion, affection and relationship make up the bulk of everyday work.' She 
stresses that in caring one person relates to another person. Her book starts 
with a description of caring, which is considered to comprise compassion, 
competence, confidence, conscience and commitment. The importance of 
compassion is stressed; Tschudin quotes Churchill who believes that in nursing 
'Compassion is the groundwork, competence the superstructure'.5 Thus 
compassion seems to be a foundation of caring, although Tschudin also 
asserts that caring can occur without compassion.
6 
Like Anne Scott, Tschudin feels that compassion requires a high degree 
of involvement with the patient. She quotes the following description of 
compassion by Nouwen: 
'Compassion asks us to go where it hurts, to enter into places of pain, to 
share in brokenness, fear, confusion and anguish. Compassion challenges us 
to cry out with those in misery, mourn with those who are lonely, to weep with 
those in tears. Compassion requires us to be weak with the weak, vulnerable 
with the vulnerable, powerless with the powerless. Compassion means full 
immersion in the condition of being human'? 
144 Later, Tschudin explains that caring involves receiving the other person 
into oneself: 
'It is a question of understanding the sufferer in her or his own position. It 
is not a question of projecting oneself into the other; it is a question of receiving 
the other into oneself. This may sound contrary to much that has been written 
about caring. On deeper reflection though, it can be seen that caring based on 
relationship can only be received caring. One cares for the other; one receives 
the other.' She goes on to discuss Martin Suber's distinction between the I - It 
and the I - Thou relationship, asserting that the world of I and Thou is that of 
relationship and the one appropriate to caring. 
At times in Tshcudin's discussion the importance of the caring 
relationship is seen to override other professional issues. For example, she 
states that: 
'The carer is in relation with the care-receiver. That is what care is all 
about. .... Anyone who has been at the receiving end of care will say that what 
matters most is how human the nurse or doctor - or any carer - is. Not how 
clever, how efficient, how good with the best equipment; no - but how able the 
carer is to receive the cared-for: that is what matters.'8 
Having been on the receiving end of care myself I must say that I 
profoundly disagree with this statement. The technical skill of my surgeon was 
more important to me than his caring relationship with me, and the fact that the 
nurses on one occasion failed to perform an essential but basic nursing task 
thus causing considerable discomfort and a prolonged hospital stay mattered 
far more to me than 'how human' the nurse was who finally performed the 
procedure! In my view competence (as professional skills and 
knowledge)should be regarded as essential - neither an attitude of caring and 
compassion nor the establishment of a particular relationship with the patient 
will achieve the goals of health care, even in the context of incurable and fatal 
illness. 
145 I have included these fairly long quotes to illustrate the depth of 
interaction and involvement, which according to these writers, the professional 
is supposed to seek with the patient. Anne Scott and Verena Tshudin are 
writing about nursing in general health care, which of course includes the care 
of terminally ill patients. They are certainly advocating a degree of knowledge 
and interaction with the patient which resembles a close personal relationship 
rather than the traditional patient/professional relationship. 
Of course, the concepts of care, compassion and commitment and 
sympathy, which have been 'borrowed' for use in health care ethics, have their 
origins and a long history in personal relationships which pre-dates their 
mention in health care. As Christopher Cherry notes: 
'they remain embedded in a realm of morals, and ultimately of ethics, 
which tends towards the personal as opposed to the impersonal, the individual 
as opposed to the collective, the partial as opposed to the impartial, and the 
unmanaged as opposed to the managed.'9 
Clearly, in a managed system of health care such as the NHS, there 
must be impartiality and concern for the collective good, especially in the face 
of scarce resources. Christopher Cherry concludes that it is inconceivable and 
impossible for 'the partial and particular and personal to co-exist with and 
soften the impartial and the impersonal.' He is clear that the concepts of care 
and compassion, having their roots and meaning in personal relationships, 
cannot simply be transposed into a managed system of health care and into the 
patient/professional role. 
4.1.iii.  Is  such  a  close  relationship  a  good  thing  for  the  patient 
and  the  professional? 
At first sight, if the establishment of this close relationship solves the 
patient's psychological, social and spiritual problems then it would appear to be 
a good thing for the patient. It must confer some sort of overall benefit on the 
146 patient. But we must look at the process of building this relationship, not just at 
the outcome which it is claimed to achieve. 
As mentioned above, a close relationship requires considerable 
knowledge of the patient. Mary Vachon suggests two ways 'of approaching an 
assessment of what causes most concern in a terminally ill person'. She 
asserts that the first approach involves inquiring into the following; health and 
well-being of every kind, family and marital attitudes, housing and money 
worries, sexual and social activities, job and daily life, self-image, and 
existential issues about illness, invalidism and death. The alternative approach 
which she advocates is 'assessing what patients want' and she states that this 
includes possibilities such as relief of symptoms, better support, firmer security, 
sustained relationships - both personal and professional, and stronger morale 
to face the future. She goes on to suggest a number of questions which might 
entice patients 'who do not want to speak about personal matters' to discuss 
the areas she is interested in. She adds that 
'Using these approaches the interviewer can begin to assess the areas 
in which patients will be able to use practical assistance to help them cope 
more effectively. This will also allow the clinician to decide in which areas he or 
she is comfortable to intervene and which will require some outside 
assistance.'1o 
Vachon's description of the recommended professional approach to a 
patient in the context of palliative care is not unusual. It should be  noted that 
this approach entails a number of assumptions. It assumes that the patient 
wants some intervention into his or her psychological, emotional, social and 
spiritual state, or it assumes that the process of intervention is justified by the 
benefit to the patient, and perhaps most importantly it assumes (without any 
evidence) that the patient consents to this type of questioning or to any 
intervention. Where patients are unwilling to divulge the information she seeks, 
Vachon actually suggests the questions which might cause them to reveal it! 
147 Thus the establishment of this close relationship may not be a good thing 
for the patient - the latter may be exposed to intrusive or manipulative 
questioning without consent, and worse still, may perceive that he or she 
receives essential symptom control and treatment only if he or she acquiesces 
to such questioning and provides the answers. 
In health care generally it is now widely accepted that treatment is not 
given to competent patients without their informed consent, and that any form 
of duress or coercion in the process of obtaining such consent is unacceptable. 
Yet consent in the context of psycho-social care in palliative care is hardly ever 
explicitly sought. It is the terminal illness of the patient which has caused the 
patient to seek help, so it is this illness for which the patient has given implied 
consent for health care. The scope of implied consent is difficult to define, but it 
suffices to say that we cannot assume that a patient implicitly consents to 
whatever care interventions the professionals consider would be beneficial. 
Someone asking for pain control does not necessarily want to explore feelings 
related to the diagnosis, let alone those related to previous life crises, close 
relationships, or sexuality. It is certainly disrespectful of patients to embark on 
personal discussions unless they have indicated a desire or at least willingness 
to do so. 
Of course patients may want help with social, psychological, or spiritual 
problems, especially once physical distress has been alleviated. It is obviously 
appropriate to ask frequently what problems the patient wants to address. But 
there is a subtle and morally important distinction between encouraging 
patients to talk about their present concerns and asking searching questions 
which it is difficult to avoid answering. In the context of specialist palliative care 
patients are often placed in situations from which it is difficult to escape without 
making personal revelations. It is not morally acceptable to assume that 
patients want and consent to care for emotional, social and spiritual distress, 
148 and on the basis of this assumption to instigate deeply personal assessments 
and interventions. 
This is a difficult area in palliative care, where professionals (influenced 
by writings such as those quoted above) are so strongly motivated towards 
relief of all distress that they tend to assume that the patient, in consenting to 
give a history of the illness and in permitting physical care and examination, is 
also consenting to give a personal life history and is permitting the detailed 
assessment of psychosocial problems that is generally recommended in texts 
on palliative care. However, the belief that the relief of psychological distress is 
a morally good aim and a great benefit to the patient cannot justify attempting 
to 'treat' these problems without the patient's consent. 
The situation in palliative care is confounded by the dependence of the 
patient on the team for physical care and symptom control. The assumption of 
consent to psychosocial assessment and intervention leads to the infliction of 
'care' on the patient who may find it difficult to refuse this care or even to 
escape from it,  especially if it is 'sold' to the patient in a package in which it is 
inextricably mixed with physical care and treatment which is wanted. It is clearly 
not morally justifiable to bind different aspects of care together in this way so 
that it is difficult for patients to select those which they want and to refuse those 
which they do not want. Yet in the drive for 'holistic' care specialists in palliative 
care have become almost unaware that they are binding symptom control and 
physical care together with psychosocial care. 
Intrusive and potentially exhausting questioning in the name of 
assessment of psychosocial and spiritual needs may clearly be a harm to some 
patients. But it is not the only harm that may arise out of attempts to form this 
close relationship and to 'intervene' to solve the patient's problems. There are 
some other harms which may befall patients in the course of what is termed 
psychosocial and spiritual care. 
149 It is true that all people have emotional, social and spiritual needs which 
if not met can give rise to suffering. However, such needs can be identified only 
by the patient, and not by professionals. There is a danger that professionals 
assume some unmet needs on the basis of their own experiences, values and 
beliefs, or on the basis of what they have been taught that patients need. They 
may then consider it necessary to explore in detail those perceived or assumed 
needs which the patient may hitherto be unaware of (and therefore not 
distressed by) or which the patient may not wish to discuss. For example, a 
nurse may suggest to a patient that she has an unmet need for continuing 
sexual contact. The patient, whose libido is reduced by hormone therapy and 
by her illness, may not perceive this need but may be very suggestible and may 
also think that as a normal woman she 'ought' to have this need. In fact it may 
be very difficult for her to have satisfactory sexual contact for many reasons. 
Thus an iatrogenic unmet need may be generated and give rise to distress. 
The patient may also be harmed if the professional concludes, rightly or 
wrongly, that the patient's response to circumstances derives from some deep-
seated 'hang-up' or unfinished emotional business which the professional 
thinks the patient 'needs' to sort out. In fact the patient may be too exhausted or 
simply unwilling to confront a long-term 'hang-up' which was not dealt with even 
in health. Specialists in palliative care often consider that their role is to help 
patients to achieve a peaceful and meaningful death (see Dame Cicely 
Saunders quote above). To this end they believe that patients should be 
encouraged and 'helped' to resolve some issues (often in relationships) that 
have troubled them for many years in life. As a result of this belief there is a 
definite risk that the patient may be distressed by being encouraged or 
persuaded to confront a traumatic issue or relationship. There is a further 
serious risk that the patient's condition may deteriorate whilst this issue is 
unresolved and the patient is in a transitional state of even greater distress, 
150 confusion or anxiety. A traumatic death amidst re-awakened and re-lived 
distress may result. This outcome is clearly a significant harm. 
Denial of the diagnosis or prognosis by the patient may be perceived by 
carers as a need to break down that denial in order to enable the patient to 
make more realistic life plans and move on towards acceptance of death. As 
John Hinton remarks that 'peaceful acceptance has remained the seldom 
questioned common aim' of professionals in palliative care.
11  But since denial is 
known to be a protective mechanism, and thus a coping mechanism, there is a 
significant risk that the patient may be harmed if it is broken down. This risk is 
justifiable only if the denial is causing the patient to refuse highly beneficial 
treatment or if the denial itself is causing emotional distress. 
Sometimes it is suggested that distress which the patient is experiencing 
as a result of family relationships can be relieved by getting the family together 
in a situation of 'family therapy'. If such therapy is not conducted by someone 
highly skilled and experienced there is a great risk of harm to all concerned. 
Even case conferences about the patient's future care can give rise to 
expression of strong emotions and suppressed family strife may come to the 
surface. When this happens it can be destructive to all concerned. In the 
context of palliative care there may simply not be sufficient time and energy 
from the patient and family to resolve relationship difficulties, so that 
encouraging people to air their differences may result only in distress. 
A more difficult philosophical question is whether sadness, anxiety and a 
sense of loss in a terminal illness constitute or represent any sort of unmet 
need or problem which should be 'treated'. It seems more sensible to suggest 
that they are simply natural and appropriate human responses. If this is the 
case then it is doubtful that the patient would benefit from their abolition, even if 
that was wanted and was possible. It makes little sense to that say sadness, 
loss and realistic anxiety are 'needs' which should be met, or that they are 
151 inappropriate responses which should be manipulated in some way into 
alternative responses that professionals believe are more beneficial. 
On the other hand conditions such as depression, which is common, can 
and should be recognised and treated. Furthermore, anxiety and guilt based on 
misunderstandings about the aetiology of the illness or about its future 
progression should be assuaged by giving accurate information and truthful 
(but not false) reassurance. 
In summary one might say that a delicate balance has to be struck 
between the harms, risks and benefits for patients resulting from the 
assessments and interventions for relief of psycho-social and spiritual distress. 
Whilst professionals may gain a great deal from rewarding close 
relationships with their patients, especially in terms of job satisfaction and 
enjoyable and stimulating human contact, there are clearly associated harms 
for them as well as for patients. 
The most obvious is the emotional trauma resulting from repeated losses 
of patients to whom they have become personally attached. Doctors and 
nurses are able to maintain emotional well-being in specialist palliative care 
partly because they do not become personally attached to the vast majority of 
their patients. This is not to say that the patients do not matter to them, nor that 
they fail to recognise that each person is unique. Rather, it is to say that they 
matter because they are patients and only as patients - the relationship remains 
in the realm of the traditional doctor/patient or nurse/patient relationship, rather 
than becoming a bond of personal attachment. The formation of relationships 
with patients which are close and personal enough to solve the patient's 
psycho-social problems, or 'meet the patient's psycho-social needs', is likely to 
result in  repeated grief and bereavement experiences for professionals. Such 
frequent and repeated losses would be unsustainable. 
Furthermore, there is a great emotional cost in suffering-with the patient 
to the extent recommended by those who ascribe to the descriptions of 
152 compassion quoted above. Emotional distress and exhaustion are likely to 
result. Anne Scott disputes this and claims that the more the professional 
focuses on and becomes imaginatively involved in the patient's circumstances 
the less the professional will focus on his or her own distress. She claims that 
such a 'patient-directed' practice will allow an enriching and enlarging of the 
practitioner's perspectives.
12 But this claim does not take into account the 
exhausting nature of trying to absorb and understand the distress of another. 
However much one is concentrating on the patient's distress, this does not 
decrease the personal impact of witnessing at close quarters the pain and 
suffering of others. Indeed, concentrating only on the patient may simply 
submerge the practitioner's distress so that it goes unrecognised until it 
manifests itself later in mental or physical exhaustion or illness. 
Professionals are also likely to suffer feelings of guilt and failure if 
patient's psycho-social distress is not relieved. The assumption that the role 
and responsibility of the professional is to enable the patient to attain a 
meaningful death will inevitably lead to feelings of failure and guilt if patients die 
apparently still emotionally or spiritually distressed or with continuing strife in 
relationships. Since it is easier to relieve physical symptoms such as pain than 
to enable patients to achieve this meaningful death, much more stress and 
even depression and guilt are likely to result from perceived failure to achieve 
the goals of psycho-social and spiritual care. 
Finally, there is a real possibility that in immersing themselves in their 
patient's lives and problems, and in forming close relationships with them, 
health care professionals cease to develop their own lives and talents, 
especially those outside the work environment. They may increasingly try to 
meet their own emotional needs at work. The tendency to do this is aggravated 
by spending long hours at work and little at home. However, the main reason is 
the emphasis which the philosophy of palliative care puts on responsibility for 
153 the patient's psycho-social well-being which entails close involvement with the 
patient. 
4.1.iv  Do  the  potential  benefits  to  patients  justify  the  potential 
harms. to  both  patients  and  professionals? 
One must conclude that there are significant harms for both patients and 
professionals in forming this close personal relationship. Yet one might argue 
that the benefit of the relationship (for the patient) might justify those harms. In 
reply to this two points must be made. 
The first is that the close relationship required to solve the patient's 
psycho-social and spiritual problems cannot be achieved. It requires resources 
of professional time which are not available except for a small minority of 
patients. It is the case that only a minority of people dying, even in the United 
Kingdom where specialist palliative care is well-developed, receive care from a 
specialist team. If it is the professionals' duty to solve  patients' psycho-social 
and spiritual problems, then they are bound to fail. In reality, it makes no sense 
to say that doctors and nurses have obligations and responsibilities which they 
cannot possibly fulfil. 
The second point is the one mentioned above and made by Christopher 
Cherry. He explains that, in the context of a managed health care system, the 
patient matters simply because he or she is a human being. The patient does 
not matter in a personal sense to the professional, for the personal attributes 
and qualities of the patient, which he calls 'the particularities of identity', are 
valued in the context of personal relationships, rather than in the 
patient/professional relationship necessary in such a system. He states: 
'Ideas such as love, devotion, caring for, suffering with, feeling 
compassion for and empathising with are most at home where there is minimal 
abstraction from identity, where alleviation of misery, deprivation, sickness and 
suffering falls within the frame of a pre-existing relationship which has started 
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Where such issues are the sole reason for a relationship the moral epistemic 
concepts are significantly modified; a modification which amounts, in essence, 
to an abstraction from identity  .... 
Carers and writers on caring often give themselves a bad time because 
they mistake what is a logical impossibility for a shortfall in compassion. They 
do not adequately distinguish between the relief of suffering as something 
called for within the course of a relationship of which that suffering is just one 
feature and the relief of suffering as the essence of a relationship, as the only 
reason why it should be there at all. With this goes a failure to distinguish 
between the logics of "non-abstracted" and "abstracted" caring, and hence a 
sense that if only they tried hard enough they could offer the first and not 
merely the second.' He goes on to state that 
'This value (non-abstracted caring) cannot conceivably exist within a 
managed health care system, although it can of course co-exist - in the 
community, for example - with other values the system incorporates or 
generates. At the same time, many who believe in the centrality of this non-
transferable value believe also that its unavoidable sacrifice is a price regularly 
(and increasingly) worth paying for-the institutional goods and professional 
skills the system makes possible.'13 
His argument is convincing. From it and the above discussion one must 
conclude that the close personal relationship  which the philosophy of palliative 
care advocates to the end of relieving psycho-social and spiritual distress is 
neither achievable nor desirable. 'Non-abstracted' caring, which is caring on a 
personal level with the degree of intimacy which it requires, is not an 
appropriate end in a managed health care system. 
The very provision of palliative care services carries an emotionally 
important message to patients about their value to the rest of the community. 
Christopher Cherry makes this point in a footnote, where he comments that 
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better, and that they may also care about who makes this happen. 
Experience in palliative care shows that patients are touched by the fact 
that the community continues to provide for their needs, even if inadequately, 
when clearly there is no prospect of recovery or return to what might be 
regarded as a useful and productive life. It matters to them, and in some way 
consoles them, that members of the community are willing to fund their care, 
either charitably as an extra to the NHS provision, or by taxation via NHS 
services. Charitable provision is arguably an even stronger indication to 
patients that their community still considers their welfare important, and it is 
interesting to note that even NHS specialist palliative care services are reliant 
on charitable provision to some extent. 
It may be that the provision of care for these patients by the community 
demonstrates to them that they are in some way valued, even if that is an 
'abstracted' value in the sense that the community must value them as human 
beings and cannot value them in a personal sense. It seems to follow that being 
valued by one's community enables one to retain a sense of self-respect in 
illness, which must be essential to well-being. Howard Brody, in his book 
'Stories of Sickness', comments that self-respect is fundamentally a social 
concept - it relies on social reciprocity. He further explains that self-respect is 
an attribute of persons that figures centrally in how they respond to sickness. In 
order to maintain their self-respect they need affirmation of their altered life-
plans by others, and those chronically sick or handicapped 'need a very strong 
and repetitive symbolic reassurance from the state that their lives are viewed by 
their fellow citizens as being worth Iiving.'14 The provision of specialist palliative 
care provides this reassurance from the community. 
Returning to Dame Cicely's comments as initially quoted - 'you matter 
because you are you, and you matter until the last moment of your life.'; if we 
interpret these words as meaning that the patient matters to the community and 
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sense in the context of the NHS. The patient, abstracted from his or her actual 
identity, matters to the community which demonstrates this by providing care. 
The health care professionals are the agents of the community's care for its 
members. In contrast it is much less plausible to say that the particular patient 
is cared for in a 'non-abstracted' sense by the particular health care 
professional. This latter interpretation, popular as it is amongst specialists in 
palliative care, is unrealistic, and if it were lived out in practice would probably 
lead to harm both to patients and staff. 
The first question of 'thesis 4' on psycho-social care was whether 
doctors and nurses should seek to control the patient's psychological and social 
and spiritual problems as part of their remit. Since this requires the 
establishment of a close personal relationship which I have concluded is 
morally undesirable, then either an alternative way to achieve the goal must be 
achieved, or I have to conclude that the goal as stated is unacceptable, and so 
must either be abandoned or be modified in some way. Rather than modifying 
or abandoning the goal, it is often suggested that the patient's psychological 
and social problems can be resolved by the introduction of another kind of 
professional who tries to establish a different but still special relationship with 
the patient. This different kind of relationship is that which is said to occur 
between 'client' and 'counsellor'. 
4.2.  An  alternative:  the  client/counsellor  relationship. 
The last twenty years has seen a rapid rise in the popularity of 
'counselling' as a way of dealing with human distress, traumatic life events, or 
difficulties with relationships.  As such, it has everything to do with psycho-
social care, and perhaps something to do with spiritual care if the latter is taken 
as helping a person in a search for meaning. Thus it is often advocated as a 
way of helping the dying. 
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has a contractual basis. It is now said to be a set of skills which can be (and it is 
argued should be) taught. It is not a relationship which naturally evolves 
between people, so that counsellors have to be trained to fulfil their role (and 
clients have to agree to their role). Thus courses for professional counsellors 
are available, and increasingly similar courses are recommended for health 
care professionals. 
The meaning of the term 'counselling' has become blurred by its many 
different uses. The British Association for Counselling states that the 
counselling task is to give the client a chance to explore, discover, and clarify 
ways of living more satisfyingly and resourcefully. This goal is achieved via the 
special relationship between counsellor and client. 
The counsellor sees the client for pre-arranged sessions lasting for a set 
time. This is not an open-ended, flexible relationship, but is clearly contractual. 
Whereas in health care a  patient is frequently permitted to take more time than 
the allocated outpatient clinic allocation, and patients are free to ask for help 
when they feel they need it, in counselling the schedule of meetings is agreed 
in advance and the client is expected to adhere to it as a foundation of the 
relationship. Access to the counsellor is certainly not based on client-perceived 
need. 
The idea of the relationship is that the counsellor will help the client find 
the solution to the client's problems, or will help the client to resolve the issue 
which is causing distress. However, the responsibility for working on the 
problem definitely lies with the client - the counsellor is regarded as having a 
facilitative role only. This means that the counsellor cannot be held responsible 
for the outcome of the relationship. This is in contrast to health care, where a 
professional is held accountable for the outcome of treatment. 
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congruence and unconditional positive regard, and a non-directive approach, all 
of which are morally problematic. 
Empathy may be described as the ability to understand and share the 
emotions of the other person so as to enter their perceptual world, and to live in 
that world without making judgements. The moral problems of empathy are 
closely linked to those of compassion as described above. By listening to the 
client's story and interpretation of events, the counsellor is expected to 
empathise with the client. But empathy entails understanding the meaning that 
emotions and experience have for the other person. It is doubtful if even very 
close friends or marital partners can achieve this level of understanding, so it 
seems literally incredible that it could be achieved by a counsellor listening to 
the client for a few fixed and often fee-paying sessions. 
In the context of palliative care it seems particularly unlikely that the 
counsellor can really understand the client's feelings regarding the terminal 
illness. Understanding usually requires having had a similar experience. The 
counsellor is very unlikely to have had any personal experience of receiving a 
fatal diagnosis, nor of the reality of confronting death in the near future, nor of 
the weakness and exhaustion the illness may bring, nor of the depression 
which afflicts many patients at some time. Without such understanding the 
counsellor cannot possibly enter the perceptual world of the patient. So 
perhaps the goal of empathy, even if desirable, is unattainable. 
Despite this obvious problem, it is thought to be important that the client 
is convinced that the counsellor is listening and empathises. To this end the 
counsellor is told to adopt certain non-verbal behaviours such as postures 
towards the client, positions for chairs, level heights for conversation and even 
amounts of eye contact. Verbally, the counsellor is expected to keep reflecting 
back to the client the last phrase of sentences or a paraphrase of what the 
client has said. This is intended to demonstrate that the counsellor is listening, 
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again. The counsellor is also expected to demonstrate empathy by statements 
such as 'that must have been difficult for you'. 
The problem with such trained behaviour is that it is easily recognised as 
such, and when so recognised the client may (quite reasonably) lose faith in the 
genuineness of the counsellor. The client may also feel that talking to the 
counsellor is like speaking to a rock face and hearing the echo, whereas those 
supporting counselling would say that the counsellor is more like a soft 
reflective mirror. 
The aspects of counselling associated with achieving empathy have, 
perhaps unfortunately, been described as a set of skills called 'listening skills', 
or 'communication skills' which many health care professionals have now been 
taught. Those professionals who were good communicators would have 
encouraged and enabled the patient to tell his story naturally. Those who were 
not would definitely have inhibited the patient in this respect. The latter group 
mayor may not be helped by being taught such skills - the worst possibility is 
that they sound to the patient like a patronising computer program. 
The concept of offering only unconditional positive regard is even more 
problematic, for it means being non-judgmental. If the counsellor is truly 
intellectually non-judgmental as well as verbally non-judgmental then the 
counsellor must hold no personal values, or at least must not believe that any 
particular way of living and dying is any better than another. The counsellor 
must be a post-modernist. But most health care professionals working with 
terminally ill patients do believe that some ways of living and dying are better 
than others. For example, they do seem to believe that peaceful acceptance of 
death (see Hinton quote in section 4.1.iii.) is better than bitter striving against it 
or denial. They tend to regard healing fraught relationships as preferable to 
dying with ongoing family tensions and strife. Health care professionals from 
their experience will know that some ways of living the end of one's life seem to 
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even professional counsellors, are very unlikely to be non-judgmental 
intellectually. 
Of course it might be argued that whilst they will inevitably have their 
own views and values regarding better and worse ways of dying they should 
not express those views verbally. Certainly in the traditional doctor or 
nurse/patient relationship the professional inhibits any desire to tell patients 
what they may think of the way the latter conduct their relationships and 
religious lives. On the other hand they have a professional duty to inform 
patients of life-styles which are injurious to health, and they may even have a 
duty to try to get patients to change those life-styles. 
Yet in the context of the special relationship of counselling the counsellor 
should not be verbally judgmental of the patient's way of living and dying, 
however injurious to himself or those around him. This is in contrast to both the 
professional/patient relationship and close personal relationships. The 
counselling role is, in this sense, very passive. Moreover, since in this regard it 
does not resemble any relationships which have evolved naturally in society it 
is also artificial. People will not behave naturally in a totally non-judgmental way 
- they will have to be trained to do so. 
Consistency requires that the non-judgmental counsellor should also be 
non-directive towards the client. This concept is a cornerstone of counselling. 
The counsellor must not tell the client what he or she 'ought' to do. Indeed, the 
counsellor must guard against giving any such hints to the client, leaving the 
latter to work it out for himself. 
In contrast the idea of congruence, which is linked with genuineness, 
seems quite inconsistent with being non-judgmental and non-directive. For a 
person is said to be congruent when he is accurately aware of what he is 
experiencing, and when he communicates to another fully and honestly exactly 
what he is experiencing. In counselling congruence is thought to be a good 
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the counsellor. 
There are several difficulties with this idea. Firstly, it is not always 
possible to be sure what one is thinking or experiencing in a given situation 
because our motives and emotions can be complex and inaccessible. 
Secondly, if congruence is 'being what you are' at all levels of feeling and 
awareness, and then communicating that to another, then there is surely a risk 
of bringing a relationship (of whatever nature) to an abrupt, unsatisfactory and 
possibly destructive end. People would need to be deeply attached at a 
personal level to withstand the full blast of congruence! In the context of the 
relationship between the patient and the health care professional it would not 
be acceptable to be congruent, since this might entail expressing strong 
disapproval, inappropriate affection, or worse still sexual attraction! 
Finally, it must follow that it is impossible to be both non-judgmental, 
non-directive and yet congruent at the same time. One would have to be a true 
post-modernist, fully committed to the view that no one way of living and dying 
is any better than another, in order to be genuinely non-judgmental and non-
directive with a client. This view is not compatible with being a health care 
profeSSional, for the latter certainly do (and should) have views about ways of 
living and dying which are most compatible with health. 
This brief description of the central precepts of counselling leads to two 
conclusions. The first is that it seems logically impossible to combine these 
concepts and associated 'counselling skills' in any human relationship. The 
second is that it is morally unacceptable to attempt to introduce them into the 
professional/patient relationship of palliative care. Indeed, patients would 
probably be  harmed by health care professionals becoming enmeshed in  role 
conflicts through attempting to be a counsellor. In order to pursue counselling 
both the patient and the health care professional would have to change roles, 
and this is simply not a practical possibility. Therefore, the artificial relationship 
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solve the psychological, social and spiritual problems of their patients. 
Counselling should not be  regarded as a way to achieve this goal. 
4.3.  Should  the  goal  of  contrOlling  the  patient's  psycho-social 
and  spiritual  problems  be  abandoned  or  modified? 
The concept of controlling the patient's psychological, social and spiritual 
problems should certainly be abandoned, for it would entail controlling the 
patient's emotions, relationships and values. This latter idea is deeply counter-
intuitive, principally because it hints of brainwashing and is certainly destructive 
and disrespectful of the patient's autonomy. 
Furthermore, it is exceedingly unlikely that health care professionals 
could ever attain this undesirable goal, since they cannot personally meet the 
patient's psycho-social and spiritual needs, and the participation of patients 
themselves is essential in relieving such problems - no technical solution 
administered by professionals and received by patients could ever be 
successful. 
This leaves us with the question of whether the goal should be 
completely abandoned. In that case a policy could be adopted whereby health 
care professionals see the patient's emotional, social and spiritual state as 
strictly the patient's affair, and they cease trying to address any problems which 
patients might raise. Obviously, answers to enquiries about the illness and its 
likely progress, together with realistic reassurance to counter fears  should 
always be given. 
This solution seems excessively restrictive. For professionals will always 
want to try to alleviate the emotional distress of patients, and from their 
experience they will have learned that certain approaches of other patients and 
families proved helpful in similar circumstances. This is not to say that there is a 
professional skill in alleviating the patient's emotional distress, but simply to say 
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used to alleviate such distress. In other words, professionals can use their 
common humanity to comfort the patient, through companionship, in 
combination with giving advice based on the relevant professional knowledge of 
similar situations. 
Thurstan Brewin has termed this sort of professional contact 'friendly 
professional interest' or FPI. He says the following: 
'In a 'hopeless situation, tender loving care is not enough, concern and 
compassion are not enough. Somewhere along the road between old-fashioned 
TLC and new-fangled counselling, lies something as old as Medicine itself, 
which I have called here friendly professional interest. For the doctor - whatever 
else is said or done - FPI is the basic minimum. It need not take up a lot of time; 
and it does not need special training beyond what ought to be given in every 
Medical School. Lack of it is a common cause of low morale and misery.'15 
He recommends a regular but informal visit, probably lasting only a few 
minutes, and perhaps as little as once a week. He stresses that the 
professional's approach should be easy, friendly, yet interested and 
professional. He is not recommending that the professionals step out of role, 
but rather that they should strive for certain qualities. Of professional 
friendliness he says the following: 
'The ability of one person to lend strength to another (not just in 
medicine, but also in the way that a good leader does, for example when men 
or women face possible death in some other kind of threat or disaster) is a 
mystery that nobody entirely understands. But, for my money, in medical 
situations - especially advanced cancer - just being natural and friendly has a 
lot to do with it. Look at the way some hospital cleaners and porters boost the 
morale of frightened patients. Do they have special understanding, spiritual 
inspiration, or powers of leadership? Not usually. How many communication 
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relaxed, with friendly good humour and no awkwardness or embarrassment..  .. 
Professional friendship is not quite the same as ordinary friendship, but 
much that applies still holds true. A friend is warm and welcoming at each 
meeting. A friend pays small compliments. A friend has at least some idea of 
how the patient feels; some idea of what she has been going through; 
understands how her moods may vary (maybe hope one day, despair the next). 
A friend listens; knows the value of a little praise; asks how she can help. A 
friend is just as ready to talk seriously (if that is what the patient wants) as to 
joke or gossip. A really supportive friend doesn't go over the top emotionally, 
but is always concerned; doesn't stay too long; knows when to be silent; 
doesn't ask too many questions. A doctor should follow suit.'16 
This powerful extract really says it all. Patients want doctors who are 
genuinely concerned and understanding, as a friend might be,  not those who 
have simply been trained to look concerned and understanding. Courses on 
counselling and communication skills cannot teach the attitude and qualities 
that Thurstan Brewin is describing. 
At the same time the patient must be able to remain confident in the 
professionals' competence. Dr.  Brewin stresses the importance of continuing to 
examine patients rather than relying exclusively on investigation results. For 
gentle and respectful but business-like and efficient examination, besides 
yielding clinical information, stresses to patients 'that they have not been 
abandoned, that the doctor is still anxious not to miss anything that could be 
corrected or prevented. And there is also a chance to lay firm, calm, caring, 
unhurried hands on all parts of the body, blending professional efficiency with 
the age-old power of touch to give comfort; at the same time giving a clear 
signal to the patient that we don't think of him as in any way repugnant, unclean 
or infectious.' 
165 On the subject of interest it is important to stress that doctors ought not 
to be less interested in patients because a diagnosis has been made and the 
prognosis is very poor, so that cure cannot be offered. Dr.  Brewin also suggests 
that professionals should be interested in the patient as a person - most have 
some events in their lives which are of importance and general interest, and 
interests in patients as people often leads to increased respect for them. 
Howard Brody, in 'Stories of Sickness', explains further how ordinary 
professional contact in listening carefully to the patient's story can help patients 
and professionals to understand the meaning of the illness for the patient. For 
the meaning of the illness has much to do with spirituality, and peace of mind 
for the patient and self-respect. He explains that: 
'being sick includes experiencing a special and generally very frightening 
sort of disruption in the unity of body and self, and it also includes undergoing 
an alteration in one's social role and in the way one relates to others and vice 
versa. It is unlikely that these essential features of the sickness story will be 
elicited by the standard medical history, but they may be better understood if 
the patient is asked to relate the meaning he attaches to the illness.'17 
In his foreword to 'Narrative Based Medicine', he states that 'Some of 
medicine works very well precisely because it treats people as being all the 
same; and some of medicine works very well because it treats people as being 
all equal.'18 His point could be expanded as follows. In both clinical medicine 
and ethics we  must appreciate both the similarities between cases and the 
differences between them. Hence the relevance of casuistry. Working out in 
what way cases are the same and also being aware of their uniqueness and 
the differences between them is crucial to both casuistry and clinical medicine. 
The patient's unique story is part of the case history. It is evidence. It goes 
beyond straight factual evidence because it usually contains insights into the 
meaning of the illness for the patient. 
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can make the meaning of the illness more positive for the patient in three ways: 
'First, the illness experience must be given an explanation of the sort that 
will be viewed as acceptable, given the patient's existing belief system and 
worldview. Second, the patient must perceive that he or she is surrounded by 
and may rely upon a group of caring individuals. Third, the patient must achieve 
a sense of mastery or control over the illness experience, either by feeling 
personally powerful enough to affect the course of events for the better or by 
feeling that his or her individual powerlesness can be compensated by the 
power of some member or members of the caring group (such as the 
physician).'19 
He is sceptical that courses on ethics can make doctors more 
compassionate, and considers instead that doctors should be taught always to 
listen to the patient's  story with 'the air of one trying to recognise - trying to 
make a link between their own humanity and the humanity of the anguished 
individual before them,.'D He suggests that this practice should be encouraged 
in ordinary medical education, and should be integral to clinical work. 
4.4.  Conclusions. 
1. Patients' consent should be sought to in depth questioning and interventions 
regarding their psycho-social and spiritual welfare. 
2. A close personal relationship between patient and professional is potentially 
harmful to both, unachievable and not sustainable. It is morally undesirable. 
3. The requirement for the development of a close personal relationship 
between patient and professional should not be part of the philosophy of 
167 palliative care, nor should the development of the client/counsellor relationship 
be advocated. 
4. The goal of controlling the patient's psychological, social and spiritual 
problems should be abandoned. 
5.  It should be replaced by the idea of alleviating those problems within the 
context of the traditional professional/patient relationship, using ordinary human 
interaction, sensitive explanations and advice based on professional knowledge 
and experience, and friendly professional interest. 
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170 Chapter 5 
Rationing 
Thesis  5:  that  within  health  care  there  ought  to  be  a  just 
distribution  of  resources  to  palliative  care,  and  then  among 
terminally  ill  patients  regardless  of  their  illness. 
Introduction. 
This thesis comprises two separate assertions which relate to the two 
processes which occur in the distribution of health care resources. The first, 
'that there ought to be a just distribution of resources to palliative care as a 
whole', relates to the process of macroallocation, whereby the available 
resources are distributed between different areas of health care. Resources 
are allocated to different specialties and for different treatments. 
Macroallocation requires differentiation between services and treatments. 
The second assertion, 'that there ought to be a just distribution of 
resources among terminally ill patients regardless of their illness', relates to 
the process of microallocation, whereby the benefits of a service or treatment 
are distributed between individual patients. Assuming that the capacity of 
patients to benefit exceeds the available supply of the service or treatment, 
then health care providers must decide which patients should receive the 
service or treatment, and which should not. Microallocation requires 
differentiation between patients. In the following discussion these two areas 
will be considered separately. 
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Specialist palliative care services currently compete with other services 
for their share of National Health Service resources. Judgements are 
currently made by Health Authorities, and in the future perhaps by Primary 
Care Trusts, regarding the proportion of their funds which should be spent on 
providing specialist palliative care. The NHS is cash-limited since it is funded 
from taxation and so constraints of financial and human resources will always 
exist. Despite promised increases in health care spending, resources will 
remain insufficient to provide all services and treatments from which patients 
could benefit. Indeed, the costs of health care are likely to increase as life-
prolonging treatments enable patients to live longer, but frequently in a 
dependant condition and reliant on continuous health care input. So now and 
in the future services must compete with each other for a share of limited 
resources. 
5.1.i  Evidence  of  benefit. 
In order to compete successfully evidence of benefit from the palliative 
care service is required. Researchers have found it difficult to prove and 
demonstrate the benefits of specialist palliative care as compared with 
conventional care, both in the context of comparative studies and randomised 
controlled trials. 1Z3 Despite the failure of numerical scales used in such 
studies to demonstrate a clear benefit from specialist palliative care services 
over conventional care, there is a widespread belief that specialist services do 
provide better care. 
This belief is probably based on shared experiences of those dying in 
specialist care - the reputation of specialist services for providing excellent 
care, as judged by patients and families, has led directly to great charitable 
support for the speCialist services. In contrast it is obvious that the 
environment and priorities in busy acute medical or surgical wards are not 
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careful explanation of the disease process. It may also be the case that health 
care providers and the commissioners of care recognise that the  benefit 
sought from specialist palliative care is very difficult to demonstrate by 
numerical scales. They have therefore to date accepted at face value the 
benefit from specialist services. 
Duncan Keeley in an editorial on the problems of rigorous assessment 
of palliative care services
4 comments that 'wisdom and compassion are 
needed when evidence is lacking'. He notes that randomised trials in 
palliative care are fraught with problems and that this may be why 
assessment by such trials has not provided conclusive evidence of the 
superiority of specialist services over conventional care. He asks 'Can we 
insist on evidence of effectiveness from randomised controlled trials for 
support services which are of such evident human desirability as to render 
their deliberate withholding difficult or unethical? If we want to know whether 
five years of pill taking for high blood pressure will reduce our risk of stroke 
we are unwise to rely on our own or our doctor's common sense impression 
and want evidence from randomised controlled trials. But if our loved one is 
dying and wishes to die at home, how much evidence do we  need that skilled 
home nursing available around the clock would be a good idea?' Dr Keeley is 
making a plea for commonsense in the commissioning of care, but he is also 
making a statement about the importance of wisdom and compassion and 
acknowledgement of a 'broad and inclusive conception of the role of health 
care services in reducing human suffering'. This statement is very much to do 
with societal values. In particular, it reflects the high value people tend to put 
on being comfortable at the end of life, and on being able to die where one 
chooses. 
Richard Smith, editor of the 'British Medical Journal', makes a similar 
plea for recognition of the value judgements which are inevitable in the 
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decisions regarding whether or not drugs or services should be made 
available via the NHS are often 'dressed up' as technical arguments, but are 
in fact value judgements. He states that 'The NHS has survived so long 
because it has been an institutional expression of deeply held values. But we 
cannot have universal access free at the point of delivery, 
comprehensiveness, and high quality on current resources. If the government 
wants to sustain the NHS then it needs to engage the public in deciding how 
to trade those values.' In this editorial, entitled 'Stumbling into rationing', he is 
calling for public debate regarding macroallocation. He is suggesting that the 
public should have some say on how health care resources are spent. This 
argument is compelling because the resources are derived only from the 
public via taxation and the service is for the benefit of the public. 
In the area of specialist palliative care, it is largely public demand and 
approbation of the existing services which has led to pressure to increase 
their availability, rather than evidence from randomised trials or comparative 
studies. To date this pressure has been sufficient to increase public spending 
on palliative care, albeit at a gradual pace. But public demand due to 
perceived effectiveness of specialist care is unlikely to be sufficient in the 
future to enable specialist palliative care to compete successfully for 
resources. It is likely that bodies such as NICE, the National Institute for 
Clinical Effectiveness, will require evidence of benefit as a condition for 
funding of services and treatments, and specialist palliative care may then 
come off badly when its benefits, in so far as they can be demonstrated via 
trials, are compared with the benefits of other treatments. The difficulties of 
such comparisons are discussed below, section 5.1.vii. 
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Since specialist palliative care as it has been provided to date is 
considered to be  beneficial it has been suggested that it should be  made 
available for all patients. 
Currently, specialist services reach a varying proportion of terminally ill 
cancer patients. The Calman-Hine report on cancer services
6 has 
recommended that specialist palliative care should be available to all patients 
who need it. If all terminally ill cancer patients were to receive the service, 
clearly more resources would be required. 
It has also been suggested that specialist palliative care should be 
available to all terminally ill patients regardless of their diagnosis. In 1992 a 
report from the Department of Health recommended the provision of palliative 
care services to all who need them7,  and this was reiterated in a National 
Health Executive letter to Health Authorities
8
.  As so often happens, these 
policy statements were not followed by provision of funding to provide the 
service for every terminally ill patient, nor even for a majority of such patients, 
but only for a minority. It is therefore not surprising that specialist palliative 
care is currently not available to the majority of patients dying from diseases 
other than cancer. Julia Addington-Hall noted in  1998 in a report for the 
National Council for Hospice and Specialists Palliative Care Services that 
patients with non-malignant but terminal diseases were very unlikely to 
receive specialist palliative care, even from a hospital support team.
9 
In a presentation on behalf of the Department of Health in February 
2000, Sue Hawkett, specialist palliative care nurse advisor to the department, 
quoted the following aim 'Within the context of a Quality Improvement 
Framework, ensure that appropriate information, psychological and social 
assessment and subsequent support, with access to specialist palliative care, 
are provided to al/ those who are affected by cancer and delivered to those 
who need it.' [my italics]. 
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palliative care should be available for all patients 'who need it', but the funding 
available is sufficient for only a minority of terminally ill patients (regardless of 
diagnosis). This raises the important question of how it is to be decided that a 
patient 'needs' the service. Much turns on the meaning of the word 'need' in 
this context - policy statements using the term without any description of the 
sense in which it is used are meaningless. It will be tempting for service 
providers to describe the notion of 'need' so as to allow them to provide care 
for all the patients who fall into their defined category of need. The concept of 
need gives rise to considerable problems in health care rationing, both in 
macroallocation and microallocation. It is discussed more fully in section 
5.1.vi. 
S.1.iii  The  goals  and  moral  necessity  of  rationing. 
Rationing is an imposed distribution system which has two goals; firstly 
to ensure the best use of resources by using the most cost-effective 
treatments and secondly to ensure a just or fair distribution of treatment 
benefits. A rationing system for the NHS is required now and will continue to 
be required in the future. At present, there is no such system and the current 
resource allocation process could best be described, as Richard Smith 
comments, as 'muddling through'  .10 This rather haphazard method results in 
resource allocation which is greatly influenced by political expediency, 
pressure groups, and the media. It is unlikely to achieve the goals of 
rationing. 
It is clear to most people that financial constraints must be imposed on 
the expenditure of resources, and that because of those constraints rationing 
is necessary. Since rationing entails denying beneficial care to some patients, 
proposals for means to avoid it are sometimes made. Two mechanisms are 
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boundaries of 'health care'. 
The first suggestion entails finding ways of increasing the funding 
available for health care so that patients are not denied any intervention, 
especially life-prolonging treatment, from which they could benefit 
significantly. It is sometimes argued that there is an obligation to provide 
health care which overrides almost all the other obligations of a community 
towards its members. For example, John Harris argues that there is an 
obligation to provide health care which overrides almost all the other 
obligations of a community.11 He states that: 
'the obligation to provide health care, and in particular life saving health 
care, to each and every citizen, regardless of  its effect on the aggregate 
health status of  the community, takes precedence over the obligation to 
provide defence forces against external (and often mythical) enemies.' (my 
italics). 
Harris seems to be suggesting that we should spend money on trying 
to 'save' the life of a person, perhaps even for only a few months, regardless 
of the effect of this expenditure on the health status of the rest of the 
community, and regardless of the other social benefits which must be 
foregone to fund that 'life-saving' care. Very few people would agree with him. 
Not only would his suggested policy be associated with serious social 
disadvantages in terms of paucity of education, defence etc., but it would also 
result in very little expenditure on palliative interventions because of the 
overriding priority status given to prolonging lives. Neither politicians, nor the 
public, nor health care professionals are likely to agree with Harris' argument 
and its consequences. Financial constraints on  health care expenditure will 
continue. 
The second suggestion, of narrowing the boundaries of health care 
seems a more promising mechanism. Setting limits to or re-defining what the 
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country provides for its population. A process of continually narrowing the 
scope of health care to be provided would reduce health care costs. For 
example the elderly, even if terminally ill, who require 24 hr nursing care but 
not frequent medical intervention, are no longer entitled to that care free of 
charge in a long-stay hospital. Instead, they have to fund their own care in 
privately owned nursing homes if they have more than a modest amount of 
savings. Yet even this very significant narrowing of NHS provision has not 
enabled sufficient funds to be available to provide all the treatment and care 
from which patients could benefit. Even if there were a continuous process of 
setting greater limits to the scope of NHS provision financial constraints would 
still exist. Moreover, reducing the scope of the health service is itself a 
disguised form of rationing. 
Financial constraints will inevitably cause some people to be denied 
care and treatment from which they could benefit. It is this fact which the 
public, patients and health care professionals find most difficult to accept and 
which causes them to try to deny the fact that rationing is morally necessary 
and to evade attempts at implementing it. When faced with the fact that we 
cannot have a particular treatment or aspect of care because of cost, or that 
we cannot provide what we consider a beneficial treatment for a patient, it 
seems that we all become aware only of what we cannot have or provide. We 
seem to become oblivious to the fact that judicious use of resources enables 
a decent minimum standard of treatment and care to be provided for 
everyone. 
Health care professionals, the public and politicians need to be 
reminded frequently of the consequences of not rationing health care. 
Rationing is an externally imposed distribution system which endeavours to 
derive the greatest benefit from medical technology and care and to distribute 
that benefit in a way which is as just and fair as possible. If health care 
178 rationing is not undertaken, then it is very clear that we will not make the best 
use of resources and unjust distribution of health care benefits will occur. 
Turning a blind eye to these outcomes is morally unacceptable. Failure to 
ration health care will lead to less than optimal use of resources and injustice. 
Rationing is necessary so that each person has the best chance of 
obtaining optimal treatment when he or she becomes ill. People behind a 'veil 
of ignorance' would wish to dwell in a community where the best use was 
made of health care funded by that community, and where benefits were fairly 
distributed. Politicians, health care professionals and the public will need to 
be continuously reminded of this fact in order to bolster their determination 
and courage to formulate and implement rationing pOlicies. The community as 
a whole needs firstly to believe  in the practical reality of capacity-for-benefit 
exceeding supply, and secondly to believe in the importance of justice in the 
use of public resources for health care. 
Unfortunately pOliticians have remained very reluctant to initiate and 
support the implementation of explicit rationing because denying people 
beneficial care and treatment is unpleasant and is not a political vote-winning 
activity. Therefore others in society, probably health care professionals, will 
have to take responsibility for it. This may be preferable to a situation where 
those unfamiliar with the benefits and harms of treatments have the authority 
and power to allocate resources. Health care practitioners working in 
palliative care should therefore participate in the rationing exercise, striving 
for optimal utilisation and just distribution 'of resources. Health care 
professionals and the public should be involved in formulating rationing 
policies. This would leave government with the role of ratifying the policies! 
It is necessary to have a system of rationing, and one which produces 
just outcomes, or at least outcomes less unjust that those resulting from the 
present practice of 'muddling through'. 
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Whilst doctors may be able to accept the moral arguments in favour of 
rationing, they may still be uncomfortable with it because they consider that a 
duty to pursue the goals of rationing conflicts with their duties to individual 
patients. This moral discomfort arises because they think that to carry out the 
one duty they necessarily fail to carry out the other. This sort of unease is 
distressing for them and can also be demoralising and stressful. It is the sort 
of unease we all experience when, in order to fulfil one duty which we 
consider very important, such as preventing serious harm to a person, we 
have to renege on another important duty such as fulfilling a promise made to 
another person. 
Doctors often consider that they have a duty always to do the best for 
the particular patient in front of them, or to act in that patient's 'best interests', 
and that they have (or ought to have) clinical freedom to carry out that duty. 
Professional codes of conduct reinforce this idea - they stress that doctors 
should act in their patients' best interests, and this is made particularly clear 
in the case of the incompetent patient. Two separate issues are at stake here; 
firstly, that of clinical freedom, and secondly the duty to do what is in the 
particular patient's best interests. 
Clinical freedom is the notion that the doctor should be free to provide 
whatever treatment he or she considers to be in the best interest of the 
particular patient. It is a strongly held ideal, and some doctors might even 
regard it as some sort of right. Thus they might regard this right to prescribe 
as they consider best for the patient to override other considerations, such as 
the welfare of other patients or the community. For example, in the context of 
palliative care they would prescribe bisphosphonates for bone pain without 
the extra funding needed to support these expensive but effective drugs. This 
would result in overspending, which would have to be compensated for by 
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departments in an NHS Trust. 
Clinical freedom obviously can never be absolute; it must always be 
constrained by law. Clinical freedom can be considered similar to the idea of 
freedom in a democratic society. In such a society it is considered right that 
people should be free to pursue their own ideals and life plans provided they 
function within the law, which exists to protect the interests of all members 
impartially. Even in a democracy there are limits to personal freedom. These 
limits may be imposed by law. For example, we must pay taxes, wear seat 
belts and obey speed limits in cars. These limits are necessary if we are to 
live together successfully and safely in a community. There are also moral 
limits to personal freedom. We should not do things which harm others, even 
if such actions are not proscribed by law. Such limits are 'imposed' by the 
moral law. In a similar way, the freedom of clinicians ought to be limited by 
the law and by the majority opinion of their informed colleagues in other 
specialties and by team members. I shall later develop the communitarian 
idea of the team as a constraint on individual clinical freedom. At this point I 
am by no means suggesting the removal of clinical freedom but only its 
responsible use in a team spirit. 
Sometimes the notion of clinical freedom is described in terms of 
autonomy of physicians. But it should be noted that 'Granting physician's 
clinical autonomy is justified by reference to the patient's interests, not the 
physician's'  .12 Thus the foundation of the concept of clinical freedom or 
autonomy is the good of patients, not physicians. So the interpretation of the 
meaning of clinical freedom must be made in the context of the good of 
patients, which means patients in a general sense rather than just one 
particular patient in front of just one particular physician. In other words, the 
'clinical freedom' argument against rationing is really secondary to the 
'patient's best interests' argument, which I shall now consider. 
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do the best for the patient before them, regardless of the resource 
consequences, tend to argue that the nature of the special relationship 
between them and that patient requires that they do not in any way 
compromise that patient's interests, even in the interests of other patients. 
The 'special relationship' argument can be interpreted in two ways. In 
terms of the first way, which I shall call the 'advocacy' interpretation, the 
doctor should be loyal to his individual patients and advocate their best 
interests. It should be noted that one acts as advocate for someone to 
someone else. To whom is the doctor advocating the patient's interests? If 
the doctor is pleading the cause of his patients to the commissioners of health 
care, for example by arguing coherently and honestly for more resources for 
specialist palliative care on the grounds of its benefits for patients, then 
clearly this is a professional duty. On the other hand, if the doctor is using the 
advocacy argument to expend resources without agreed provision of those 
resources, so that other patients must be deprived of some other benefit to 
fund his treatment, then he is judging that the duties of advocacy override the 
duties of general justice. Such a judgement cannot be justified. There are 
analogous cases outside health care. For example, a mother has duties of 
advocacy towards her own children, but if she happens to discover that her 
child is bullying others at school  then the duty of general justice, to strive to 
stop her child bullying others and thereby protect other children, overrides the 
duty of advocacy. 
The second interpretation of the 'special relationship' argument is 
based on the idea that the foundation of the special relationship between 
doctor and patient is an implicit promise by the doctor to the patient. I 
introduced this idea and argued for its validity in chapter 2.  If the doctor 
implicitly promises to do the best for his or her patient, as opposed to the 
182 generality of patients, then it is not at all obvious that a duty of general justice 
will override this. 
Clearly there are elements of both advocacy and the promissory 
relationship in the doctor-patient relationship. Arguments about which is the 
more important are unhelpful. Instead the discussion should be moved on by 
asking the question: who is the doctor's patient? To put it another way, to  . 
whom does a doctor have positive duties to act 'in the patient's best interests'. 
Do doctors have a special relationship and obligations to benefit just the 
patient in front of them at an instant, or equally to all their patients? Do 
specialists in palliative care have duties just to the patient in front of them at 
an instant, or equally to all those currently under their care, or even to those 
who in the future will come under their care? Do they owe obligations to all 
the people from the community who are patients of that NHS Trust, or in the 
community they serve? 
No one contests the fact that the doctor-patient relationship confers on 
the doctor a responsibility to do the best possible in the circumstances for the 
patient in front of him. But what of all the other patients to whom he will have 
the same obligation during the rest of the financial year? They are also his 
patients, present before him on a different occasion, so surely he must have 
an equal obligation to do the best possible for each patient at whatever point 
in the year the referral takes place. So, if the doctor's budget is a fixed 
constraint and is to be respected as such, and assuming insufficient 
resources are available to provide all the care and treatment which would be 
beneficial, then care and treatment must be rationed at the level of the 
individual patient in order to ensure that patients are treated equally no matter 
the timing of their referral during the financial year. 
In other words, since all patients referred to a single consultant or 
service are owed a fair share of that doctor's resources, rationing is essential 
at the level of the individual patient. Thus rationing is required between 
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responsibility towards all of them arising from the professional relationship 
with each. 
This is the same as pointing out that there is a necessity to ration 
treatment and care provision amongst current patients, a policy which is 
generally accepted. For example, if on a particular day there is only one 
specialist palliative care bed available, but there are two patients who would 
benefit from it, then rationing at the individual patient level is required and 
this form of rationing is widely accepted. One patient will receive a higher 
standard of treatment than the other, and usually doctors react to this 
decision dilemma by giving the specialist bed to the patient who is likely to 
derive most benefit from it, taking into consideration also the harm sustained 
by not receiving specialist care. Rationing in this case is accepted because of 
the concrete and fixed nature of the resource of in-patient specialist beds - it 
is clear that only one bed can be available, since the total number is fixed, 
and that two patients cannot share the bed. 
Difficulties of acceptance of rationing occur when doctors and others 
do not consider the resource to be truly constrained, or when they think it can 
be shared so that each patient can benefit. This latter situation sometimes 
occurs when the resource of a single specialist palliative care nurse is 
considered 'flexible' so that she can be expected to look after sixty patients 
rather than an average number of thirty-five. It also occurs when doctors 
overspend their drug budgets and imagine that the deficit can somehow be 
made up without compromising the care of other patients. 
It must be admitted that doctors who fail to respect the constraints of 
resources, and who thus expend more than their service's agreed share, are 
not generally acting maliciously. They may simply be taking what they 
consider to be the easiest way out, and be blameworthy on account of lack of 
moral courage to face up to a responsibility that is onerous and often 
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via taxation or charitable giving then the duties of general justice override 
those of special relationship with an individual patient. 
All health care staff will find it difficult and distressing to have to 
withhold beneficial care from patients. Their 'moral distress' can be alleviated 
only by the conviction that they are doing the most right action in the 
circumstances. In order to be able to maintain their integrity and self-respect it 
is essential that they judge that they are meeting their obligations to all their 
patients in the best way possible, and that they personally are not 
blameworthy on account of the paucity of resources. 
The arguments surrounding the obligations of rationing versus those 
towards individual patients can be summed up in terms of the use of the 
apostrophe's': doctors ought to base their treatment decisions not on the 
basis of the 'patient's best interests', but on the  'patients' best interests'. 
This position leads on towards a consideration of the responsibility of a 
specialist palliative care team towards the community they serve. 
S.1.v  Team  responsibility  for  the  health  care  of  a  community. 
Specialist palliative care is funded by NHS resources, but also 
substantially by charitable giving from the community. Whilst some units and 
teams are an integral part of NHS care and are managed by NHS staff they 
are still dependent on charitable funding for a significant part of their service 
provision. The other units and teams are managed by independent charities, 
and have a variable contribution from their local NHS Trusts. These 
independent units have some autonomy, but this is limited by the constraints 
imposed by the agreement or contract they have with the NHS locally. Thus 
virtually all specialist palliative care teams are funded jointly by NHS funds 
and also by charitable giving from their local population. 
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politically driven re-structuring of the NHS the responsibility for deciding what 
health care should be provided is being devolved increasingly to groups of 
general practices called Primary Care Groups. Currently Health Authorities 
are still commissioning most secondary care, including specialist palliative 
care. The problem with rationing at the level of the primary care group is that 
it seems very difficult for members of different practices to agree on treatment 
priorities and rationing policies. Moreover, it is very difficult for members of 
one practice to alter the behaviour of members of another practice who are 
not adhering to the rationing policy agreed by the majority and are therefore 
overspending. No-one seems to know what will happen if a primary care 
group becomes significantly overspent. Unfortunately it seems likely that in 
order to remain in budget for the financial year treatment which is clearly 
beneficial and normally routinely available would have to be denied to some 
patients. Whilst the authority and responsibility for rationing seems gradually 
to be passing to primary care groups, they do not appear to have a 
mechanism for enforcing inevitable and necessary rationing policies on their 
members. This situation is likely to lead to low morale and bad feeling 
between practitioners, and could result in the group giving up attempts to 
constrain costs with disastrously unjust consequences for some patients. 
If treatment priorities are decided by Primary Care Groups it is very 
likely that different groups will assign different priorities to different treatments 
and services, including palliative care. It then follows that whether a service is 
available, plus the extent of the service, will depend on the opinion of the 
patient's primary care group, and thus ultimately on where the patient lives. 
The same result occurs where health authorities have to decide on treatment 
priorities. This has been referred to as 'rationing by post code' and is widely 
accepted to be an unjust outcome in a publicly funded health service. The 
only solution would be to decide at national level the 'illnesses' which the 
186 NHS will treat, and also to decide at national level which drugs will be 
available and purchased by the NHS for certain conditions. The National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has been set up to fill this latter role. 
However, rationing criteria will have no success unless there are very strong 
incentives, be they legal or moral or preferably both, for doctors and other 
health care professionals to implement the rationing system once it has been 
agreed, and even if they personally feel that some patients will be 
disadvantaged in order that others can benefit. 
If this policy were followed, similar NHS provision for specialist 
palliative care would occur nation-wide. Persisting differences would be due 
to additional funding from charitable sources to improve basic services. 
At present, specialist palliative care services managed by the NHS are 
usually located within a Hospital Trust, the latter being the functional 
economic unit of secondary health care. Each consultant in that Hospital 
Trust is a member of a team of consultants (and other health professionals) 
caring for a community as a joint responsibility. The team of health care 
professionals within the Trust, with the organisational assistance of 
management staff, have the task of providing the best possible care for the 
people living in the catchment area within the allocated budget. The budget is 
currently provided largely by the Health Authority, but in the future it may 
increasingly be controlled by Primary Care Groups. 
Consultants in the NHS are all team members, not isolated doctors 
whose only responsibility is towards the patient in front of them. This is 
because no single consultant could provide the patient's care without the 
involvement of a host of colleagues in a variety of departments in the Trust. 
Since consultants can fulfil their function only in the context of team 
functioning, it follows that there is a responsibility to work as a member of that 
team. This entails not exploiting other departments by regarding them as a 
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department. 
Thus consultants (including those in palliative medicine) should be 
good team players in terms of co-operating with their professional colleagues 
to make the most just use, and the best use, of the resources available for the 
community served by the NHS Trust. There is a moral obligation to strive for 
this goal. Rationing is essential to achieve it. So rationing activities are not 
simply justifiable, they are morally required of NHS consultants. 
Refusal to take joint responsibility for the implementation of agreed 
rationing policies within the Trust is very likely to result in an unjust 
distribution of resources, which consequence is morally unjustifiable. 
However great the benefits one might personally consider one's own service 
to convey, maverick overspending so that another service must be cut back 
so as to meet budget constraints cannot be justified. Consultants should 
argue constructively and truthfully for the benefits of their care, whilst at the 
same time acknowledging that the overriding criteria in rationing are the most 
cost-effective use of resources with a just distribution of the benefits. 
One might argue that as a team member a consultant should 
implement a rationing policy which has been agreed within the Trust team 
even though he or she believes the policy to be less just than could be 
achieved. Teamwork requires respect for team decisions, even though the 
individual may at times disagree with them. 
Implementing a rationing policy may mean rationing at the level of 
individual patients (micro-allocation), so that some patients are given the 
expensive treatment which is denied to other patients, or it may mean 
agreeing not to provide an expensive treatment which the Trust team or the 
Health Authority has decided cannot be made available to any patients 
following a cost/benefit analysis (macro-allocation). 
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palliative care teams should regard NHS and charitable resources as having 
been given to them in trust for the health care of the community. They are like 
trustees of a charity, whose responsibility is to make the best use of the 
charity's resources and distribute the benefits justly. In effect  all health care 
professionals, administrative and management staff are trustees of the funds 
provided charitably and through taxation. 
A more detailed account of how health care, including palliative care, 
might be rationed requires a development of the distinction I have already 
made between macro-allocation and micro-allocation. Macro-allocation 
requires us to decide which services and treatments a publicly funded health 
service should provide. Micro-allocation requires us to decide which patients 
should receive these treatments or services. They are best considered 
separately. 
S.1.vi  Concepts  of  health,  need  and  efficiency. 
A publicly funded health service exists to provide health benefits. 
However, virtually all treatment and care options entail some harms (side-
effects and inconveniences) and some risks. Decisions regarding which 
treatments and care facilities a publicly funded health service should provide 
require consideration of the benefits, harms and risks of each treatment or 
care option, and also the costs of those options. Some concepts have been 
central to discussions regarding which treatments and care should be 
provided. I shall discuss the concepts of health and health care, of need, and 
of efficiency. 
There have been many attempts to define 'health'. However, a 
universally acceptable definition of health - even if it could be established -
would not decide those benefits which a publicly funded service should 
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choosing a definition of health does not in itself make clear which services 
should be provided. Difficult moral choices about what sorts of benefits the 
health service ought to provide still have to be made. 
The following benefits ought to be included within the remit of health 
care (including palliative care): 
Prolongation of life 
Relief of distressing symptoms arising from physical and mental illness 
Nursing care when necessary because of physical disability or mental 
infirmity. 
Should the remit of health care services (including palliative care) be 
limited to the above goals? This is an important question. It has already been 
noted that the philosophy of palliative care includes the psychosocial and 
spiritual welfare of patients and the 'quality of life' of relatives as a goals, 
whereas other services for patients do not explicitly include these goals within 
the remit. Clearly, there are major resource consequences arising from the 
inclusion of these aspects of care. 
It is debatable whether a publicly-funded health service should be 
committed to providing interventions which enhance the psycho-social well-
being of patients (as distinct from the treatment of psychiatric illness). It is 
very doubtful that a health service ought to provide interventions which 
enhance the psycho-social well-being of those who are not ill, for example 
counselling services for bereaved relatives. It is impossible to limit the 
services which a publicly funded health service ought to provide if one 
considers that everything which enhances psycho-social well-being, even in 
the context of terminal illness, should be provided. Indeed, if such a view is 
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infinite. 
Rather controversially, especially in the sphere of palliative care, and in 
the context of very limited resources, I would suggest that the benefits 
expected from the service should be limited to  the prolongation of life, relief 
of distressing symptoms arising from physical and mental illness, and care 
and assistance with the activities of daily living when necessary because of 
physical disability or mental infirmity. 
It might be suggested that an analysis of the purpose of health care 
would provide a basis for deciding which benefits the service should provide. 
But what is the purpose and ideology behind health care? Is it to enhance 
autonomy? Is it to uphold the dignity of each individual? Is it to try to even out 
the injustices of life's lottery in terms of health so as to strive for the 'level 
playing field' of life opportunity based on good health? Is it to ensure that 
each person has the capacity for effective interaction with others? Is it to 
alleviate suffering? It is very unlikely that agreement would be reached on this 
matter,  and given the diversity of views it will not be possible to derive 
answers to questions about which benefits the health service ought to provide 
from a debate about the purpose of health care. 
The concept of need is one which is often discussed in the context of 
decisions about the provision of health care. Three aspects of the concept of 
need are important in resource allocation; firstly, it is intended to convey a 
moral 'ought' to meet that need, secondly, need is an instrumental term - we 
always need something in order to achieve a goal, and thirdly, different 
definitions of need have different meanings and consequences in terms of 
resource allocation. 
The concept of need in terms health care is generally taken to imply a 
strong moral 'ought' or duty on behalf of an affluent  society to meet that 
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mean by 'need' we would achieve a description of those benefits which the 
health service ought to provide. When used in the context of health care, the 
term 'need' is simply being used as a substitute or short-hand for that which 
the publicly funded health service ought to provide. 
What do we mean when we speak of 'the needs' of patients and their 
families for palliative care, or of a 'needs assessment' for palliative care? 
Research yields evidence regarding interventions which provide benefit, and 
assertions that patients and their relatives 'need' those beneficial 
interventions usually follow. Such assertions in turn imply that there is a moral 
obligation to provide those interventions. But neither research, nor the 
assertion that patients and relatives have certain needs, tells us which of 
those 'needs' ought be met by the service, or how to balance apparently 
competing needs when there are insufficient resources to meet them all. 
In the context of health care it is important always to appreciate that 
'need' is an instrumental term. Patients always need something in order to 
attain a particular goal, although that goal itself is often not explicitly stated. 
For example, we may say that patients need information (in order to give 
informed consent), or that relatives need bereavement counselling (in order to 
reduce emotional and physical morbidity). When deciding which of two or 
more competing needs should be met, practitioners in palliative care must 
consider the goals giving rise to the needs. They then have to choose which 
goals ought to take priority over others in the circumstances. Rationing of 
scarce resources means that low priority goals and their associated needs will 
not be met. 
Macroallocation requires the prioritisation of competing needs and 
goals. For example, resources might be allocated to provide expensive 
chemotherapy (thousands of pounds per patient) which has a 30% chance of 
prolonging life for six months. Alternatively, those resources could provide a 
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district general hospital. The goal of prolonging life competes with the goal of 
alleviating suffering. 
Microallocation requires that practitioners differentiate between 
patients. For example, there may be only one available specialist palliative 
care bed, but two patients who need it for different reasons - one may be in 
the midst of a family crisis and the other may be imminently dying. The goals 
are different in the two cases. In order to allocate the bed the health care 
practitioner must take a view about which goal is more important in this 
instance. 
The way people choose to describe the concept of need also varies. 
For example, if one takes a narrow view of the concept of need one might say 
that a need is 'something without which one will be fundamentally harmed', as 
has been suggested by Childress and Beauchamp  13.  In the context of health 
care this definition would imply that we  might need health care which would 
prolong life significantly, or alleviate incapacitating suffering or disability. It is 
less clear that a desire to die in a particular place constitutes a need which if 
not satisfied will fundamentally harm a patient. It is even more debatable that 
counselling after the loss of a 'significant other' constitutes a need in this 
case. 
Some have suggested a much broader definition, and have defined 
need as 'capacity to benefit' 14.  According to this use of the term patients and 
their relatives 'need' anything from which they could benefit. Clearly there is a 
problem if the term 'need' is used in this way. The association of need with a 
moral obligation to meet such needs leads to the conclusion that the NHS 
ought to provide everything from which patients and relatives could benefit. It 
would entail providing every intervention which would benefit people in terms 
of their health. It would also entail the idea that everyone ought to be assured 
of good housing, lack of deprivation, rewarding employment and a healthy 
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package. If we were to provide everything which would benefit the health of 
each individual the responsibilities of the health service, let alone palliative 
care, would be infinite. Moreover, it is interesting to note that with regard to 
other public services such as education and housing we do not consider that 
the publicly funded service should provide everything from which each 
individual could benefit. 
It is also important to note that there cannot logically be a moral 
obligation to do that which is impossible - it is impossible to provide all the 
housing and education services from which each individual could benefit. 
Similarly, it is impossible to provide all the health care, or palliative care, from 
which patients and relatives could benefit. So the association between a need 
and the obligation to  meet it must break down if 'capacity to benefit' is 
accepted as a description of 'need'. 
Yet another definition of 'need' was used by Franks et al when they 
conducted a systematic review of the literature regarding the level of need for 
palliative care
15
• They used an epidemiological definition where need refers to 
'specific indicators of disea$e or premature death which require intervention 
because the level is above that generally accepted within a particular 
society'  .16 This definition does make it clear that need is an instrumental term, 
that a person can need an intervention only if the intervention is effective in 
achieving the goal, and that a problem is declared a need only if the indicator 
is above a level deemed acceptable and tolerable in the society. As the 
authors acknowledge, the use of this definition requires evidence and 
judgements about the ability of the intervention to control the problem, and 
also about the level of the problem considered acceptable within society. In 
the context of palliative care the indicators would presumably be symptoms 
such as symptoms and psycho-social distress, or the requirement for 
increasing care for patients terminally ill and unable to look after themselves. 
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and only if, the service was shown to alleviate the symptoms and distress, 
and the symptoms and distress were considered to be above the level 
considered acceptable. It would be difficult to decide how much pain and 
distress society considers 'acceptable' in terminal illness. Furthermore, the 
implication of this definition is that if the pain and distress is considered to be 
acceptable, then there is no 'need' for health care at all, let alone palliative 
care. 
The range of meanings intended by people using the term 'need' in 
health care easily gives rise not only to confusion, but also to feelings of guilt 
or resentment among health care practitioners and the public. Because of the 
strong association between the concept of a health care need and the moral 
obligation to meet it, health care practitioners are likely to feel guilty if they 
cannot provide those interventions that they consider their patients need. This 
guilt is likely to persist whether they consider a need to be something from 
which a patient might benefit, or something which if not met will lead to a 
fundamental harm. Health care practitioners may also resent being placed in 
the situation of having to decide which patients should have their needs met 
and which should not. 
Members of the public, especially if themselves ill, are likely to consider 
that they 'need' those treatments or services from which they would expect to 
benefit. They are likely to feel resentment or anger when they do not have 
access to such care, even if the benefit thus denied them is relatively small. 
I have said that a need arises from a desire or aim to achieve a certain 
goal, but that there is no clear agreement about the goals of a health care 
service. Achievement of explicit goals is central to discussions regarding 
efficiency. Unfortunately, 'efficiency' is a term often used very loosely in 
discussions about rationing and health care policy. 
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more pragmatic approach is required for use by those who must ration health 
care in the clinical context and who have no  background in economics. Uwe 
Reinhardt has suggested such a pragmatic interpretation: 'among several 
policies - with al/ of  them designed to achieve exactly the same goal - the 
most efficient policy is the one that reaches that same specified goal with the 
least expenditure of real resources (human labor, energy, materials, land and 
so on).'17 His use of italics here emphasises that efficiency is always directed 
towards a goal, and that policies or processes can be compared in terms of 
efficiency only if  they are all directed towards the same specified goal. 
The problem in health care is that the goals appear varied, even 
though I have suggested that they should be limited to prolongation of life, 
relief of suffering, and essential nursing care. Moreover, the goals are often 
not explicit, even in the minds of health care professionals, and many 
treatments or services aim to achieve more than one goal. Thus confusion 
arises firstly because people do not recognise that when efficiency is 
discussed it is essential to specify the goal which the policy or process aims 
to achieve, and secondly because patients and professionals are basically 
unclear about the goals that the treatment or care package is aiming to 
achieve. 
Even when the goals are made explicit, assessing the extent to which 
they are achieved may be very difficult. This is particularly true in palliative 
care. It can be very difficult to assess the success of a specialist palliative 
care service in achieving symptom relief, let alone alleviation of psychological 
distress. It is then even more difficult to decide whether the specialist service 
achieved such goals more efficiently than conventional primary and 
secondary non-specialist care. It is (relatively) easy to sum the human and 
financial resources entailed by a service or treatment, but much more difficult 
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met. 
Given that it is difficult to assess the achievement of health care goals 
(other than length of prolongation of life), it is very difficult to compare the 
efficiency of one treatment or service versus another in achieving specified 
goals. But one of the aims of rationing is to ensure the best use of resources 
by using the most cost-effective treatment or service. Cost-effectiveness is 
closely related to efficiency. A treatment or service can become more efficient 
either by decreasing costs or by increasing effectiveness, or both. It is very 
unfortunate for those who have to ration health care that effectiveness (the 
achievement of goals) is so difficult to assess, for it follows that efficiency is 
also very difficult to assess. 
Macro-allocation must entail the comparison of efficiency of services 
and treatments, but until we have established more explicit goals, and more 
reliable methods of assessing, even qualitatively, the achievement of those 
goals, then comparison of services in terms of efficiency is at a very primitive 
stage. At present, 'efficiency' is said to be assessed by counting the number 
of patients treated by a particular service, and the financial and human 
resources costs of treating that number of patients. Here the number of 
patients treated is being used as a substitute for effectiveness. In fact, the 
effectiveness or outcomes of the treatments, and the quality of care provided, 
are currently not well assessed, leading to the conclusion that current 
'efficiency' assessments are almost meaningless. 
Awareness of this problem is increasing, hence recent emphasis on 
achieving better quality of care (as opposed to simply higher numbers of 
patients cared for). New initiatives under the umbrella title of 'Clinical 
Governance' aim to improve outcomes or effectiveness of treatments and 
services. Improving effectiveness is just as important in increasing efficiency 
as is cutting costs, although to date most emphasis has been placed on 
197 cutting costs. A better understanding of the concept of efficiency, particularly 
its relationship to specific goals, is essential to the achievement of the first 
aim of rationing, and to the process of macro-allocation. 
If the use of such essentially contestable concepts, such as health, 
need, and efficiency, cannot provide solutions to the problems of macro-
allocation, then we must turn to direct consideration of the many benefits 
derived from available treatments and care packages. We must try to 
evaluate the net benefits from treatment and care options by weighing up the 
magnitude and likelihood of the benefits against the magnitude and likelihood 
of harms and risks of those options. We must also consider the forfeit of 
benefit that patients will sustain if the treatment and care options are not 
available. 
When a treatment or care package is evaluated it is usually only the 
outcome which is assessed. Unfortunately this practice fails to take into 
account the benefit (or harm) that may be entailed in the process of treatment 
or care itself. The process of many treatments is actually harmful, for example 
in terms of side-effects. On the other hand the actual process of some 
treatment and care packages are beneficial, and these benefits should be 
considered alongside any beneficial overall outcomes of the care. For 
example, in the context of palliative care excellent physical care and symptom 
control performed compassionately may allay patients' fears, and the 
reduction in anxiety may significantly reduce symptoms such as pain and 
dyspnoea. It is clearly morally unsatisfactory to consider only the outcome of 
a treatment or care package, and to omit the value or disvalue of the process 
itself. When comparisons of treatment and care packages are required for 
macro-allocation it is essential to consider the benefits, harms and risks of the 
process of health care. 
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packages, in terms of process as well as outcome, we are left with the task  of 
deciding which of those benefits ought to be provided by the publicly funded 
service. Some sort of comparison has to be made between the values of the 
goals that are achieved by the many possible treatment and care packages. 
One of the most important attempts to achieve that comparison by 
representation of benefit as a single number was the concept of the QAL  Y. 
S.1.vii  The  concept  of  the  QALV. 
The development of the QAL  Y is the most sustained and serious 
attempt to express all the outcomes of health care in common numerical units 
called OAL  Ys. As Edgar et al state in 'The Ethical OAL  Y' 18 
'The basic thinking behind the QALY is that health has two main 
dimensions: length and quality. Effective health care must either extend life or 
improve its quality or preferably both, so in theory all effective health care will 
produce Quality Adjusted Life Years or QAL  Ys .. .' 
The use of the QAL  Y calculation to represent health care benefit 
entails the assumption that improvements in length of life and quality of life 
can be traded off against each other.
19 In turn, this assumption is built on a 
belief that quality of life can be represented numerically. 
Of course evidence can and will demonstrate the time-span by which a 
treatment prolongs life, be it days, months or years. There is no moral or 
practical problem with the concept of added time to life, measured in our 
standard units of time. However, there are both moral and practical problems 
with the idea of assessing the quality of  life  change which results from 
treatment, and then with expressing that quality as a numerical value on a 
metrical scale. Yet this is exactly what is central to the concept of the QALY. 
The quality of life of the health state before and after treatment is represented 
as a number on a scale. The scale used to represent the quality of the 
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represents full health and 0.0 represeflts no quality of life, or death. According 
to the QAL  Y concept it is  possible to be in a health state whose quality of life 
is rated as worse than death (some may consider the persistent vegetative 
state, advanced dementia or quadriplegia to be worse than death). A quality 
of life worse than death would be measured as a minus figure, for example  -
0.5. The figures on the scale for each health state are derived by questioning 
either the general public, those living in the health states, or health 
professionals. It is apparent that it may be of crucial importance which group 
is assessing the quality of life in each health state. 
To calculate the health gain or QAL  Ys from a particular treatment the 
number of years by which life is prolonged is multiplied by the improvement in 
quality of life resulting from the treatment. For example, if a coronary bypass 
graft added 10 years to the patient's life, at a health state rated as 0.9, then 
the outcome of the treatment is 9 Quality Adjusted Life Years. Similarly, if a 
treatment prolonged life for 5 years but in a state of paraplegia rated as 0.5 
on the quality of life scale, then the QAL  Ys gained would be only 2.5. It can 
be seen that the underlying assumption of the QAL  Y is that people are likely 
to prefer a shorter life of high quality rather than a longer life of low quality. 
Whilst it is conceptually easy to calculate QAL  Ys for treatments which 
do actually prolong life it is much less apparent how this can be done for 
treatments (such as palliative care) which do not prolong life at all but which 
improve its quality. The QAL  Y score for such treatments is achieved by 
making an assumption about the patients expected length of life, say 10 
years, and multiplying this by the improvement in quality. For example, 
regarding a hip replacement, if quality is improved from 0.7 to 0.9, and the 
patient lives for 10 years, the QAL  Y gain as an outcome of hip replacement is 
0.2 x 10 or 2 QAL  Ys.  If palliative care improves quality of life from 0.2 to 0.4 
for 0.5 of a year the QAL  Y gain is a mere 0.1  of a QALYI 
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complex where a treatment impacts on both length and quality of life. For 
example, palliative chemotherapy may prolong life by 6 months, but it may 
either enhance or decrease quality of life from that which would pertain 
without the chemotherapy but with palliative care. I shall not focus discussion 
on the complexities of such calculations. Rather, I will question whether they 
actually give us a more accurate impression of the health gain than if the 
person's state before, during and after the treatment were just describedto 
us, together with relevant evidence about the expected prolongation of life in 
years. 
Once the number of QAL  Ys gained from a treatment has been 
calculated it is a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate how much it costs to 
gain 1 Quality Adjusted Life Year by various treatments. This is known as 'the 
cost per QAL  Y'. It is then possible to compare the cost per QALY of various 
treatments. It is clear that since specialist palliative care is a package 
available to a patient for perhaps only 0.25 of a year, and in view of 
advancing illness quality of life improvements (in so far as they can be 
assessed) are small, then a very small QAL  Y gain is achieved, so the cost 
per QAL  Y will inevitably be high. 
The assumption behind the use of QAL  Ys in macro-allocation is that 
there is a moral imperative to achieve the maximum benefit from resources -
in other words, the maximum QAL  Ys per pound. Specialist palliative care 
would achieve few QAL  V's per pound, so if cost-per-QAL  Y were the major 
factor used in  macro-allocation, then specialist palliative care might not be 
funded at all. 
S.1.viii.  Criticisms  of  the  QALY. 
Many criticisms have been made of the concept of the QAL  Y and of its 
use in macro-allocation. However, the single and most important criticism is 
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health states where the number is part of a metrical scale. There are two 
reasons for this. 
Firstly, there is no clear and universally accepted concept of quality of 
life. We have already seen (chapter 3) that 'quality' may be thought to lie in 
happiness, in a life of significant toil, in the ability to choose, or in membership 
of a community, to name but a few candidates!aJ When people are asked to 
rate the quality of life of a particular health state on a numerical scale we have 
no idea what concept of quality of life is in their minds. If they rate the quality 
of life in a wheelchair as 0.5, we do not know if this is because they believe a 
paraplegic person cannot hold down a satisfying job, or have satisfactory 
relationships in the community, or have an adequate range of life choices, or 
is simply very unhappy for any reason. 
Secondly, when they are asked to rate quality of life on a scale from 
0.0 to 1.0, they are really placing health states in a series, or producing a 
'rational ordering' of those health states. They are not necessarily saying that 
a quality of life of 0.6 is twice as good as one of 0.3. They are considering the 
rank ordering of health states. It is exceedingly unlikely that they are 
wondering whether all the intervals on the scale are separated by the same 
amount. It is possible that they are actually rating quality of life on a scale 
more like a logarithmic scale, such as the Richter scale used to measure 
earthquakes. There are simply no grounds for assuming that they are either 
able to rate quality of life on a metrical scale or that they are actually doing so. 
Since this assumption is not well founded, the entire logical and arithmetical 
foundation of the QAL  Y concept fails. 
If the use of the scale to describe quality of life is invalid, then the use 
of that measure in a calculation to describe the benefit of health interventions 
as a single figure simply confounds the errors. When data are being handled 
to achieve a goal, it is often said 'rubbish in, rubbish out'. In other words, if the 
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QAL  Y system is that if rubbish is put in, something even worse than rubbish 
will be put out, for there is a real risk that the error in estimate of quality of life 
will literally be multiplied. This would lead to counter-intuitive if not 
disastrously misleading results in terms of QAL  Ys gained by the majority of 
treatments. 
Most of the other criticisms of QAL  Ys are based on the judgement that 
they appear to produce conclusions regarding macro-allocation which are 
intuitively either unwise or unjust. For example, it has been suggested by a 
group funded by the European Commission to look into the ethical problems 
of QAL  YS21 that these problems can all be solved by 'weighting' the QAL  Y 
score in a certain direction so as to make the result more intuitively 
acceptable. For example, a higher number of QAL  Ys would always be 
obtained for curative treatment of life-threatening conditions in young people 
than for curative treatment of similar conditions for older people, since more 
years of life would be gained. If allocation of health care resources followed 
this conclusion the result would be pervasive discrimination against older 
people as a group. It has been suggested that the QAL  Y result should be 
manipulated mathematically (referred to as 'weighting') in order to prevent this 
result. 
A second counter-intuitive result of QAL  Y calculations would be the 
very low priority given to palliative care when the patient is known to be 
terminally ill. Any treatment which does not prolong life, but which improves 
its quality for the short time remaining, will produce a very low QALY score 
(and high QAL  Y per pound cost) and therefore will probably not be funded. 
Yet good relief of distress at the end of life, or 'dying well', is generally thought 
to be a high priority. The counter-intuitive conclusion of the QAL  Y calculation 
could be altered mathematically by positively weighting the quality of life in 
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any palliative care available at all following OAL  Y calculations would have to 
be very significant! 
A third counter-intuitive result has been described by Prof John Harris 
as that of 'double jeopardy'.22 Certain patient groups already have a quality of 
life score of less than 1, perhaps as a result of mastectomy, a colostomy, or 
disability due to previous illness or accident. If the quality of life of such 
persons is rated at only 0.5, then life-prolonging treatment for them is likely to 
be denied, because the OAL  Y score gained is necessarily less than if the 
same treatment were given to patients with a higher quality of life score. The 
OAL  Y value of the years of life gained for a disabled person with a quality of 
life rating of 0.5 would be only half that of the OAL  Y value of the same 
treatment given to a patient whose quality of life score is 1. This results in 
'double jeopardy'- those already disadvantaged by disability  will be 
discriminated against in terms of life-prolonging treatment because the OAL  Y 
gain from treating them is less than that achieved by treating people with no 
underlying disability. 
Obviously it is possible mathematically to manipulate OAL  Y scores in 
order to obtain results which are not counter-intuitive in terms of macro-
allocation. However, one must ask what is the point? If OALY scores produce 
conclusions for macro-allocation which are deemed intuitively to be unjust, 
then it would be  more rational to abandon the OAL  Y concept because 
experiments using it have produced unacceptable results rather than to 
continue to massage the figures to obtain the results which we thought were 
just in the first place. 
A fourth counter-intuitive result, and one which cannot be solved by 
mathematical manipulation of OALY scores, is that the utilitarian goal of 
maximising OAL  V's gained will often result in an unfair distribution of benefits. 
For example, if by palliative care one could improve the quality of life of one 
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preferable to improving the lives of four people by 0.1  for 1 year at the same 
cost of £ x.OO.  According to the QAL  Y concept we should do the former, thus 
denying 3 people any benefit at all. Yet improving the lives of four people is 
probably a more just distribution of the benefit than providing a larger gain for 
just one person. A utilitarian application of QAL  Y's in macro-allocation yields 
counter-intuitive results in terms of fairness. 
A further and important consideration is that QAL  Ys present an over-
simplistic view of the outcomes of health care. The criticism applies to 
measuring effects of treatment on both length of life and quality of the 
resulting health state. It is an overly simplistic idea to think that these two 
sorts of outcome arise independently of each other. For example, relieving a 
patient's pain may result in reduction of exhaustion and prolongation of life, 
but evidence gathered from trials on analgesics is unlikely to include any 
effect on length of life. The outcomes of health care arise from very complex 
interactions between the various effects of treatments, and our techniques for 
gathering evidence are unlikely to be sophisticated enough to assess overall 
outcomes comprehensively and reliably. 
Moreover, whilst it is easy to ascertain whether the patient is alive or 
dead it is much more difficult to estimate the patient's quality of life after the 
treatment. This problem is confounded by the difficulties of deciding who 
should rate the quality of each health state, namely the public, health 
profeSSionals, or those people who are actually living in that health state and 
so can be expected to have some knowledge of it. At first sight the last group, 
those actually in that state, seem best able to rate its quality. Groups of the 
public who are asked to rate various health states will probably have no 
knowledge of the health states occurring in terminal illness. On the other hand 
the public are paying for health care, and as a group also benefit from it, so if 
QAL  Ys are to be used it can be argued that their judgement of the value of 
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decisions. 
This last point is crucial in debating the role of OALYs in macro-
allocation. The problem with using the general public's evaluation of various 
health states in order to make macro-allocation decisions based on OAL  Ys is 
that when people were asked to place a numerical value on those states they 
were doing just that. They were not agreeing, either implicitly or explicitly, to 
the concept of the use of those evaluations directly in resource allocation, and 
they were not evaluating health states with the use of OALYs in mind. They 
were certainly not producing numerical representations of the health gains 
produced by treatments - the OAL  Y calculation does this. Nor were they 
making decisions about priorities in macro-allocation. 
Some proponents of the OAL  Y concept have argued that the role of 
OAL  Ys in macro-allocation might have to be restricted, so that they are not 
the only factor considered. For example, McKie et al  23 suggest that 
'there is a principled way of governing the restrictions: the OALY 
method should be restricted when, and only when, it threatens to diminish 
social utility. Thus we do not think that health care should always be 
distributed so as to produce the largest possible number of health-related 
OAL  Ys, and it is plausible to suppose that tilting the balance of health care 
towards the more disadvantaged members of society will reinforce feelings of 
concern and sympathy, and lead to a more compassionate society  ... So we 
would be prepared to restrict the application of the OAL  Y method in particular 
circumstances if it threatened to have adverse consequences sufficient to 
outweigh any corresponding benefit it might have.' 
In response to this sort of suggestion I would argue that since the 
OAL  Y concept has major and fundamental flaws it is unhelpful and unreliable 
as a method or tool in macro-allocation. It is not possible to rate the quality of 
life on a numerical scale, as was discussed in chapter 3. Therefore, any form 
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If tried, it yields results which are not only meaningless but also lead to 
conclusions about macro-allocation which are counter-intuitive. The benefits 
of prolonging life and decreasing distress due to disease are 
incommensurable, and the latter cannot be evaluated numerically, either 
individually or on some sort of global quality of life scale. Thus they should 
simply be described qualitatively. In other words, economic or mathematical 
data are simply evidence to be used in a process of macro-allocation which 
must itself rest on  humane judgement. 
S.1.ix  How  should  macro-allocation  decisions  be  made? 
Macro-allocation decisions are about what treatments and care the 
publicly funded health care service should provide, and how much of them. 
Such decisions entail discrimination between treatments or services. I have 
described the benefits of health care as confined to three categories: firstly, 
the prolongation of life, secondly, the relief of distressing symptoms arising 
from physical and mental illness, and thirdly, care and assistance with the 
activities of daily living when this becomes necessary because of physical 
disability or mental infirmity. Specialist palliative care probably has only a 
minimal effect on the length of life, but is concerned with the relief of 
symptoms and with provision of care and assistance with the activities of daily 
living as necessitated by the impairments caused by terminal illness. 
When macro-allocation decisions are made the following are the most 
relevant considerations: 
1 The characteristics of the population and the community to be served 
2 The characteristics of the various treatments and services 
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beneficence and non-maleficence. 
1 Relevant characteristics of the population and community. 
The extent and characteristics of palliative care services must depend 
on the context within which the service is provided. For example, in the midst 
of a war associated with casualties and food shortages no-one would wish to 
argue that setting up setting up a specialist palliative care service should be a 
priority in health care. Economically deprived nations will naturally prioritise 
provision of adequate food, warmth,  shelter and hygiene to enable the 
population to survive, together with inexpensive vaccinations and antibiotics, 
simple and cheap preventative measures against infections diseases etc. 
In the United Kingdom at the beginning of the 21 st century health care 
resources are inadequate to provide many treatments and care packages 
from which the population could benefit. Life-expectancy has increased 
mainly due to improved hygiene, nutrition and housing, but also due to the 
successful treatment of infectious diseases. Many more people are living into 
old age and this has two major consequences. Firstly, they develop incurable 
illnesses associated with ageing, and whilst life-prolonging measures are 
technically possible in many cases, they cannot be resourced for all who 
would benefit. Secondly, the natural history of the ageing process seems to 
include a tendency towards inability to function independently, due to 
deterioration in mobility and mental faculties. Therefore there is an increased 
requirement for basic care to enable people to eat, keep warm, move from 
bed to chair and walk short distances. In an affluent society there is a moral 
imperative to meet these most basic requirements for the survival and dignity 
of an increasing number of elderly people. 
Currently in the UK the cost of providing this basic care is not met from 
the health care budget, and patients who have savings are required to fund 
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24 has suggested 
that the basic nursing needs of such patients should be funded publicly, 
whatever their personal means. The argument that a decent minimum 
standard of such basic care should be publicly funded is compelling. It might 
also lead to a more effective use of hospital beds since patients would not be 
reluctant to leave hospital because of the adverse implications of funding their 
own continuing care. In the absence of the provision of even such basic care 
for the frail elderly it is difficult to argue that specialist services for the dying 
should be provided, other than at a level necessary to achieve reasonable 
symptom control and adequate physical care. It should also be said that 
perhaps the very expensive treatments used to prolong the life of people with 
incurable illnesses such as cancer for a few months should not be resourced 
until and unless a decent standard of basic care is available for all. 
Against a background of information about the changing characteristics 
of the population in terms of ageing, attempts have been made to asses the 
'need' for palliative care for the population. Two methods have been used. 
The first is to study the epidemiology of terminal illnesses and the symptoms 
they cause. Mortality statistics for various diseases are gathered from death 
certification, and research is done to assess the incidence of various 
symptoms in each disease, thus giving rise to figures representing the 
number of people who might require palliation of those symptoms. This 
method was used by Franks et al when they conducted a systematic literature 
review regarding evidence of need for palliative care. For example, their 
review suggested that 45-100% of patients with advanced cancer experience 
moderate to severe pain, and it was inadequately managed in 20-40% of 
those patients::5. Of course one cannot assert that such patients should 
ideally receive specialist palliative care unless there is evidence that such 
care would alleviate the pain better than conventional care. The authors of 
this review acknowledge that evidence of symptom prevalence will not identify 
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professionals, nor its cost-effectiveness. The second method used to asses 
the need of the population for palliative care is to look at health service use. 
There are so many assumptions built into the notion that use of a health 
service indicates the service which should be provided that this second 
method would seem to be of little practical value. 
Despite epidemiological evidence of the care requirements of an 
ageing population, and similar evidence of the incidence of distressing 
symptoms associated with terminal illness, it seems that priority is presently 
given to life-prolonging treatments over basic care and symptom control. As 
the population ages, and more control of secondary care is exercised by 
primary care, this priority structure might change. Until such a change occurs 
there will continue to be few NHS resources for speCialist palliative care, 
much of which is provided by the voluntary sector and funded by charitable 
contributions. 
The first thesis of this chapter is that there ought to be a just 
distribution of health care resources to palliative care as a whole. In view of 
the demographic changes in the population which have recently occurred and 
which are predicted in the future, a 'just distribution' of resources towards 
palliative care would require some redistribution of funds from life-prolonging 
treatments towards symptom control and provision of basic care for the 
increasing number of people who will develop the incurable and terminal 
illnesses associated with ageing. 
2 The characteristics of the various treatments and services. 
The costs and the benefits of each service to the community and to the 
individuals who receive it are central to decisions about macro-allocation. 
Unfortunately there may be considerable difficulty in deriving information 
regarding benefit from the existing evidence base and this applies to 
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and individual studies have shown little impact on quality of life or pain control 
from specialist palliative care as opposed to general palliative care
a5
,27. 
In assessing costs and benefits the number of people to whom the 
service is given is relevant - if a large number will receive it then the costs 
may be high but the total benefit is also likely to be large. In the case of 
specialist palliative care the number of patients receiving it at anyone time 
may be relatively low, but since all people will ultimately die, the number 
benefiting from the services at the end of life will be very high. This situation is 
similar to that of obstetric services, which are serving a relatively small 
proportion of the population at anyone time, but which benefit virtually 
everyone around the time of their birth! 
Where treatments are concerned, roughly the same considerations 
apply. The benefits, harms and risks of the process of care during the 
treatment, which will include the possible side-effects and mishaps, should be 
described. The outcomes of the treatment should also be examined. The 
evidence from research will obviously be crucial in providing the information 
base for these assessments. I have already argued that attempts to quantify 
net benefit in quality of life and to represent it as a single numerical figure in a 
scale are invalid i.e. the scales cannot measure what they are said to 
measure. Qualitative descriptions of benefit are to be preferred. Harms and 
risks should be described qualitatively for the same reasons. The exception to 
this general rule would occur where there is evidence regarding the length by 
which life has been prolonged by a treatment, since this can be represented 
in units of time. 
It is also possible, but very difficult, to calculate the financial 
implications of providing or not providing certain treatments. Where a person 
is enabled to be independent or even to return to work there is clearly a 
financial benefit to that person and the community. Conversely, where a 
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of that patient's ongoing care must be considered. Currently the cost of the 
procedure is considered, but not the costs of provision of care during the life 
prolonged. It is puzzling that so much effort has been put into attempts to 
asses benefit and represent it numerically as compared with few attempts to 
estimate overall financial costs of treatment. 
Treatments and care provided for individuals may also benefit the 
whole community, by reassuring members that when ill or dependent or dying 
they will receive compassionate and competent care and their dignity will be 
preserved. In this way the community demonstrates respect for all individuals 
regardless of their health state. Fostering ideals of compassion and 
acknowledging the importance of dignity enhance the environment of the 
community for everyone. Conversely, failure to provide such care tends to 
increase fear of dependence and illness, producing anxiety and perhaps 
encouraging an image of those who are unwell as simply a burden on others. 
Thus one may argue that availability of specialist palliative care services for 
those with major care requirements and symptoms which require specialist 
help for effective relief is a significant benefit to the community. Most people 
face the reality of their own mortality at intervals during their lives. Provision of 
adequate palliative care would do much to diminish the fears which surround 
the dying process. 
3 Moral principles. 
Equity is the principle of fairness or justice in the distribution of benefits 
and burdens in a community. It naturally and rightly comes to mind when 
considering the distribution of the benefits of publicly funded health care. 
Aristotle originally described equity in his formal principle of justice, which 
states that equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally in 
proportion to their relevant inequality2B. This means that we should treat 
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between them. Two problems arise when implementing this principle in health 
care. Firstly, we must decide in each case which criteria may justifiably be 
used to discriminate between people or groups of people, or what are 
'relevant differences'. Secondly, we must decide what it means to treat people 
equally. 
With regard to the first problem it can be very difficult to decide which 
characteristics of people constitute relevant differences when it comes to 
health care. Macro-allocation decisions effectively require us to discriminate 
between groups of people because certain illness-categories tend to occur in 
certain groups. For example, should we allocate more resources to the care 
needs of the elderly frail and dependent patients, or should we allocate more 
resources to those in middle life who can obtain symptomatic benefit and 
prolongation of life from techniques such as coronary artery bypass grafts and 
some palliative treatments for cancer. 
The most important questions in relation to this thesis are firstly, 
whether specialist palliative care should be available to all patients or not, and 
secondly, if it is not available to all patients then should its use be limited 
mainly to patients with cancer, AIDS and motor neurone disease as at 
present,29 or should a proportion of patients with other terminal illnesses also 
benefit. 
The first question asks whether it is equitable to discriminate between 
patients at all, or whether everyone should be entitled to specialist palliative 
care in the same way that all are entitled to and receive obstetric care at birth. 
The political position is currently unclear. Sue Hawkett on behalf of the 
Department of Health said in a presentation in February 2000 entitled 
'Palliative Care for All' that within the context of quality improvement 
frameworks 'access to specialist palliative care should be provided for all 
those who are affected by cancer and delivered to those who need it'. This 
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access means if the care is not delivered, and there is no description of what 
is meant by need. In  1992 the Standing Medical Advisory Committee (SMAC) 
stated that all patients in need of palliative care services should have access 
to them.
3l This statement is similarly enigmatic. 
Although there are far too few resources to provide specialist palliative 
care to all dying patients, the question remains as to whether this would be an 
appropriate goal. What benefits would specialist palliative care bring if 
available to all people? It is important to have one's expectations anchored in 
reality, and there has been a tendency to imply that specialist palliative care 
can enable patients and health care professionals to have very substantial 
control over the dying process, and control is assumed to entail benefit. 
For example, Richard Smith in an editorial in the British Medical 
Journal
31  in January 2000 quoted twelve 'principles of a good death' which 
were identified by the Debate of the Age Health and Care Study Group32. 
These 'principles' included some goals which are sadly unattainable, even 
with infinite resources, such as 'To know when death is coming, and to 
understand what can be expected', and 'To be able to retain control of what 
happens'. As Richard Smith says, the twelve principles stress the importance 
of control, autonomy and independence. He adds that they should be 
incorporated into 'the plans of individuals, professional codes, and the aims of 
institutions and whole health services'. I would suggest that it is unhelpful to 
any individual or community to enshrine unattainable goals in its aims for 
health care. Even specialist palliative care cannot enable everyone to know 
when death is coming, and no-one can control what actually happens since 
we have very limited control over bodily processes. The idea that everyone 
ought to be able to retain control, autonomy and independence until the 
moment that they die simply perpetuates the myth of total medical power over 
the body. It is important to retain realistic goals for specialist palliative care. 
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dying process, and since we are lacking evidence that it would benefit all 
patients, it does not seem reasonable to put forward its provision to everyone 
as a health care goal. This situation contrasts with that of obstetrics, where 
specialist ante-natal care and supervision during delivery undoubtedly 
improves maternal and foetal mortality and morbidity. 
Richard Smith also makes the additional point that 'There is, however, 
something paradoxical about creating a specialty to cater for something that 
happens to us aiL' He notes that there is now a trend for the practices of 
specialist palliative care to be adopted by all health care practitioners, rather 
than suggesting that everyone should die under specialist supervision. I 
would suggest that the practices of specialist palliative care ought to be 
adopted universally if, and only if, they are shown to be beneficial to the 
majority of patients known to be terminally ill, and this is not clear at present. 
An alternative opinion is given by Duncan Keeley in an editorial in the 
BMJ of December 1999.
33He argues that despite lack of evidence of the 
effectiveness of speCialist palliative care from randomised controlled trials
34
,35 
home-based specialist palliative care ought to be provided because of its 
'evident human desirability'. He suggests that withholding such specialist care 
may be unethical. The difficulty with this point of view is that it really seems 
irresponsible to commit large sums of money and health practitioner time to 
the provision of a specialist service which has not been shown (by trials and 
studies) to be of benefit compared with conventional care. The answer may 
be to use comparative and qualitative studies rather than to rely on 
randomised controlled trials which are notoriously difficult to carry out in the 
palliative care setting (for moral and practical reasons). 
Provision of specialist palliative care to 'everyone would also require 
that we could identify with reasonable certainty those who are terminally ill. 
This is unlikely to be possible, since there are obvious problems in defining 
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patient may live, and doctors' inaccuracies in prognosis have been clearly 
identified.:D If it is very difficult to determine when a patient is approaching 
death, then it is difficult to plan health care services so as to provide specialist 
palliative care for everyone who is dying. 
It is reasonable to conclude that resources should not be committed for 
the provision of specialist palliative care to everyone who is dying. If, in the 
future, we have evidence (not necessarily from randomised controlled trials) 
that specialist palliative care generally provides benefits over and above 
those of conventional care, then universal provision should be considered. 
The costs and benefits of such specialist care would then have to be weighed 
against the benefits of other treatments and care packages for acute and 
chronic illnesses. 
The second question in relation to equity was whether specialist 
palliative care ought to be provided almost exclusively for patients with 
cancer, AIDS and motor neurone disease, or whether it should be available to 
patients with other terminal illnesses who have particularly difficult problems. 
Alternative formulations of this question are; is it equitable to discriminate 
between patients on the grounds of the nature of their terminal illness; is the 
nature of the terminal illness a morally relevant and justifiable criterion to use 
for rationing specialist palliative care? 
Discussion on this topic is currently characterised by the view that 
specialist palliative care ought to be extended to patients with a wide range of 
terminal illnesses. However, it is by no means clear to  me that this conclusion 
is valid. Whether or not a patient group should receive a certain treatment or 
care package seems to me to depend on whether we are reasonably sure 
from the evidence that they will actually benefit from that care package. It 
seems reasonable (and essential) to discriminate between patients on the 
basis of whether or not they will benefit from the particular service or 
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treatment package unless one has reasonable grounds for thinking it will be 
effective. Papers on the subject of equity of access to specialist palliative care 
seem to be based on the (presently uncertain) assumption that specialist care 
will benefit non-cancer patients, as the following examples show  .. 
Michael Connolly argues that 'Palliative care expertise could and 
should improve the care of many more patients than it currently does', and he 
argues that the current provision of specialist palliative care mainly to patients 
with cancer is inequitable.
37 His argument rests on the assumption that 
because patients with end-stage diseases such as heart failure, lung fibrosis, 
renal failure, stroke, liver cirrhosis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
have similar symptoms to patients with cancer,38,33 then the treatments which 
have been found to be effective in patients with cancer will be effective in 
those with these other diseases. This assumption must be questioned 
medically, for whilst a symptom due to one illness may be relieved by a 
certain treatment it does not follOW that the same symptom caused by another 
illness will be relieved by the same remedy. He does advocate research to 
establish the extent to which symptoms caused by non-malignant disease are 
amenable to the remedies which are effective for the same symptoms in 
cancer patients. In the absence of such research, it seems strange that he 
asserts that 'it is ... obvious that much of what has been learned within 
palliative care for people with cancer is applicable in some way to those with 
other diseases'. It would seem most sensible to conclude that before 
resources are expended on extending specialist palliative care services to 
people dying of non-malignant diseases there must be some evidence that 
those services are effective for these other patient groups. 
Katherine Wasson, a clinical ethicist in a palliative care centre, goes 
much further and claims that the present situation for non-cancer patients 'is 
unfair, unequal and inequitable'.40 She asserts that palliative care 
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protecting the patient's best interests and respecting patient autonomy  .... for 
all their patients, regardless of the diagnosis'. The problem here is that the 
question is whether those with non-malignant disease should be patients of 
specialists in palliative care, not whether they are owed the same obligations 
as others once they are patients. It makes no sense to assert that specialists 
have obligations to provide their particular brand of care to certain groups of 
patients in the absence of evidence that one's particular skills will benefit 
those groups. 
Wasson further asserts that 'this duty to care is not limited to patients, 
but extends to caring for and supporting family members, colleagues and 
other professionals.' Her argument seems to be that specialists in palliative 
care have a 'duty to extend palliative care to people with a wide range of life-
threatening diseases', plus all those other people associated with terminally ill 
patients! The difficulty with assertions of this kind is that obligations are 
claimed to exist where it is not humanly possible to fulfil the obligations. 
Her arguments around justice are based on the incontestable notion 
that 'there should be a uniform standard of care for all dying people'. But a 
uniform standard of care does not imply that all people should have the same 
type of care or treatment when dying, regardless of their diagnosis. It seems 
unlikely that evidence will show that patients with diverse illnesses would 
benefit from the same type of care and the same treatments, even specialist 
palliative care! 
Capacity to benefit is a criterion (and perhaps the only criterion) on 
which it is morally acceptable (and morally required) to discriminate between 
groups of patients. It seems likely that patients with non-malignant disease 
will benefit from some of the symptom control measures currently used in 
specialist palliative care, and they may also benefit from other aspects of the 
care package. But pilot studies and some research are necessary before it 
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prevent the possibility that they be subjected to ineffective strategies, and the 
possibility that resources might be wasted. Discrimination between patients 
on the grounds of their ability to benefit from a specialist palliative care 
service is not inequitable. 
Where micro-allocation is concerned the task is to discriminate 
between individuals and this is discussed in section 5.2. 
Efficiency (sometimes the concept of utility is used instead) is to do 
with attaining the maximum output from the input of resources. As discussed 
in section 5.1.vi, it is necessary to specify the precise goal of efficiency - in 
other words, exactly what output is to be maximised from the resources. 
When judging the efficiency of various macro-allocation strategies one must 
be specific about what the goal of efficiency or.the output to be maximised is. 
Like many care packages, specialist palliative care has more than one goal. 
Thus the outputs to be maximised include relief of distressing symptoms for 
each patient, the largest possible numbers of patients treated, adequate 
physical care per patient, together with provision of this care for as many 
people as possible. It can be seen that goals of symptom control and 
adequate care compete with goals related to maximising the number of 
patients who benefit from the service. A compromise always has to be struck 
between these two sorts of goals. This may be achieved by establishing as 
one's primary goals benefit in terms of symptom control and physical care to 
the largest possible number of patients, using quality of care as a constraint 
rather than a goal. 
The principles of equity and efficiency frequently constrain each other 
in clinical practice. For example, centralisation of speCialist resources may 
make for their more efficient use in terms of the resources needed for a given 
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travel for very sick patients. 
Other moral principles frequently used in discussing health care, such 
as the importance of obtaining consent and respecting the patient's refusal of 
treatment, or beneficence and non-maleficence, are more relevant to the 
problems of micro-allocation, and  their force will be discussed in section 5.2. 
In concluding this discussion of macro-allocation, with particular 
reference to specialist palliative care, I am suggesting that access to a decent 
minimum of health care should be available to everyone. A decent minimum 
in terms of specialist palliative care would mean that advice regarding 
symptom control should be available to all health care professionals by 
education and telephone consultation. Patients whose symptoms are 
particularly difficult to control, or who have complex care requirements which 
are best met by specialist input, should be treated by a specialist palliative 
care team. However, the majority of patients would be cared for primary and 
secondary teams not specialising in palliative care. 
In order to fund this universal decent minimum level of care, efficient 
use of health care resources is required. Judgements about efficiency cannot 
be made unless one specifies the precise goal of the efficiency drive. 
Maximising the chosen health benefit per unit of resource will necessitate 
restriction of choices for patients and professionals. 
The macro-allocation judgements that a community makes and the 
policies it follows reflect the relative values attributed by that community to the 
three major types of benefits gained from health care. Those relative values 
also tell us something about the attitudes of members of that society to those 
vulnerable people who are dependent on others for care, or who are 
terminally ill. Perhaps they also tell us something about attitudes towards 
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possible that by influencing and altering macro-allocation policies those 
responsible for making them may be able to influence society's attitudes to 
vulnerable people, and perhaps also towards death itself. Thus it can be 
argued that macro-allocation strategies can be a force for either good or evil. 
5.2  Micro-allocation. 
5.2.i  Micro-allocation  is  unavoidable. 
The necessity to discriminate between individuals in order to determine 
who ought to receive some share, or a greater share, of scarce resources is 
an unpleasant and unavoidable reality. Unfortunately, however hard we try to 
establish macro-allocation policies which will diminish the necessity to 
discriminate between individuals, such discrimination will remain an 
inescapable and very difficult task for health care professionals. It is very 
unlikely that expensive life-prolonging treatments will be withdrawn altogether 
in order to fund symptom relief or basic care such as specialist palliative care. 
Thus palliative care practitioners will have to decide which patients should 
receive specialist in-patient or community care, and for how long. 
This is a sphere in which judgement is necessary. In particular, just as 
in macro-allocation there had to be a balance between the moral principles of 
equity and efficiency or utility, so in micro-allocation there must be a balance 
between the principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for the 
patient's consent or refusal of treatment, equity and efficiency. 
For example, it will always be necessary for professionals to decide 
how to divide the precious resource of their time between patients (or 
increasingly, between patients and relatives). There is a natural tendency to 
give the most time to the patient (or relative) who is the most assertive in 
demanding or requesting that time. But a policy of dividing one's time 
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patients may benefit more from professional time, and may be more seriously 
harmed by being allocated insufficient time. Similarly, it will always be 
necessary to discriminate between patients who would benefit from care in a 
specialist unit, such as a specialist palliative care unit. There will always be 
more patients who would benefit from such specialist care than there are 
specialist resources. Decisions here cannot mechanically follow 'guidelines'; 
qualitative judgements are required, and those making them must be 
prepared to take responsibility for them. 
S.2.ii  Adverse  consequences  of  micro-allocation. 
Even when morally justifiable methods of discrimination are used in 
micro-allocation the public, patients and doctors all tend to feel very 
uncomfortable with the whole exercise and the results. Patients tend to feel 
distressed, angry or bitter, and health care professionals often feel stressed 
by the responsibility and angry that shortage of resources requires that they 
choose between one patient and the next, often without any 
acknowledgement from politicians that this is necessary. There is particular 
distress when a treatment or care package which would alleviate suffering or 
prolong life for a terminally ill patient is denied to one patient in order to 
provide it to another, even when that other patient would derive greater 
benefit from it. 
Most distress and adverse media pUblicity usually occurs when a 
patient is denied a life-prolonging treatment. This is partly because being 
forced to discriminate between patients with regard to life-prolonging 
treatment entails making a choice about who will live longer - the almost 
certain consequence for the patient denied the treatment is earlier death. For 
example, expensive life-prolonging chemotherapy regimes can prolong life for 
a few months, but may not be fully funded, thus requiring health care 
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the benefit from such treatments is to be maximised, then patients who are 
expected to gain the most benefit should receive them. But it might be argued 
that everyone has an equal desire or interest in staying alive, and that since 
this characteristic is the same then discrimination between patients on any 
other grounds is not justifiable. The argument that there is a moral 
requirement to maximise the health benefit from scarce resources is more 
convincing, and so the net benefit expected from the rationed treatment must 
be a highly relevant characteristic or criterion in the rationing process. 
The language used to describe the rationing of life-prolonging 
treatments, particularly in the media, tends to exacerbate emotional reactions 
to discrimination between individuals. For example, such treatments are 
usually described as 'life-saving', which leads to the notion that if society does 
not provide them it has failed to 'save' a life. There is a strong general 
presumption of the rightness of trying to save lives in society, and it is 
generally considered a moral obligation to save a life if one can do so without 
risk to other lives. Therefore the use of the term 'life-saving' to describe a 
treatment entails a moral obligation to provide the treatment, whereas  the 
term 'life-prolonging' is not associated with the notion of a moral obligation. 
It can and should be argued that the term 'life-saving' with regard to 
medical treatment is misleading in most cases. If a curative treatment for an 
otherwise terminal illness can be given to a child or young person one might 
reasonably argue that such treatment 'saves' a life. But such treatments 
would be provided by a decent minimum of health care, unless they were 
extraordinarily expensive or themselves entailed severe suffering. In the 
context of resource allocation in health care it is important always to 
remember that ultimately all patients will die. For this reason it makes much 
more sense to speak of life-prolonging or life-sustaining treatments rather 
than life-saving treatments - for no life can be 'saved' forever. Furthermore, 
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not a whole average life-span. Thus it is misleading to imply that such 
treatments have 'saved' a whole life. Indeed, in the case of many other life-
prolonging treatments, such as palliative chemotherapy, life may be 
prolonged for less than six months. 
5.2.iii  Relevance  of  various  criteria  or  characteristics  in 
micro-allocation. 
In discriminating between individuals there is general acceptance of 
the formal principle of justice previously mentioned - that equals should be 
treated equally, and unequals unequally. This means that people who are 
equal in all the relevant characteristics or criteria should be treated the same, 
whilst those who are different in relevant characteristics or criteria should be 
treated differently. The moral problem lies in deciding what are the relevant 
characteristics or criteria on which we should discriminate between patients in 
the process of micro-allocation. I have used some examples from general 
health care because they illustrate the use of the criteria in clinical practice. 
The most obvious criterion, and one which is generally agreed to be 
morally justifiable, is what we might call medical utility, or the expectation of 
medical benefit from the treatment. Assessment of benefit must include 
assessment of the likelihood of benefit for each patient, as well as its 
magnitude. In general health care it is often apparent that one patient is more 
likely to benefit than another. For example, if one kidney is available and 
there are two potential recipients, the likelihood of success of the transplant is 
as relevant as the length of time that the transplant might add to the life of 
each patient. If one patient is a diabetic the chances of success of the 
transplant in that patient are less, so if other clinical features are similar then 
the transplant should go to the non-diabetic patient. 
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benefit for everyone. It is then impossible to differentiate between patients on 
the basis of medical benefit. For example, Viagra is an effective treatment for 
impotence. It appears to be equally effective regardless of the aetiology of the 
impotence, so the likelihood of the benefit is the same. The restoration of 
potency is a benefit of the same magnitude to all men distressed by their 
impotence. Therefore it is impossible to discriminate between men requesting 
this drug on the grounds of differences in benefit. In view of this fact it is 
probably preferable to avoid micro-allocation decisions pertaining to this drug 
altogether. Since it was judged financially impossible to make it available to 
all who would benefit, then the most appropriate rationing decision would 
have been to make it unavailable via the NHS. Such a decision would have 
been morally defensible also on the grounds that per tablet it is not a very 
expensive drug, so that patients could purchase it using a private prescription. 
Most micro-allocation decisions are more complex than the Viagra 
example. Many care packages produce benefits which are actually different in 
nature, and those different benefits are incommensurable. For example, 
patients may derive different sorts of benefit from specialist in-patient 
palliative care - some will gain symptom relief, others essential intensive 
nursing care while dying, others may benefit from a life-prolonging treatment, 
and in other cases exhausted family members can recover and the patient 
can be relieved of feeling responsible for their weariness. These benefits are 
so different that they are difficult to weigh against one another. Rationed drug 
treatments may likewise have more than one effect. Bisphosphonates are 
relatively expensive and currently cannot be given to all who would benefit. 
Some patients will gain pain relief from them, whilst in others they may 
prevent pathological fractures, and in others they may prolong life by 
preventing hypercalcaemia. It is difficult to compare these different benefits in 
order to decide which patients should receive the drug. 
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withheld or withdrawn from a patient in the course of micro-allocation is 
clearly relevant, and should be considered under the heading of medical 
utility. For example, if two patients would both benefit from admission to a 
specialist palliative care unit but only one place is available, then it is 
necessary to consider the outcome for the patient who does not receive 
specialist care. If one patient is already settled in a hospital bed, albeit on an 
'acute' ward, then that patient will suffer less harm by lack of a specialist 
facility than an alternative patient who is at home and if denied specialist care 
will pass through the accident and emergency department (enduring several 
hours on a trolley) before being admitted to an acute ward where the nursing 
team do not know him. 
Thus the criterion of medical utility can be difficult to apply in practice -
even if we think we can be reasonably sure which patients are most likely to 
benefit, and to achieve the greatest magnitude of benefit, weighing benefits 
(and harms) against one another is difficult. 
The criterion of age has given rise to controversy regarding whether its 
use to discriminate between patients is justifiable. There is no doubt that 
providing a life-prolonging treatment to a young person is highly likely to result 
in more years of added life than if the same treatment were given to an older 
person. Of course the difference is dependent on the age difference between 
them, and when the age difference is small it becomes impossible to say with 
sufficient certainty which patient will live longest. Similarly, providing a single 
pain-relieving procedure (such as a hip replacement) with long-term effect to 
a young person is likely to yield greater total alleviation of suffering than 
giving the same treatment to a very old person who is expected to live only a 
few years. The use of age in this way as a discriminatory criterion has been 
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out in the micro-allocation process. 
On the other hand it may be argued that such discrimination against 
the elderly can be justified by appealing to the concept of a 'fair innings' for 
each human being. According to this line of reasoning, "a younger person 
should have a greater claim because he or she has not yet had the 
opportunity to survive for as long a period as an older person, or has had less 
of a 'fair innings'." 41  This argument seems to accord with our moral intuition. 
For example, if there is one bed in an intensive care unit, and a grandmother 
and a small child would each recover from their illness if it were provided for 
them, but would die without it, then most people (possibly including the 
grandmother!) would allocate the bed to the child. This accords with our idea 
that the grandmother has had a fair innings already, whereas the child has 
not.  In such situations the use of age as a criterion for discrimination seems 
morally justifiable. However, the closer together the ages of the prospective 
recipients of care become, the less acceptable the use of the criterion of age 
appears to be. Unfortunately, where micro-allocation decisions are necessary, 
prospective candidates for the treatment are likely to be in a similar age 
range, and thus in practice age is usually not a morally justifiable criterion for 
discrimination. 
Whilst the 'fair innings' argument seems persuasive when applied to 
allocation of life-prolonging treatments between patients of widely differing 
ages, it does not seem convincing or applicable in the context of palliative 
care. There seems no justification for allocating better symptom control to 
younger patients than older ones, simply on the grounds of age. Of course it 
is likely that other relevant factors such as available carers and the likelihood 
of benefit from the treatment will differ between young and elderly patients. 
Age should not be confused with medical utility as a criterion. Age may 
be associated with greater harms and risks from many treatments. For 
227 example, elderly people tend to tolerate chemotherapy very badly, so 
because of severe side-effects they are likely to derive less net benefit from 
palliative chemotherapy than a more robust younger person. Extensive 
curative surgery, such as oesophagectomy for carcinoma of the oesophagus, 
is exceedingly risky in the elderly, so that it may result either in death or in a 
prolonged period of illness. If in such cases a rationed treatment is given to 
the younger person because of greater medical benefit then the decision has 
been made on the grounds of medical utility and not age and this is justifiable. 
Social utility may be described as the comparative value of the 
patients who may receive treatment to the community. It is sometimes 
suggested as a justifiable criterion for micro-allocation, especially of life-
prolonging treatments such as renal dialysis and major organ transplants. For 
example, it might be suggested that a young mother of three children or a 
business man providing employment might both be given priority over a 
young drug addict with no dependants who supports his habit through crime. 
The public might support social utility as a rationing criterion, particularly as 
the NHS is publicly funded and the public may consider that rationed 
treatments should be given to those people who convey the greatest benefits 
to the community. 
Social utility appears less relevant in the context of palliative care 
because symptom relief and provision of care at the end of life are very 
unlikely to enable patients to resume their normal social roles. If one 
considers the benefits of palliative care in terms of short term rehabilitation, 
then social utility appears a very difficult criterion to apply. For example, 
should one enable a young mother of three children to return for a time to her 
home where she can be with her children, or should one enable a frail elderly 
person to remain outside residential care for a while longer? The benefits in 
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seems impractical as a criterion for micro-allocation in palliative care. 
Moreover, social utility is readily misinterpreted as implying that one 
person is intrinsically more valuable than another. This suggestion is not 
compatible with the ideals of equity which must be of major importance in a 
publi.cly funded health care system. Judgements about a person's value to the 
community might easily be based on the prejudices of others, and this 
outcome might even be unavoidable. For this reason social utility should not 
be used as a criterion in micro-allocation even though there may be some 
public support for its use. 
Queuing is a commonly used strategy in micro-allocation, the criterion 
being the length of time waiting for the treatment. Unfortunately, where 
demand for a treatment conSistently outstrips supply the queue will just 
become longer and longer, so that patients may either die in the queue or 
their illness may progress past the stage at which it is amenable to the 
treatment. In the case of treatment such as specialist palliative care, coronary 
care or intensive care, then it is obvious that queuing is morally completely 
unacceptable as a discrimination policy, for patients simply die on the waiting 
list, and those who survive long enough to receive the treatment may never 
have needed it anyway. 
Queuing is used extensively within the NHS as a rationing strategy, 
although it is often not recognised as such and so might be referred to as 
impliCit rather than explicit rationing. The public assume that once in a queue 
they will eventually receive the treatment, but in the case of palliative care this 
assumption is false since patients would very often succumb to their illness 
whilst awaiting care. Moreover, queuing results in treatments being given to 
those who have waited the longest, rather to those who would derive most 
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as a method of resource allocation. 
Prior commitment is sometimes used as a criterion to differentiate 
between patients who would all benefit from a scarce service or treatment. It 
may be justifiable in the case of life-prolonging technologies requiring major 
resource input, such as renal dialysis and artificial ventilation. On the other 
hand it is probably not justifiable for treatments or services which alleviate 
suffering or provide care, such as specialist palliative care services. 
The example of haemodialysis for renal failure provides an illustration 
of where prior commitment may be a justifiable criterion for micro-allocation. 
Hospital dialysis facilities are strictly limited in terms of the number of patients 
they can each serve. Once dialysis has been commenced for a patient it is 
continued until a transplant or terminal illness intervenes. In practice this 
means that once the commitment to dialyse a patient has been made the 
treatment is not withdrawn, even if a patient who would derive greater benefit 
from the treatment presents and has to be turned down. This is because 
withdrawal of the treatment from any patient would result in certain death, and 
no doctor or team wish to take responsibility for withdrawing the treatment so 
long as its benefits outweigh its burdens and risks. They consider that they 
would have caused death in such a case. (This is understandable, but not 
rational, since the renal failure caused the patient's death, see chapter 1 for 
discussion.) Instead, it is considered preferable not to start the dialysis for the 
patient for whom there is no room in the dialysis programme. In this case 
withdrawing treatment is regarded as so unpleasant that it is considered 
justifiable to continue treatment in some patients when it is denied to others 
who would probably derive more benefit from it. 
Graphic examples of the result of using prior commitment as a criterion 
in micro-allocation occur in palliative care. Sometimes dialysis is commenced 
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incurable and progressive carcinoma of the prostate gland. Teams 
commencing the dialysis will probably feel they must honour the commitment 
already made to that patient, even though this may mean denying dialysis to 
other patients who might derive more benefit in terms of length of life and 
return to normal activity. This scenario happened to a patient normally 
resident in Bournemouth, who commenced dialysis as an emergency 
measure in Oxford whilst visiting there, and was subsequently found to have 
locally advanced and incurable cancer of the prostate gland. His local dialysis 
centre in Portsmouth declined to provide dialysis because he was then known 
to be terminally ill. They conSidered, quite justifiably, that they should not 
provide dialysis for him because to do so meant they would have to refuse it 
to another patient who was not already terminally ill with cancer. When the 
Portsmouth team declined to provide dialysis, the Oxford team who had 
commenced it felt duty bound to continue to provide it, so the patient travelled 
twice a week to Oxford for the treatment. 
It should be noted that the UK is very unusual amongst affluent 
Western communities in that it does not provide sufficient dialysis for all 
patients with end stage renal failure who are not otherwise terminally ill. Other 
European countries and the USA provide sufficient dialysis services, so that 
these difficult  and publicly unpopular decisions are effectively avoided. 
Prior commitment is often considered very important by health care 
professionals who institute other life-prolonging treatments, even artificial 
feeding and hydration. They often consider that they have made a 
commitment to provide care for the patient whose life they have prolonged. 
For example, if artificial nutrition and hydration are commenced on a patient 
who is very disabled but not imminently dying, then practitioners may judge 
that they have a duty to continue to provide that patient's care. Yet such care, 
which may be undertaken in a specialist palliative care unit, will continue for 
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patient facility. Knowledge of this 'opportunity cost' to several other patients, 
and the feeling of duty to the patient whose life has been prolonged, may 
combine to make practitioners unwilling to commence the life-prolonging 
treatment because its use will entail what they reasonably judge to be an 
inequitable use of the specialist palliative care facility. 
In this case the principle of honouring prior commitments actually 
results in professionals withholding a beneficial treatment because they do 
not want to have to face the choice between two morally undesirable 
consequences - the first being care of the one patient but a major opportunity 
cost to other patients, the second being breaking the commitment to provide 
care personally and sending the patient to a nursing home. 
It would seem morally preferable to offer the life-prolonging treatment 
to the patient but to explain that ongoing care as an in-patient in the specialist 
unit cannot then be provided. At least then the patient is informed about what 
life may be like if the treatment is accepted, and so is able to make an 
informed choice about whether or not to accept the life-prolonging treatment. 
This approach also has three other merits; firstly, it fosters openness and 
honesty between patient and profeSSionals, secondly it avoids patient 
acceptance of the treatment under the misguided impression that ongoing 
care will be provided in the specialist facility, and thirdly it requires 
professionals to face the stark realities regarding the true 'costs' of some of 
these apparently simple life-prolonging technologies. 
Sometimes the provision of a life-prolonging treatment medically 
requires ongoing care in the specialist unit, which itself is a scarce resource. 
This situation occurs when ventilation (via a tracheostomy) of a patient with 
motor neurone disease is considered. Such patients would require 
moderately long periods of care in the intensive care unit, where pressure on 
beds is often acute. Once ventilation has been commenced, anaesthetists 
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when a patient who could derive more benefit from ICU care is awaiting a 
bed.  Having commenced the treatment, they feel they have made a 
commitment to the patient to provide the necessary ongoing care. They also 
consider that if they withdraw ventilation, then the act of switching off the 
machine and giving sedation to alleviate distress appears to them to be an act 
which (intentionally) causes the death of the patient. They would not consider 
that the act was more accurately described as withdrawal oftreatment with 
foreseen death of the patient due to the underlying illness, although this 
description is more rational (see chapter 1 for discussion). 
Where the provision of a life-prolonging treatment entails an 
inequitable and inefficient use of a scarce specialist resource, whether it be 
specialist palliative care or the intensive care unit, then it would appear 
preferable not to commence the life-prolonging treatment and instead allow 
the patient to die of the underlying disease. It should then be considered that 
the immediate cause of the patient's death is the underlying disease, and that 
the scarcity of resources has meant that it has not been possible to prolong 
this patient's life. 
Specialist palliative care services provide treatment to alleviate 
symptoms and give essential care far more often than they provide life-
prolonging treatments. When hospices first began to accept patients, the 
general policy was for the patient to remain until death, or until the patient 
improved and wanted to go home. A commitment was made to care for the 
patients until death. As demand for these specialist beds increased, it 
became apparent that looking after a small number of patients for many 
weeks until their death, whilst denying care to others who would benefit to a 
similar or greater degree, was unjust. Most specialist palliative care units now 
operate a policy whereby they offer short-term care but not long-term care, 
thus giving many more patients the opportunity to benefit from the service. In 
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commitment, undertaken when the patient entered the hospice, to a policy of 
providing care to those patients most likely to benefit and asking those whose 
needs can be met elsewhere to move, either back home or into residential 
care. This change in policy was clearly morally necessary as the legitimate 
demand for specialist palliative care beds increased. 
Similar problems are now being experienced with domiciliary specialist 
palliative care services. In my own unit for the first 25 years increase in 
demand for specialist palliative care support at home was met by gradual 
increase in the number of nurses and doctors in the team. Once a patient was 
taken on for home care, then a commitment was made to remain in contact 
until the patient's death (unless the disease clearly remitted). However, by the 
end of 1999 the number of. appropriate referrals had risen to the point where 
the nurses felt they could no longer offer sufficient time to provide all the 
support they felt should be given to each patient and family. Some team 
members reacted by working longer hours (without financial recompense or 
compensatory time off) and felt stressed. Therefore it became necessary to 
limit the case load of each nurse numerically, in the same way as the number 
of beds is limited on an in-patient unit. 
Micro-allocation then became necessary. There was a choice between 
caring for a fixed number of patients from referral to death continuously, or 
caring for a larger number of patients (those judged to be able to derive most 
benefit from the service) but not necessarily continuously from referral to 
death. Patients who were stable or with few symptoms could be discharged 
from contact for a period, liberating nurse time to care for those with more 
difficult problems. Ability to benefit from the service, plus harm sustained 
without the service, seems a more justifiable criterion to use in this case than 
prior commitment. It seems an inequitable and wasteful use of resources to 
maintain contact continuously with patients who are stable and whose 
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distressed or imminently dying. Clearly, patients and the primary care team 
had to be informed that continuous contact from referral to death could not be 
guaranteed because of the requirement to make the best use of the specialist 
resource and to distribute that benefit justly. 
From a purely logical standpoint, and bearing in mind the requirements 
of equity and efficiency, prior commitment should not be used as a criterion 
for micro-allocation. Instead, continuous reselection of patients is morally 
required so that those who stand to benefit the most receive the treatment or 
care. This policy does require health care professionals frequently to 
discharge patients from specialist care, even when they are deriving some 
benefit from it and would prefer to remain in specialist care. Although morally 
the most just policy, it is  difficult to implement because it entails withdrawing 
a beneficial service from terminally ill patients who have grown to feel secure, 
and who know that the alternative care packages, whilst adequate, are 
unlikely to be as good. 
It is sometimes suggested that the degree to which the patient's 
conduct has caused the condition might be used as a criterion for 
discrimination in micro-allocation. For example, one might refuse liver 
transplants to alcoholic patients who have previously been warned that their 
alcohol abuse will irrevocably damage their liver, or one might refuse 
expensive palliative chemotherapy for lung cancer to smokers. It is important 
not to confuse such decisions with those based on medical utility. For 
example, if an alcoholic continues to abuse alcohol after a transplant the new 
liver will also be destroyed. 
At first consideration it does seem reasonable to discriminate between 
those who have brought the illness on themselves and those who have not. 
But it is difficult to prove that the patient really understood that the damaging 
235 life-style would result in organ failure. Moreover, there will inevitably be 
prolonged and probably unresolvable arguments about the patient's 
responsibility for the conduct. 
Finally, chance can be used as a way of 'discriminating' between 
patients. When chance is used in micro-allocation the patient who is most 
lucky receives the treatment, which is allocated by a lottery system. This is 
seen by many people as being a fair method of allocation when it is used to 
choose amongst a group of people between whom there are no other relevant 
differences. This latter qualification is essential. It should be argued that as 
the stakes regarding health care are so high, micro-allocation by lottery is 
justifiable only when there is no morally preferable criterion. The arguments 
above support medical utility as the only criterion which is clearly a relevant 
difference between patients, although age might be, (according to the fair 
innings argument), if the age difference between potential candidates is 
sufficiently great. 
Unfortunately there are practical problems with allocation by lottery. 
Firstly, if a lottery is to be held, then it should be held only between patients in 
the same age range and for whom the treatment holds the same medical 
utility. But patients appear serially for treatment, and it is very unlikely that a 
group of patients (or even two patients) who are equal in terms of medical 
utility will ever come forward at the same time. Secondly, since the stakes are 
so high attempts to rig such lotteries are very likely. Thirdly, a lottery system 
is associated with these very significant practical problems. Lastly, some 
people may consider that such important decisions should not be made by 
'mere chance', and so a lottery should avoided. However, on those rare 
occasions where two patients in the same age range come forward and the 
treatment has the same medical benefit for both, then drawing lots would be 
the fairest solution. 
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morally appropriate and practically applicable criteria for treatment, but 
preceding discussions (section S.1.vi and chapter 3, section 3.1.v) have 
shown that  the confusion surrounding such terms causes these concepts to 
be useless in the process of micro-allocation. 
The conclusion of this discussion of micro-allocation is that the criterion 
of medical utility, although frequently difficult to apply, is the only clearly 
justifiable criterion for use in micro-allocation of scarce specialist palliative 
care resources. Since those resources will always be limited, this criterion will 
remain essential to discriminate between terminally ill patients (whatever their 
diagnosis) in order to determine who should receive the specialist resource. 
5.3  Conclusions. 
1.  There is overwhelming evidence, deriving from considerations of finance 
and equity, that health care rationing, and rationing of specialist palliative care 
services is necessary. 
2.  Members of specialist palliative care teams are trustees of resources; 
objections that they may raise to rationing are based on misunderstandings. 
3.  Macro-allocation cannot be based on the QAL  Y,  but requires judgement 
about the relative benefits of treatment and care packages, about the 
characteristics of the population, and the use of relevant moral principles. 
4.  Resources should not be committed for specialist palliative care for 
everyone until and unless there is clear evidence of benefit over and above 
conventional care. Qualitative evidence may suffice. 
237 5.  Micro-allocation is unavoidable; judgement has to be made regarding 
patients' ability to benefit from specialist care. Other criteria are difficult to 
justify morally. 
6. A decent minimum of palliative care ought to be provided, and entails 
education and telephone advice available to all health care professionals, and 
care by a specialist team only for patients whose symptoms are difficult to 
control or whose care requirements can be met only by a specialist team. 
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242 Chapter 6 
Conclusions:  The  way  forward 
The discussion in the preceding five chapters was intended to bring out 
the main weaknesses of the philosophy of palliative care as it is summarised in 
the 
WHO definition.  At the same time the immense strength of the palliative care 
movement and its benefits for patients have not been minimised.  In this way I 
hope to have carried out the main aim of the thesis - to offer a critique of 
palliative care in Kant's sense of establishing the strengths and weaknesses of 
palliative care.  But if we grant the force of this critique there remains an 
important question: are we to end negatively with the conclusion that a 
philosophy of palliative care is not possible, or is it possible to end on a more 
positive note, with a very  brief outline of a possible philosophy of palliative 
care? 
I believe that it is both possible and desirable to indicate, at least briefly, 
a possible direction for palliative care to take. Whether we dignify this with the 
title of 'philosophy' is not a matter which need detain us.  Let us begin with the 
question of the desirability of having such a philosophy. 
Is it desirable to describe and use a philosophy of palliative care? Yes, 
for several reasons: 
1) There is a current fashion for mission statements, philosophy statements 
etc., and so if a single officially recognised statement is not formulated each 
specialist palliative care team will draw up, display and attempt to live by its 
own individual philosophy or mission statement. 
243 2) The word 'palliative' is not universally understood, and patients and the 
public do not know what palliative care is, so a philosophy statement is 
necessary in order to inform them of the aims and nature of such care. 
3) It is important to produce a new philosophy statement which will influence 
the care and treatment of terminally ill patients for the better, and which avoids, 
as far as possible, the problems and adverse consequences inherent in the 
present statement. 
If we assume that these reasons point to the desirability of attempting to 
formulate a philosophy we can move on to consider the question of the 
possibility of such a philosophy. In brief and general terms, what should the 
new philosophy statement  say? It would need to satisfy certain criteria. 
Firstly, the aims, values and assumptions described in the statement 
should be consistent with the aims, values and assumptions of health care in 
general. Secondly, these aims should be consistent with professional codes 
and the law. It is essential that a new philosophy should not influence health 
care practitioners to act contrary to their professional codes or the law. Thirdly, 
the aims and values of palliative care should not cause its practitioners to 
pursue goals which are unattainable within the current national health service. 
Granted the acceptability of these criteria, I propose the following brief 
account of a philosophy of palliative care. It is intended to avoid the pitfalls I 
have identified in the existing philosophy, but to preserve the essence of 
palliative care as it is currently practised. 
'Palliative care is the care of patients whose disease is incurable and is 
expected to cause death. The aims of treatment are to minimise pain and other 
symptoms and to prolong life, but with a minimum of  burdens and risks as 
244 assessed by individual patients and professionals working together. The 
informed consent of competent patients regarding treatment is sought by 
presenting information honestly but sensitively. Refusal of treatment by patients 
is respected. 
Incompetent patients are treated in accordance with their best interests 
as judged by the health care team following examination of the medical 
circumstances and exploration with the family of what can be known of the 
patient's wishes. 
Professionals provide support to patients: 
by ascertaining how much information patients seek and providing it sensitively; 
by listening to patients' views about their own goals and values; 
by discussing the possible impact of various treatments on their lives so as to 
work out which treatment will most benefit the particular patient; 
by providing advice based on experience. 
Explanation, professional advice and encouragement are given to caring 
relatives within the limits necessitated by the rules of confidentiality towards 
patients.' 
245 Appendix: Casuistry 
Casuistry has had a bad name for several centuries, and has become 
synonymous with the drawing of fine distinctions or with quibbling and special 
pleading. Historically this came about because of the abuse of the method in 
order to salve the consciences of noblemen in the 16th and 17th centuries. As 
such it was effectively satirised by Pascal in his 'Provincial Letters'1 and 
criticised philosophically by Adam Smith and others.2 Oddly enough, Adam 
Smith is perfectly happy with reasoning about particular cases, but he calls it 
'natural jurisprudence'. Whatever it is called I believe that it offers a way of 
reasoning in health care ethics which is widely practised by doctors, and has 
been used in this thesis. The method has recently been defended and 
extended in an influential book by Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin called 
'The Abuse of Casuistry', published in 1988, and in a paper entitled 'Casuistry 
as Methodology in Clinical Ethics,.3 
In the latter paper Jonsen describes casuistry as 'the interpretation of 
moral issues, using procedures of reasoning based on paradigms and 
analogies, leading to the formulation of expert opinion about the existence and 
stringency of particular moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims 
that are general but not universal or invariable, since they hold good with 
certainty only in the typical conditions of the agent and circumstances of 
action'.4 
Jonsen and Toulmin also describe casuistry more simply as 'the art of 
analysing moral issues in terms of cases and circumstances'.5 They stress that 
moral choices in life are essentially practical in nature, in that we make those 
choices in the context of a particular set of circumstances at a particular time 
and a choice must be made as to what to do. Thus moral issues should be 
regarded as requiring practical reasoning. 
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temporal in that they may not apply at a future time where circumstances may 
have changed subtly, and they are presumptive in that future events or 
consequences may prove those choices to be less than the best. 
Practical reasoning is contrasted with theoretical or scientific reasoning 
which they describe as being to do with the understanding or discovery of 
universal principles or laws such as those of physics or geometry, and the 
subsequent application of such principles or laws. 
Neil Pickering, in company with Childress and Beauchamp,6 Raanan 
Gillon?, and many others writing on bioethics, presents an alternative view. In 
'General Principles and Particular Cases',8 he argues that the way one 
describes a case in terms of the principles considered most relevant 
determines which principle is used to guide and justify one's action. The chosen 
principle guides and justifies one's action via a logical syllogism. For example, 
where a technically feasible treatment would probably result in overall harm to a 
patient, the principle of non-maleficence would justify not providing that 
treatment according to the conclusion of the logical syllogism which would be 
as follows: 
Major premise: doctors ought not to harm their patients. 
Minor premise: the treatment in this particular case would harm this 
patient. 
Conclusion: I ought not to give this treatment to this particular patient. 
On the other hand Jonsen and Toulmin state that faced with a particular 
case one must decide which paradigm case from a taxonomy of cases our 
problem case most resembles. This suggestion pre-supposes a taxonomy of 
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care, but for the purposes of the present discussion I shall assume it could be 
drawn up. The choice of which paradigm case to use for comparison is not only 
difficult but will also be highly influential in our decision. Examples help to 
illustrate this point. 
If we take the example of a case of assisted suicide one would choose 
from a number of quite different paradigm cases for comparison with the 
particular assisted suicide case. One paradigm might be the rightness of 
preventing a young girl depressed by disappointment in a love affair from 
committing suicide - the maxim here would be a duty to prevent suicide when 
its causes are temporary. Another paradigm might be that of allowing a 
terminally ill patient to have a supply of drugs adequate to ensure pain control 
knowing that the patient might choose to take the medication with suicidal intent 
- the maxim here would be that of giving patients responsibility for managing 
their own lives. Alternatively one might consider a paradigm of 'medicalizing' 
aspects of ordinary human life, as suggested by Tania Salem in a paper 
entitled 'Physician-Assisted Suicide, Promoting Autonomy - Or Medicalizing 
Suicide?,.9 
A second example concerns issues of confidentiality. Quite often in 
palliative care a relative caring for a patient seeks information regarding the 
patient's illness. Following the pathway of casuistry one would have to decide 
whether this case most resembles a paradigm where the patient's right to 
confidentiality clearly should not be breached, or whether it most resembles a 
paradigm where the carer has a clear 'need to know' in order to minister to the 
patient. The choice of paradigm case for comparison with the problem case is 
crucial, since not only will it determine our choice of maxim as a warrant for a 
claim that a certain course of action is right, but it will also clearly colour our 
attitude to the problem case. 
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process of choosing our paradigm case and its associated maxim in more 
detail. He states that each case has a structure or morphology. This structure is 
composed of 
the circumstances of the case, 
special topics which are always relevant in the field of clinical ethics, 
the maxims which might be considered relevant, 
the form of argument one uses in applying the maxims. 
The circumstances can be summarised as 'who, what, when, why how 
and by what means'. They are the features of this particular clinical case at this 
particular instant. I have already noted that how one describes a case, which 
includes the circumstances, has a major influence on the factors one considers 
in reaching a judgement and on one's moral perceptions of the case. Only 
those factors which one includes in the description of the case will be included 
in the ensuing deliberations - if a factor, such as the patient's stated reason for 
making a choice, is omitted from the description it will not feature at all in the 
process of making a decision. In order to ensure that all relevant factors are 
considered it seems best to include many details about the particular case. 
Unfortunately, rehearsing a very detailed account can be like searching through 
a garrulous patient's history for the relevant information, a process with which 
all clinicians are familiar and which is remarkably similar to describing a case 
for the purposes of casuistry. The important analogy to remember is that where 
a diagnosis has not yet been reached, features of the history which at first 
seem of no relevance may turn out to be important as alternative diagnoses are 
considered. So it is important not to omit features of the case which may be 
relevant. 
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are always relevant to the clinical decision. He calls these special topics. Thus 
statements about these special topics should always be included in the 
description of the circumstances. He does not give a list of these topics, but 
suggests that the medical indications of the case, the preferences of the 
patient, the quality of the patient's life and social and economic factors external 
to the patient are examples of these special topics. He considers that these 
factors will virtually always be relevant to a decision in clinical medicine, and as 
such they are 'invariant', although of course their actual content will vary greatly 
as cases are necessarily individual. 
Once the circumstances of the case have been described, including the 
special topics, certain maxims which he defines as 'brief rule-like sayings' will 
appear to have a bearing on the case. Jonsen states that 'These maxims 
provide the 'morals' of the story. For most cases of interest, there are several 
morals, because several maxims seem to conflict. The work of casuistry is to 
determine which maxim should rule the case and to what extent. To what 
extent means under what constellation of circumstances, for certain changes o"f 
circumstances will lead to another maxim emerging as more significant. 
'Circumstances', say the casuists, 'make the case'. This appears to mean that 
the selection of the appropriate maxim to rule the case is profoundly dependant 
upon the circumstances  .... For the classical casuist, a maxim would accumulate 
weight from the circumstances that hung from it in a particular case.' 
It is important to remember that the maxims themselves have been 
derived from paradigm cases - those in which the right (or wrong) course of 
action is apparent to virtually all people and about which there is no significant 
difference of opinion. So having described the particular case, one chooses a 
paradigm case and considers how the maxim derived from that case might be 
applicable to the particular case. Thus a correct description of the morphology 
of the case, including a comprehensive description of the circumstances and 
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associated maxims. 
Although Jonsen and Toulmin do not state that one should choose a 
paradigm cases (or cases) which are as similar as possible to one's own case 
in terms of the crucial moral problem(s), yet it seems that common sense would 
dictate that this must be so. For there seems little point in ignoring a relevant 
paradigm case, or in using one which has few features in common with the 
particular case. Of course, if one did ignore relevant paradigms, or used 
significantly dissimilar paradigms, one could be accused of 'bad casuistry'. 
Jonsen suggests that cases fall into certain types, and gives the example 
of cases where the underlying issue is 'euthanasia'.12 He proposes that cases 
of a certain type should be 'lined up' so as to form what he calls a taxonomy or 
classification of cases. He then suggests that 'the casuist seeks out those 
cases, within the type, that demonstrate the most obviously, unarguably wrong 
(or right) instance. This would be a case in which the circumstances were clear, 
the relevant maxim unambiguous and the rebuttals weak, in the minds of 
almost any observer  .... Such cases can be paradigms'. Thus Jonsen is 
advocating that in order to choose paradigm cases one must first identify what 
type of case one is dealing with, and then place it in the 'line-up' of similar 
cases, where cases are progressively further and further away in terms of 
circumstances from the paradigm case. 
In 'The Abuse of Casuistry' Jonsen and Toulmin liken the process of 
identifying what type of case the instant case is to the process of making a 
diagnosis in clinical medicine. They assert that diseases are recognised 
collections of symptoms and signs, and that there is a 'taxonomy' of diseases. 
Diagnosis is about deciding what collection of symptoms and signs recognised 
as a certain 'disease' our patient's symptoms and signs most resemble. They 
state that 'Given this taxonomy of known conditions and the paradigmatic cases 
that exemplify the various types, diagnosis then becomes a kind of perception, 
251 and the reasons justifying a diagnosis rest on appeals to analogy'.13 Since 
diagnosis depends on perception and analogy, two physicians may reach 
different diagnoses for the same patient. Jonsen and Toulmin suggest that just 
as clinicians diagnose a disease, in the same way they should decide what type 
of case the clinical moral problem most resembles, and should use the 
appropriate paradigms. 
Evidence that casuistry is actually practised in the sphere of health care 
provides strong support for the conclusion that it is possible as a method of 
moral reasoning. Health care practitioners faced with a clinical moral problem 
do classify it as one of a type, in the same way that they make a diagnosis, and 
they do compare it with cases in which the right (or wrong) solution is more 
obvious to them. They do not instinctively think of a principle and deduce the 
answer to their problem from it,  nor do they attempt to reach a solution by 
considering what a 'virtuous' practitioner might do. Instead they think of the 
'accepted' or consensus decision as to what is right in this type of case. In other 
words, they compare their case with a professional paradigm. Thus casuistry is 
a theoretical description of the thought processes of doctors faced with moral 
problems arising in particular cases. Moreover it is the most accurate 
description of the way health care practitioners resolve moral problems in 
clinical practice. 
Since the moral problems of health care, and palliative care, are 
resolved by professionals using an embryonic form of casuistry one must 
conclude that it would be possible to use this method in a more developed form 
to resolve the moral problems of palliative care. 
It should also be noted that the legal problems of health care, including 
those arising in the context of incurable illnesses, are resolved by the 
establishment of case law. Judges compare the particular case with paradigm 
cases and with the cases and associated legal judgements which have gone 
before and established precedence. They reach resolutions by this process of 
252 practical reasoning which might also be described as jurisprudence. The 
process of establishment of case law and thus accepted practice in a legal 
sense is closely analogous to casuistry. 
Moreover, doctors must always have regard to the law in relation to 
health care and they understand how case law, via legal judgements, 
influences moral judgement in health care. The existence of case law as an 
example of reasoning closely allied to casuistry, together with its influence on 
medical practice, support the argument that casuistry is possible as a method 
of resolution of the moral problems of health care. 
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